465. Letter From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland)1
Dear Harlan:
Your letter of January 25, 1963,2 recommends immediate implementation of the inspection provisions of the Antarctica Treaty and transmits a draft memorandum concerning a method for carrying out an inspection during the 1963–1964 austral summer season. In considering this matter, I believe that we should differentiate between two questions: first, whether it would be desirable to prepare an inspection plan; and second, when such a plan might best be implemented.
[Page 1056]Insofar as preparation of a plan is concerned, I believe that it is important to proceed with the necessary planning effort. In this regard, the draft memorandum prepared by your staff outlines some of the elements involved in one possible approach. However, it will be necessary, in our view, to consider some aspects of the matter in greater depth on an interagency basis in order to identify more specifically the objectives of an inspection (that is, what we are looking for), to determine the feasibility of various techniques (including, in particular, the extent to which aircraft can be used), to evaluate the effectiveness of a multilateral inspection team in contrast with a unilateral inspection team, and to develop additional information concerning skills required, method of financing, and related aspects. Although the informal staff-level consultations that have taken place have been useful in focusing attention on some of these problems, we think that additional effort is required to be certain that the most satisfactory approach has been selected.
The timing of an inspection presents problems of a different character. As you know, we have had some difficulty in convincing others that the United States does not desire inspection for inspection’s sake. Particularly at a time when we may be able to make some progress toward an agreement on nuclear inspection, I am inclined to think that it might be counter-productive for us to commit ourselves to an early Antarctica inspection. At the same time, if an agreement on nuclear testing is reached and presented to the Senate for ratification, I would not wish us to be vulnerable to possible charges arising from the fact that we had not implemented inspection provisions of the Antarctica Treaty. In the event of such charges, it would be helpful to have prepared a contingency plan and possibly set a schedule for its implementation. We might possibly mention it in our annual submission of the U.S. Antarctica plan to the other signatories due by the end of November 1963.
With more specific references to the Antarctica situation, I am concerned to learn that the scientific community has not been taking full advantage of Soviet invitations to visit their activities. Such visits could be an important source of continuing reassurance in the absence of formal inspections. Moreover, they could assist in defining inspection objectives and limiting inspections to areas of greatest potential concern, thereby minimizing possible disruptive effects. I understand that we hope to take fuller advantage of such opportunities in the future, and I would like to stress the value of doing so.
In view of the foregoing considerations, I would like to reserve for the time being judgment on the scheduling of an inspection. However, as previously indicated, I favor proceeding with development of an inspection plan without prejudice to the question of timing. With this [Page 1057] in view, I am requesting the ACDA staff to complete study of various aspects of an Antarctica inspection as rapidly as possible in consultation with your staff as well as staff of other interested agencies. In view of the progress that has already been made, we should be in a position to resolve any outstanding differences in the near future.
Sincerely yours,