424. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy1
At your request, I have examined the problem of a declaratory ban on weapons of mass destruction in outer space. It is my general conclusion that such a declaratory ban would not involve any real risks to this country from a military security point of view. However, this conclusion is based on relatively sophisticated considerations and the proposal would certainly prove to be very controversial domestically.
There is no question that it would be technically feasible to design a variety of weapons systems employing nuclear weapons in space. These weapons systems could be designed either for target bombardment with accuracies approaching those obtaining with ballistic missiles or for the detonation of extremely high yield warheads-possibly as large as 1000 Megatons-directly in orbit. The latter possibility has been widely discussed as a possible terror weapon since a single such device detonated at altitudes of a few hundred miles would on a clear day probably cause lethal burns and produce fires over areas extending to several tens of thousands of square miles. Despite the very impressive effects associated with such weapons systems, it can be shown on the basis of rather general considerations that these same effects can be achieved much more effectively and economically by earth-based weapons systems. When practical considerations such as payload, component reliability, command and control, vulnerability, and cost are taken into account, space-based weapon delivery systems as presently visualized compare poorly with comparable earth-based weapon delivery systems.
I believe the following general comments summarize the various factors that are unfavorable to the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in space:
- 1.
- Payload: A given rocket can deliver a substantially larger payload to a target as a ballistic missile than it can place into orbit. For example, a 2 stage rocket can deliver almost twice the payload to 6,000 miles as a ballistic missile as it can place in a low orbit (100 to 200 miles). Weapons systems in higher orbits involve progressively greater payload penalties; and, as an extreme case, a weapon system based on the moon would permit payloads of only a few percent of comparable 6,000 mile ballistic missile systems for comparable expenditure of energy.
- 2.
- Reliability: Component reliability is a major problem in the design of nuclear weapons delivery systems and a mean life to failure in these [Page 965] complex systems is often disturbingly short. However, in the case of earth-based systems, there can be a continuous checkout and periodic repairs or replacement. In the case of a space based weapon failure of even a minor component could make the system inoperable and possibly also unsafe. Any effort to increase reliability of a space system by redundancy in components would further penalize the payload of the space system as compared with a comparable earth-based system.
- 3.
- Command and Control: The maintenance of command and control of a satellite weapons system would be much more difficult than in the case of an earth-based system. This is true not only because of poor component reliability in the satellite, but also because of the possibility that the enemy might jam communication circuits or even take control of the system by breaking the control code.
- 4.
- Vulnerability: In general, a satellite in orbit would appear to be a very insecure place to store nuclear weapons for any appreciable length of time since the satellites would be vulnerable to enemy action and peacetime attrition. Unless a special countermeasure were taken, a normal satellite would be extremely vulnerable to ground fire from a Nike Zeus type AICBM system or modified ballistic missiles such as Minuteman since the satellite could be tracked over a period of time and its orbit calculated with extreme accuracy. While the vulnerability of a satellite could be reduced somewhat by a variety of sophisticated countermeasures, it would appear to be extremely difficult and expensive to achieve a high level of confidence that such a weapons system would be immune to enemy action since the defender would have an extended period of time to identify the hostile satellite Specifically, it does not appear to be feasible to make a large satellite weapon carrier simultaneously invisible to both radar and optical observation. Although the vulnerability of the satellite could certainly be reduced by introducing controlled or random steering in the satellite, this would further reduce the effective payload of the weapon carrier. The most significant reduction in vulnerability would probably result from the use of decoys. However, given the possibility of extended observations, techniques could probably be developed to sort out light decoys in space. In addition to the satellite vehicle itself, the communication and tracking equipment with its large radars necessary for the operation and control of a satellite weapon system would be extremely vulnerable to enemy attack.
- 5.
- Cost: For all the above reasons, the cost of a satellite based weapon system would be much greater than that of a comparable earth-based system. For example, considering some of the obvious problems, the Rand Corporation has estimated that a bombardment satellite system would be at least 5 times as expensive as earth-based system with comparable effectiveness.
I believe that the arguments in support of space based weapons systems appear to be essentially limited to the following areas:
- 1.
- Psychological: It is argued that the general fear induced by the knowledge that nuclear weapons were actually orbiting overhead would be so great as to destroy the will of the people to resist the demands of an aggressor. I find it difficult to evaluate this psychological problem since the actual danger of large scale nuclear attack exists and is much greater from the more effective earth-based weapons system from satellites. The existence of a space based weapons system would add to the international technical-military prestige of its possessor.
