Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

403. Memorandum From the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Gardner)¹

Washington, September 3, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Outer Space Problems in the Proposed GA Speech

I. Concrete Proposals for Cooperation in Outer Space

A) Cooperative Studies on the Medical Aspects of Manned Space Flight

1. Description. The U.S. and USSR might agree to exchange complete data on the post-flight examinations of their astronauts in an effort to compile the maximum amount of information on the effects of space flight on man as rapidly and economically as possible.

2. History

a. Suggested as possible Presidential offer to Khrushchev for Vienna meeting, 1961.²

b. Firm offer by U.S. to USSR to “pool our efforts and exchange our knowledge in the field of space medicine” in Kennedy letter to Khrushchev, March 7, 1962.³

c. Khrushchev reply, March 20, 1962, notes: “I can say that Soviet scientists are prepared to cooperate in this and to exchange data. . .”⁴

d. Space medicine was not one of the subjects that Soviets were prepared to discuss in context of Dryden-Blagonravov talks although it was proposed by the U.S.

e. The Secretary raised the possibility of cooperation in space medicine during his talks in Moscow.

3. Cost. If limited to exchange of data, the costs would be small. If joint experimentation was involved, however, costs could be much larger according to the extent of the program, but the value for money should be good since Soviets would pay half presumably.

B) Cooperative Tracking of Flights

1. Description. This arrangement could take several forms. It might include a tracking station with U.S. equipment on Soviet territory run by specially trained Soviet personnel with a similar Soviet station here. Or it could be limited to exchange of information from existing tracking facilities. Cooperative tracking could cover manned flights to increase the safety of the astronauts, deep space probes, specially agreed flights, or all flights.

2. History

a. President Kennedy’s letter to Khrushchev of March 7, 1962 suggested the establishment of a tracking station with U.S. equipment on Soviet territory run by specially trained Soviet personnel and a similar Soviet station here.

b. Chairman Khrushchev replied cautiously (March 20, 1962) that a joint program of observation would be of value, but he mentioned it only in the context of deep space and lunar probes.

c. Sir Bernard Lovell, Director of the Jodrell Bank Observatory, recently negotiated an agreement with the Soviets for “an extension of our cooperative work with the Soviet Union in the tracking of lunar and deep space probes.” The agreement appears to be limited to a more rapid and more complete exchange of data. A British offer to accommodate a small number of Soviet scientists at Jodrell Bank to track probes is apparently being considered by the USSR. (Two Soviet scientists came to Jodrell Bank in June 1961 to search for signals from the Venus probe.)

3. Cost. The extent of the program agreed would determine the costs. Exchange of information or observers would cost little; establishment of a tracking station and equipment could involve $5–$10 million expenditure.

C) Network of Earth and Space-Based Observatories

1. Description. Several types of programs could be involved. A cooperative program of observation from earth would be of great value since study of the same event from different angles improves the results obtained. Observation from space might include one nation providing technical equipment and the other putting it into orbit much as the U.S. has done with experimental equipment of its allies. A cooperative program might be negotiated to launch a space platform for extended observations from space.

2. History

a. Both the Kennedy and Khrushchev letters contain references along the lines of “cooperation to unlock the secrets of the universe” but no concrete programs were put forward.

b. The Lovell agreement includes a three point program for joint observation between the UK and the USSR on flare star radio emission, bi-static radar observations, and study of angular diameters and structure of radio sources.

3. Cost. The cost of a program would be governed by the projects involved. Exchange of information or observers would cost little. If an intensive program were agreed upon, including the establishment of new observation facilities on earth or extensive satellite launchings, the cost could be considerable. Language problems and resolution of technical details in construction might raise the total cost above that of a single nation’s program.

D) Cooperative Program of Space Exploration by Instruments and Men

1. Description. This proposal could be as limited as an exchange of information from instrument probes of space or it could be as extensive as joint unmanned landings on the lunar surface or, perhaps, joint flights by Soviet and American astronauts.

2. History

a. The Kennedy letter of March 7, 1962 spells out a far reaching program of space research as a hypothetical example of the type of cooperation the U.S. and the USSR might someday achieve. He specifically mentions an unmanned lunar landing and probes of Venus and Mars and even suggests the “possible utility of manned flight in such programs.”

b. Khrushchev’s reply (March 20, 1962) speaks in general terms about the need for extensive cooperation in space experiments.

