Office of the Historian

88. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence Dulles to All Chiefs of Station1

Washington, August 10, 1961.

DIR 05454. Rybat.

1.
President Kennedy’s letter to Ambassadors of 29 May 1961,2 affirms their responsibility “to oversee and coordinate” all programs or activities of the United States in their particular areas, whether of the diplomatic mission or of other US agencies. Further, he made clear he expects Ambassadors to be fully informed of these programs or activities.
2.
As you are aware you have always carried the responsibility for reviewing with the Ambassador covert action matters growing out of our responsibilities under the 5412 directive of the National Security Council. Furthermore, most of you have arrived at relationships with Ambassadors in the past which have made you conscious of the need to keep the Ambassador informed so that he may judge the political risks inherent in any activity, whether deriving from “5412” or developed in pursuit of our statutory responsibility in the field of espionage and clandestine counterintelligence. However, the feeling had developed over the past few years within diplomatic missions around the world that Ambassadors are not sufficiently well informed properly to protect them in their responsibility as the principal United States officers in their respective areas who bear the brunt of any covert or clandestine activity that inadvertently becomes known to and represents a serious affront to the local government.
3.
Where espionage and clandestine counterintelligence are concerned we have always been aware of the possible political risks inherent in our activities. This is the reason for the language of NSCID 5, paragraph 6, which states Ambassadors will be kept “appropriately informed.”3 However, it is clear today that many Chiefs of Mission feel that our officers’ interpretation of this phrase has not produced sufficient information.
4.
Therefore, you will take steps to insure that the Ambassador is informed of your espionage and clandestine counterintelligence programs in addition to your covert action projects. With relation to these operations, he should be made sufficiently aware of them so that, in his [Page 182] capacity as principal officer responsible for the United States position in the country to which he is accredited, he is enabled to make an informed judgment as to the political risks involved.
5.
In advising him of your various programs, you should pay particular attention to clarifying in his mind their general nature, scope, and purpose. Review with him, for example, the categories of covert action such as psychological warfare, black and gray propaganda, political action and economic action in pursuit of approved 5412 programs. Present your clandestine intelligence activities in categories such as scientific, political, technical, economic and military information objectives carried on against approved requirements, through working relationships with local intelligence and security services and through independent activities. Review your clandestine counterintelligence objectives to acquire knowledge of all other intelligence organizations and membership, to manipulate some members of these to a U.S. advantage, to obtain information by counterintelligence activities, as well as espionage, about all Communist Parties and to counter their objectives through local services and independent activities, and to develop higher capability through training the so-called friendly services.
6.
In many of your activities there are involved sensitive source identities and sensitive techniques, which it is desired that you safeguard. The Ambassador at times will feel he needs to know these and, in some instances, has a right to know. Judgment with respect to these, however, may have to be made ultimately in Washington. If you are in doubt about passing these ultimate details, the matter should be referred to Washington where decision will be made after consultation between the Director of Central Intelligence and Chief ODACID as to whether you should give the Ambassador these details.
7.
There will be occasions when an objectively discussed problem will result in an honest difference of opinion between you and your Ambassador regarding whether an operation should be carried on. President Kennedy’s letter makes clear that you have your own channels of communication and may use them to refer your problem to higher levels here. While the Ambassador also has his own channels to Washington, he will normally expect you to convey his views on such matters via your channels.
8.
You should consider this instruction to be of interim nature, pending review of the 1957 agreement between this Headquarters and ODACID (STACIA).4
9.
ODACID has seen and concurs with this message and is requesting all its chiefs of missions and certain principal officers to confer with you regarding it. They may, of course, see it.
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Dulles) Files, Dispatch and Book Dispatch, 1963, Box 6, Folder 11. Top Secret. Drafted by W. Lloyd George of the Deputy Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency.↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 30.↩
  3. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5/2, September 15, 1958. See footnote 5, Document 84.↩
  4. Not found.↩