Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

461. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Antarctica, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Owen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland)¹

Washington, June 13, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Antarctica: Questions related to Internationalization as Long-term Objective

Supplemental to the tactical problems attendant upon U.S. advocacy of a secretariat for Antarctica (my memorandum of June 7, 1962),² following are some more fundamental considerations on the merits of internationalization as an objective and the usefulness of a secretariat as a means to that, or some other desirable, end, assuming that somehow a secretariat would be agreed to by all.

Our present position is based on the consensus of opinion among U.S. agencies concerned, as developed in our running interagency coordination. It is therefore the position of the Department making judgments on the basis of consultation principally with NSF, DOD, and CIA. A reassessment of this position would require careful consideration of the following:

1. Would a secretariat lead to greater internationalization with eventual surrender of claims? Actually, there is reason to expect that, even if the Latins, by inadvertence or under pressure, accepted a secretariat, the result might well be to aggravate their attitude on the claims issue.

2. More fundamentally, although we do not recognize any of these claims and have made none of our own, does it necessarily follow that renunciation by all claimants is a good thing for us? We did consider various formulas of “pooling claims” in the past. But this was before it became necessary to make the Soviets full partners in a treaty on Antarctica. There is much crystal gazing involved here, but are we certain that it is in our interest to persuade countries like Australia or Argentina to surrender their claims (albeit unrecognized by us) in exchange for a joint tenancy which includes the Soviets?

3. Aside from eventual surrender of claims, are there other advantages for the United States in a secretariat? There is practically no function which requires a secretariat. A real international secretariat would cost money, involve problems of getting the right officials selected, and, since the proponents apparently refuse to consider Washington as the situs, would probably close the door to our objective of retaining Washington as the center of consultations.

4. We might successfully strive either to (1) control such a secretariat or (2) keep it innocuous and useless. Otherwise, a secretariat as well as any attendant expansion of international administrative measures is likely to restrict our freedom of action beyond what is now in the Treaty. It would tend to create pressures for such things as coordination of our science programs with those of others, and U.S. logistic support to others. In the present state of knowledge about Antarctica, the possible future uses of the area that we may have to engage in or prevent, will become identifiable only with scientific and technological progress. For instance, we may find it necessary to set up a system of tracking stations there, or engage in some other activity which, while within the terms of the Treaty, is nevertheless one in which interference or the restrictions resulting from a secretariat may be undesirable.

5. It is true that retaining our freedom means leaving others with theirs. But we already have a Treaty prohibiting nonpeaceful use and nuclear explosions, with rights of inspection. We believe it is too early to state with confidence that, on balance, we would gain with further restrictions on the freedom of action that remains. While we would, as usual, abide by new restrictions, there is doubt whether a secretariat would effectively limit, any more than does the present provision for inspection, that kind of action by those others which we, precisely, would have reason to be concerned about. The only countries whose freedom of action we may have to worry about are (1) the U.S.S.R. and (2) the Latin Americans in the event of political changes unfriendly to us in their governments.

6. Would the halfway step suggested by the British for a secretariat, not truly international, but provided by one of the countries (Australia), really be a step towards internationalization? As a practical matter, such a secretariat would be subservient to the government which provides it. The Australians are nice people, but would they always consult us in time in connection with eventual initiatives a secretariat would undertake?

7. On the other hand, international administration on a basis broader than the countries that have been active in Antarctica would present other factors: It is easier for us to deal on Antarctic affairs with those actually concerned than with all comers.

8. I should add that there are implications of domestic politics to be considered in adopting a pro-internationalization position. The minority in Congress that opposed the present Treaty as going too far in pooling our interests with the Soviets, would be even more adamant. In the Senate, besides the “southern bloc” led by Byrd and Russell, and Mr. Goldwater, this group included Messrs. Engle, Gruening, and Dodd.

So, the objections to a shift of position boil down to (1) tactical difficulties and (2) uncertainty as to the future significance of Antarctica. I know that having to deal with trees should not obscure one’s sight of the forest, and it would be a pity to forego a good opportunity to push for an experiment in international government when it comes along. So far, I sincerely wish I could think of good reasons why we should advocate a secretariat, or internationalization, but I cannot think of any which do not involve complications or unknowns.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 702.022/6–1362. Confidential. Drafted by Owen. A copy was sent to Wallner.
2. In this memorandum Owen reported that the British regarded “an embryonic secretariat” as a means to internationalize Antarctica and divest themselves of territorial claims. A secretariat would be strongly opposed by Argentina, Chile, and France, which were most vocal in their territorial claims. Norway, New Zealand, Japan, and South Africa would probably support a secretariat. Australia hoped to provide a headquarters for it. The Soviet Union would only support a secretariat if it contained “a built-in veto” and could be exploited. Owens recommended that the United States should support “intensifying multilateral consultations” and wider international scientific cooperation as a more feasible means to internationalize Antarctica. (Ibid., 702.022/6–762)