- 2.
- Dispersal: Stationing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit, particularly as part of a deterrent system, would have the advantage of removing military targets from a country and thereby avoiding the destruction associated with a counter force attack. It might also make the deterrent more effective by complicating and diversifying the requirements for a counter force attack. However, all of the earlier technical considerations, especially vulnerability in peacetime and component reliability, argue against the use of space for long lived systems which would be needed to establish a recognized deterrent capability.
- 3.
- Surprise: It is argued that a satellite based weapons system could attack without warning. While it is true that satellites in low orbit over the U.S. could be detonated simultaneously or could descend from orbit and attack targets with warning as short as those associated with submarine attack, the fact that large numbers of satellites were programmed to arrive over the U.S. simultaneously could be detected quite early and would provide days of strategic warning of a possible attack. An attack by bombardment satellites, which were not programmed to arrive over the U.S. simultaneously, could probably be detected so as to provide warning comparable to that of an ICBM attack. Such an attack would consist of a small first strike with relatively short warning followed by successive detonations for perhaps an hour due to variable times of descent. In any event, a rapid build-up of satellites would certainly be known to the other side and would remove the surprise element from the first strike attack.
On the basis of these considerations, I have concluded that, while technically feasible, a satellite weapons system would constitute a very ineffective approach to the development of a first-strike capability and would also represent a poor approach to long lived, confident weapon system for deterrent strategy. I believe that most military planners who have critically considered this problem would not take exception to this conclusion. It is significant to note that the Air Force at the present time is not calling for any specific space based weapons systems but rather desire a program to develop a capability to place payloads in space in [Page 967] the event some undetermined requirement arises. Nevertheless, despite the strong technical arguments against satellite weapon systems, the Soviet Union may still decide to deploy such a system because of its psychological effect or as a means of achieving what the Soviets might consider to be a more effective deterrent in view of their relatively inferior strategic position.
The verification of a declaratory ban would, of course, be depend-ent upon our unilateral monitoring and intelligence capabilities. We have an excellent unilateral capability to monitor space launches and to track satellites. We do not however, at present, have a unilateral capability to determine whether a given satellite contains a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, the launching of a large number of satellites for which no scientific research or other explanation was available coupled with efforts to reduce vulnerability, (such as maneuverability or decoys) would create a strong suspicion that a military satellite system which might be associated with weapon delivery was being deployed. In the period after 1965, it would also be possible to develop unmanned satellite inspection systems that might be capable of determining whether unidentified satellites contained nuclear weapons.
A simple declaratory ban of weapons for destruction in space has several attractive features. It might be easily agreed upon with the USSR since it does not involve inspection; it would deal with a type of armament which neither side has deployed; and it might result in the saving of vast sums of money which both sides may be compelled to spend on these developments in the absence of an agreement for reasons of fear or military prestige. Such a proposal would, however, also involve international and domestic and political problems, which must be given careful consideration. It would be argued that, as a first step to arms control, it would tend to set a precedent against inspection, especially as it would be noted that a ban on weapons of mass destruction in space could be easily and reliably monitored by a mutual agreement to require inspection of the payloads of all declared space launches. The question as to whether all launches had, in fact, been declared could be monitored by either an international radar system or by our existing “national” radar monitoring system. It is difficult to imagine any separate arms control agreement that could be monitored more effectively than this and at less cost than this if national radar monitoring systems were utilized.
A much more serious practical problem however, would be the question of domestic acceptance. Given the popular enthusiasm and confusion about space and the powerful lobby interest in this field, it is hard to imagine that there would be easy acceptance of the rather sophisticated arguments as to why such a ban would not involve a significant military risk to this country. If public and Congressional acceptance [Page 968] requires a major campaign to minimize the military significance of space, it would substantially reduce the rationale of undertaking a major campaign to advance such a proposal as a separable disarmament measure.
In summary, I believe that a declaratory ban of weapons of mass destruction would not involve any real military danger to the U.S. At the same time and for the same reason, it would not be a major step toward the control of armaments. Nevertheless, it could serve as a tactic to initiate some activity in the field of disarmament and could prevent a very expensive new dimension to the arms race with its unpredictable psychological reaction which might affect the overall level of military activities of both sides. As a disarmament measure I would be in favor of a declaratory ban; however, I recognize that such a proposal would involve significant domestic political problems. The question of whether the advantages of such a proposal as a disarmament measure outweigh these domestic disadvantages should be thoroughly explored.
- Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Jerome B. Wiesner, Box 67C. Secret.↩