Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

457. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Fisher) to the Special Assistant for Antarctica, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Owen)¹

Washington, October 13, 1961.

SUBJ

• Exercise of Rights of Inspection under Antarctic Treaty

I believe there are strong arguments in favor of exercising our rights of inspection of the Antarctic Treaty regardless of any suspicion of activities contrary to the treaty. These reasons are sufficiently well adduced in your memorandum to me dated October 2, 1961² and require no further amplification by me.

I believe, however, that the timing of the exercise of these rights of inspection ought to be considered in light of other aspects of Soviet-American relations and in light of the time required to mount an inspection trip of more than a perfunctory character. I can see no immediate need to exercise our right of inspection on strictly disarmament considerations and I do not think it would be harmful if the Soviet Union were the first to ask for an inspection. Specifically, I believe that the period November 1961 to January 1962, the time mentioned in your memorandum, is too early. It is too early considering the many other difficulties we can expect to find besetting Soviet-American relations at that time and it is too early to set up an inspection trip properly manned and equipped. I would suggest, therefore, that we contemplate an inspection trip sometime in late 1962, which is presumably the next earliest feasible time.

In connection with plans for mounting the inspection, I would refer you to Section 34(c) of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This provision is as follows:

“(c) the Director is authorized (1) to formulate plans and make preparations for the establishment, operation, and funding of inspection and control systems, which may become part of the United States arms control and disarmament activities, and (2) as authorized by law, to put into effect, direct, or otherwise assume United States responsibility for such systems.”

We will be in touch with you further concerning the inspection operation. Our preliminary opinion is that we should think of the inspection operation in terms of its precedent-setting value as a model for other inspection arrangements. From this standpoint, the inspection might be more elaborate than might otherwise be required.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, IO Files: Lot 69 D 169, Antarctic Files, 1961–62, U.S. Policy Matters 1961, Department of State, August–December. Confidential. Drafted by James E. Goodby.
2. Document 456.