447. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State1

A–587

SUBJECT

  • Outer Space
1.
Jean D’Arcy, Director of Radio and Visual Services Division, of the UN Office of Public Information, and former Director of Eurovision, feels that the USSR is not alone in its apparent fear about direct broadcasting from communications satellites to the home receiver, further that the technology in this field is more advanced than commonly realized, even with regard to TV signals.
2.
D’Arcy had just returned from the ITU Conference in Geneva at which it was decided not to go into the question of direct broadcasting. The French position, which he said was dictated by the Quai d’Orsay, was to call for a prohibition of direct broadcasting from satellites. D’Arcy talked with members of the French Delegation but was unable to find precisely what lay behind this position other than that it was political in nature. He was convinced, however, that the French would find strong support if they switched to a more reasonable position which requested study of the question.
3.
D’Arcy felt that many of the less developed states, who lacked conventional transmission facilities outside of major urban centers, were properly fearful of the ability of the space powers to communicate directly to their citizens. For example, one of the Indonesian representatives [Page 1013] at the Geneva Conference had said that it would be intolerable if President Kennedy used a communication satellite to speak directly to large numbers of Indonesians to whom President Sukarno wished to speak but could not for lack of conventional facilities. D’Arcy thought that similar considerations lay behind the Brazilian favor for UN censorship over the content of mass media relayed by satellite. A country like Brazil, or for that matter the USSR, might never find it economically feasible to develop conventional transmission facilities sufficient to provide coverage throughout the entire country. Thus, at such time as satellites have a direct TV transmission capability, the situation would arise in which an outside state could develop an audience which was denied to the television studios within that country.
4.
D’Arcy noted that when Eurovision was being established it was thought of principally in terms of its usefulness for those states whose television facilities were highly developed, i.e., France, Germany and Great Britain. But in actual fact the countries which today make greatest use of Eurovision are just the opposite, namely those who, because they are less developed, are greatly in need of program content. Today Eurovision programs are only rarely seen in the most developed states because they have their own programming. D’Arcy foresaw a similar trend in space. He could imagine the situation in which many countries would be forced to rely in large part on programs beamed via satellite. Countries unable to satisfy audience demand by local programming would in effect be open to propaganda and commercial advertising by outside states, thus opening up long-term domestic and economic effects beyond their control.
5.
On the basis of conversations with Americans active in the communications field, D’Arcy was convinced that there were no serious obstacles to direct radio broadcasts from satellites in the immediate future, and that it was probably only a matter of time before there could be direct TV transmission to home receivers. Although the technology might never be attractive from an economic point of view, its mere exist-ence created the fear that major powers like the US might decide on its employment for political reasons. It was this possibility which D’Arcy felt is of real concern to many representatives who attended the ITU Conference.
6.
D’Arcy said it seemed clear to him that the ITU was not the forum in which to consider what is essentially a non-technical problem. He therefore hoped that the US was giving thought to its consideration in the context of the Outer Space Committee of the General Assembly. He said he would welcome further discussion on this topic.
Stevenson
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, SP 6 UN. Confidential. Drafted by Peter S. Thacher on November 8, cleared by Zachary P. Geneas and Craig Eisendrath, and approved by Eisendrath.