490. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)1
Dear Chet:
I am informed that Canada and the United Kingdom have recently completed a joint assessment of the prospects of a multilateral convention based on the “six plus six” Geneva (1960) formula. I am informed further that it is the joint conclusion and recommendation of Canada and the United Kingdom that the United States should join them in further efforts to explore the prospects for the type of convention in question.
I consider that it would be definitely against the best interests of the United States, particularly its security interests, to follow the conclusion [Page 1105] and recommendation of the friends mentioned. The reasons for my conclusion are as follows:
If the issue for decision were regarded solely as a question of whether we should join in an effort to learn more about the prospects of such a convention, obligations of courtesy might alone dictate an affirmative answer. I do not so regard the issue. Once the United States joins such an exploratory effort, indicating thereby an active interest in promoting a multilateral on the basis indicated, the states opposed to the United States position on the territorial sea question are expected to learn of such activity and to initiate the highly detrimental countermeasures discussed hereafter. No one has suggested that the opponents of our position could be kept unaware of our activity. In other words, great potential detriment is deemed to exist in the mere act of joining “explorations” for information, wholly apart from any ultimate decision as to whether such a multilateral is to be actually opened for signature.
The real issues for decision I therefore regard as the following. Is the current state of our information on the prospects of such a multilateral adequate for decision on the ultimate question? Are the prospective benefits of promoting this multilateral substantial? Are there detriments involved in promoting this multilateral and if so, how do they compare relative to any expected benefits?
The current state of United States information on this issue is regarded as completely and uniquely adequate for a final decision on the advisability of seeking to promote the multilateral in question. This conclusion is understood to be shared by three of the four remaining sections of the interdepartmental committee which has closely studied this issue for over four years and was shared by the other section before its dissolution.
As to the question of prospective benefits to be derived from promoting the proposed multilateral, it is the considered opinion here that it would be useless from a security viewpoint, even assuming forty-five states became parties to the agreement. (This is the largest number hypothesized by anyone conversant with this subject and it is regarded here as unrealistic.) This conclusion follows from the fact that no one has suggested or would suggest that any (except Iceland) of the twenty-eight states which opposed the 1960 “six plus six” proposal would become parties to such a convention now, [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. As to the remaining states, who voted for the “six plus six” proposal in 1960, the territorial sea breadth presents no substantial security problem and effectuation of the proposed multilateral would therefore afford United States security interests no substantial benefit.
The proposed multilateral could be, and it is judged that it would be, highly detrimental to United States security interests. At present we [Page 1106] stand at a position where, at the last vote, the 1960 “six plus six” proposal failed of United Nations Conference adoption by only one negative vote to achieve the required two-thirds majority. No other proposal achieved even a simple majority. Thus, the “six plus six” position must be taken as the decisively marked point of prospective international compromise as matters now stand. If, however, the twenty-seven (leaving out Iceland) opponents of the “six plus six” formula, plus Cuba which now must be added, are galvanized into offensive action by our espousal of the Canada-United Kingdom multilateral, we anticipate a decisively unfavorable modification of the 1960 Geneva vote.
We anticipate, for instance, that action by the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, proposing a solution to the territorial sea question by independent (of the United Nations) multilateral convention would force the opposition to take cohesive and all-out action to protect their position by means of an opposed multilateral offering twelve mile territorial seas. Though the 1960 opposition was heterogeneous in marked degree (Soviet bloc, Arab bloc, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Indonesia, India, Guinea), it operated with remarkable cohesion and cooperation. As unlikely as such an alliance might otherwise be, it is regarded as almost a certainty that on this particular question, the action recommended by Canada and the United Kingdom would cause the opposition to unite in an opposed multilateral.
By itself this action would greatly disadvantage United States security interests.
Instead of confronting individual states unilaterally claiming territorial seas beyond the limit we acknowledge as legitimate, we would be confronting and challenging the validity of a multilateral treaty of approximately thirty sovereign states. Furthermore, our experience indicates that this opposition would attract more supporters from among the newly emerging states than we could, thus increasing their number to approximately forty. Finally, our ground for challenging the validity of the opposed multilateral would be decimated, once we had abandoned our present position that the territorial sea issue can only be settled by a universal rule and adopted the position that it could be validly settled by a group multilateral. (The grounds for the validity of ours could not then be distinguished from the grounds for theirs.)
On the other hand, we anticipate that our support would diminish as and because the opposition became stronger or more vociferous. Much of the support for our 1960 “six plus six” proposal was not given from any preference for that proposal. In fact no state is known to prefer it. It was supported extensively as the only possible compromise exit from a bitter conflict. When it appears, as we anticipate, that the opposing multilaterals are only going to heighten the conflict, we anticipate a [Page 1107] substantial loss of support. In all, we anticipate that our support would be reduced to about thirty-one states. This would be a drastic reduction from the fifty-four supporters in Geneva 1960 and if, as expected, the opposition easily exceeded that figure the ultimate capitulation of our multilateral would be foreordained.
I have dwelt at length on this matter because of its grave importance for the United States, I assure you that we regret advising against this affirmative proposal while being able to offer no alternative course of action at this time. We have had this specific problem under constant review for one year, however, and have consistently concluded that the independent multilateral is a course holding no substantial promise while at the same time it does hold grave potential detriment for the United States.
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 399.731/5–2561. Confidential. The typed salutation “Dear Chester” was changed by hand to “Dear Chet”.↩