Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

503. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Hyannis Port, May 11, 1963, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Territorial Sea and Fisheries Zone

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • Ambassador Butterworth
  • Mr. William Tyler
  • Mr. Pierre Salinger
• Canada
  • The Prime Minister
  • Ambassador Ritchie
  • Mr. Edward Ritchie
  • Mr. Basil Robinson
  • Mr. Orme Dier

The Prime Minister presented the Canadian case on the above. He felt there was no possibility of the matter being settled by international agreement. Forty countries had increased their territorial waters beyond the 3-mile limit. Canada had favored a 6-mile fishery zone in addition to a 6-mile limit but now was prepared to leave the 3-mile limit untouched but would declare an additional 9-mile Fishery Zone. The Prime Minister recognized that Canada must take into account the historic and treaty rights of the United States and that there must be consultations with the United States Government. He felt that the Canadian position was consistent with the Geneva negotiations. He pointed out that a 12-mile zone would affect less than one per cent of US fishing interests. The President then presented the US position, emphasizing not only the protection of US rights but the possible adverse implications of the base line principle, in so far as it might result in the closing of bays and of stretches of water of importance to US interests. The Prime Minister agreed that the application of the Canadian decision must be discussed. Canada did not want to have a row with the United States about this. He hoped that the United States would not overlook the advantage, from the security standpoint, of, for example, Canadian control of Hudson Bay. The President mentioned our difficulties with regard to US interests in the Gulf of Mexico. He said we would like to discuss further the Canadian proposal re the base line, and what this means in reality; also the security implications of the proposed step, for the U.S.A. The President asked the Prime Minister, in view of the latter’s statement that US fishing interests would be so little affected, what great advantage there would be to Canadian fishermen. The Prime Minister was not able to answer this very convincingly. The President repeated that we would like to have talks about all these matters with the Canadian Government and see what the application of the Canadian position would mean in practice. Ambassador Butterworth pointed out that taking account of US treaty and historic rights should not mean that they were to be subject to diminution and erosion by the Canadian action. The Prime Minister said the Canadian Government could only modify these US rights in agreement with the United States. The President suggested that Canadian experts on this subject go to Washington soon, perhaps as early as next week, and the Prime Minister agreed that talks should be held very soon. He emphasized that no Canadian action would be taken without prior consultation. The President said that this was likely to be a matter on which the United States and Canada would disagree, and he then dictated some language for the communique on this point, which the Prime Minister accepted. The Prime Minister drew the President’s attention to the security aspects of the problem which might alleviate and compensate for any disadvantages for the United States. The President told Mr. Tyler that he would like Mr. Feldman of the White House to sit in on the talks as an observer.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 110, Memorandums of Conversation, Pearson Visit, May 10–11, 1963. Secret. Drafted by William R. Tyler (EUR) and approved by the White House on May 16. The memorandum is marked No. 3 of 8.