3. Cost. The cost for an extensive joint program might exceed the total costs of a U.S. program alone due to the problems of language and achieving joint technical specifications in production.

Problem: There is little disagreement that increased and improved cooperation with the Soviet Union on outer space matters, including the four issues noted above, is in the best interests of the U.S. Government. NASA and others have pointed out, however, that mentioning these and other specific items in the GA speech may not further this end. Some of the reasons cited are:

1. As the speech is worded, there is an implication that the three offers represent a new initiative by the U.S. when in fact they have all been put forward in one form or another previously and have not been picked up by the USSR.

2. By repeating these offers we are, in effect, asking the Soviets to cooperate on something we know they have let pass before. At the extreme this might be misinterpreted as a cold war tactic of “offering the unacceptable” to win favor with world opinion. We do not want to return the cold war to an area that has been so painstakingly defrosted.

3. Usually, these negotiations have been conducted bilaterally with a minimum of publicity. Dr. Dryden of NASA has recently written to Mr. Keldysh of the Soviet Academy to reopen the dialogue and seek new areas of agreement. NASA is reluctant to mention specific items, especially points to which the Soviets have not responded previously, when a general offer of cooperation has been made. Further, they are especially reluctant to do this in a public and multi-lateral forum when a private and bilateral suggestion has been made.

4. Some of these proposals create serious problems at the present time. Medical data: the U.S. has published its data and we have little to trade with the Soviets until the next manned flight 18 months away. Tracking: the Soviets are reluctant to engage in any operations that will reveal their tracking capabilities. Their hedging on the geomagnetic data and delayed response to the Echo II experiments are cases in point. Moreover, the U.S. tracking facilities are carrying a heavy load and we have been discouraging requests from ESRO to track for them when their program is operational. A UN offer might bring requests from our allies as well as the Soviets that we cannot fill. Space-based observatories: our platform requires sophisticated techniques that we do not wish to reveal for security reasons, although this problem probably might be overcome if an agreement with the Soviets seemed possible.

5. An important question of policy should be decided. Are we prepared actively to seek new agreements with the Soviets before we have lived within the present agreements for some time?

Proposal: Presuming a favorable response to point 5 above, the President should convey to the Soviets and the General Assembly the strong desire of the U.S. Government to seek further agreement on projects of mutual benefit. He could note the specific projects as suggestions to revive discussion, not as new initiatives. Suggested language follows:

“As you know, Premier Khrushchev and I corresponded last year about a number of projects in outer space on which mutual agreement might be possible. Among them were the three projects on which we now have a signed agreement.

“I hope these three items will be but the first of a growing list of joint efforts—that we can search out other specific projects. We might begin, perhaps, with proposals which Premier Khrushchev and I discussed in our correspondence, such as cooperative studies of space medicine and cooperative tracking of manned flights and space probes. An additional example would be a cooperative network of observation stations on earth and in space to help us to unlock the secrets of the universe. Exploration of outer space, first by instruments and eventually by man, is a task of such challenge and magnitude that common sense dictates the maximum degree of cooperation that we can achieve. What I wish to convey to this Assembly is my government’s genuine and earnest desire to explore with the Soviet Union and other countries any projects that will promote the interests and progress of man in space.”⁵

II. Space Law

A second outer space problem in the speech relates to the statement: “Let us embody them [legal principles on which there is agreement]⁶ in a declaration of Space Law at this Assembly.” If we have reached an arrangement with the Soviet Union in the bi-lateral negotiations, then this statement poses no problem. If not, then a decision must be made whether to seek a GA resolution. Our present position as stated in the strategy paper is that:

“. . . the United States should consider putting forward such a Declaration in the Assembly and pressing it to a vote even without Soviet support, although we would have to weigh carefully the risks that this might open up debate on such matters as a ban on all military uses of space.”

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, UN 3 GA. Confidential. Drafted by R. McKelvey (IO/UNP) on August 30.
2. A background paper, dated May 25, 1961, prepared by the State Department in preparation for the meeting, suggested that Khrushchev might revive “some earlier US proposal on bilateral cooperation in scientific or medical endeavors (though probably not in the exploration of outer space).” See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. V, Document 76.
3. See Ibid., vol. VI, Document 41.
4. See ibid., Document 43.
5. Regarding the speech President Kennedy delivered to the General Assembly, see footnote 2, Document 406.
6. Brackets in the source text.