Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

405. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, September 18, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Your 11 a.m. appointment with Jim Webb

Webb called me yesterday to comment on three interconnected aspects of the space problem that he thinks may be of importance in his talk with you:²

1. Money. The space authorization is passed at $5,350 billion, and he expects the appropriation to come out at about $5,150 billion. While the estimates are not complete, his current guess is that in early 64 he will require a supplemental of $400 million ($200 million requiring authorization and $200 million appropriation only) in order to keep our commitment to a lunar landing in the 1960’s.

2. The Soviets. He reports more forthcoming noises about cooperation from Blagonravov in the UN, and I am trying to run down a report in today’s Times (attached) that we have rebuffed the Soviets on this.³Webb himself is quite open to an exploration of possible cooperation with the Soviets and thinks that they might wish to use our big rocket, and offer in exchange the advanced technology which they are likely to get in the immediate future. (For example, Webb expects a Soviet landing of instruments on the moon to establish moon-earth communications almost any time.)

The obvious choice is whether to press for cooperation or to continue to use the Soviet space effort as a spur to our own. The Times story suggests that there is already low-level disagreement on exactly this point.

3. The Military Role. Webb reports that the discontent of the military with their limited role in space damaged the bill on the Hill this year, with no corresponding advantage to the military. He thinks this point can and should be made to the Air Force, and he believes that the thing to do is to offer the military an increased role somehow. He has already had private exploratory talks with Ros Gilpatric for this purpose.

Webb thinks the best place for a military effort in space would be in the design and manning of a space craft in which gravity could be simulated, in preparation for later explorations. He thinks such a space craft may be the next logical step after Gemini. On the other hand, he is quite cool about the use of Titan III and Dinosoar and would be glad to see them both cancelled. You will recall that McNamara has just come out on the other side on Titan III.

My own hasty judgment is that the central question here is whether to compete or to cooperate with the Soviets in a manned lunar landing:

1. If we compete, we should do everything we can to unify all agencies of the United States Government in a combined space program which comes as near to our existing pledges as possible.

2. If we cooperate, the pressure comes off, and we can easily argue that it was our crash effort in ’61 and ’62 which made the Soviets ready to cooperate.

I am for cooperation if it is possible, and I think we need to make a really major effort inside and outside the government to find out whether in fact it can be done. Conceivably this is a better job for Harriman than East-West trade, which might almost as well be given to George Ball.

McG. B.

1. Source: NASA Historical Reference Collection. No classification marking. Also printed in Exploring the Unknown, Volume II: External Relationships, pp. 165–166.
2. Webb’s meeting with the President took place between 11:30 a.m. and 12:20 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Books.) No record of this meeting has been found.
3. Not printed. The article, entitled “U.S. Aide Rebuffs Soviet’s Moon Bid,” mentioned that Dr. Robert R. Gilruth, Director of NASA’s Manned Space Flight Center, had called a joint U.S.-Soviet lunar expedition impractical.