Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

387. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, April 13, 1961.

DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR US–USSR SPACE COOPERATION

General Objectives

The general objectives of scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union are to demonstrate the possibility of cooperative enterprise between the U.S. and the USSR in fields of wide interest, to achieve the practical advantages of sharing the work and cost on major projects, and to establish early cooperation in fields (e.g. meteorological activities that might eventually lead to weather control or manned exploration of the moon) in which unchecked competition may ultimately be dangerous as well as wasteful.

Guidelines

The proposals herein seek to (a) maximize acceptability by the USSR, and (b) minimize the potential for misunderstanding and obstruction which must be recognized to exist in any joint program with the Soviet Union. The proposals therefore have, in general, the following character:

(1) Valid scientific objectives.

(2) Comparable contributions by the U.S. and USSR.

(3) Technical and economic feasibility for the U.S.

(4) Minimal interference with on-going U.S. programs.

(5) Minimal grounds for Soviet suspicions of U.S. motives (access, surveillance, etc.)

(6) Opportunities for third-nation participation at appropriate time.

The proposals fall into three categories:

(a) The employment of existing or easily attainable ground facilities for exchange of information and services in support of orbiting experiments.

(b) The coordination of independently-launched satellite experiments so as to achieve simultaneous but complementary coverage of agreed phenomena.

(c) Coordination of or cooperation in ambitious projects for the manned exploration of the moon and the unmanned exploration of the planets.

The three categories of proposals are advanced in order to offer the Soviet Union a wide range of choice and avoid the appearance of “pushing” a pre-selected objective. While the costs are estimated to range from relatively insignificant levels in Category (a) to $15–20 million in Category (b) and, very roughly, $10 to $30 billion in Category (c), it may be assumed that the Soviet Union as well as ourselves is likely to pursue the more costly programs in any event.

Such cooperation as is discussed here should be proposed and carried out on the basis of an expanding U.S. program of space science and exploration, and without prejudice to continuing joint enterprise with and assistance to the free world.

Procedure

Overtures should be made at a high Governmental level to be decided at the time, inviting the USSR to engage in cooperative enterprises such as the proposals made below. Soviet counter-suggestions of areas of cooperation would also be invited. The initial discussions would seek a go-ahead for exploratory technical talks preliminary to agreement in principle. Privacy in all such discussions would appear to enhance the chances of success. Technical advice should be available at all times. Our major allies would be informed in advance of the overtures.

Proposals

Category (a)

These proposals for the most part call for the use of ground facilities for mutual services:

(i) The U.S. and the USSR might agree to provide ground-based support on a reciprocal basis for space experiments, e.g.,

• —When either nation launches a satellite or probe carrying a magnetometer experiment, the other would collect rapid-run magnetograms at its ground observatories. (A Soviet scientist has recently promised to do this in connection with the U.S. P–14 probe, following a private request.)
• —When either nation launches a meteorological satellite, the other would carry out routine and special (airborne, balloon-borne, all-sky camera) weather observations synchronized with the passes of the satellite, analyze the data from both sources, and participate in scientific exchanges of the results.
• —Similar arrangements would be useful in connection with ionospheric, auroral, and other geophysical researches.

(ii) The U.S. and the USSR could agree to record telemetry from each other’s satellites, exchanging the resulting tapes as requested. Each would furnish the necessary orbital information and telemetry calibrations to the other. This would be of particular value in sun-related experiments and could extend to the exchange of command signals to permit the best-situated nation to energize a given experiment under certain conditions of solar activity.

(iii) In the communications field, the USSR may wish to employ a ground facility for long-distance experimental transmission of voice or TV signals by means of communications satellites to be launched by NASA after mid-1962 (Projects Relay/Rebound). Such facilities are being prepared also by the U.K. and France. Transmissions may be effected between the latter and the USSR (by means of a U.S. satellite) as usefully as between the U.S. and the USSR. (If supplementary equipment peculiar to such experimental testing in this case is required by the USSR, NASA could provide it at costs ranging up to $2 million.)

(iv) Another type of cooperation can be envisaged in the field of space medicine. Summer institutes in various fields of space science also might be proposed.

The exchanges proposed in (a) have been sought, almost with complete unsuccess, at government agency and scientific society levels since the beginning of the IGY. They are included because of their inherent desirability and because a somewhat greater chance of acceptance may follow if initiated at higher levels. (The program in Categories (b) and (c) have not yet been proposed to the Soviet Union.)

The proposals made in Category (a) are for coordinated rather than interdependent efforts and thus would avoid difficulties which may be associated with the latter type of cooperation with the USSR. Activities in this category are within the capability of many nations, and participation by interested countries should be provided for.

Category (b)

(i) Weather satellites promise broad near-future benefits as a meteorological tool. Equal participation by the U.S. and the USSR in coordinated launching of experimental satellites capable of providing typhoon warnings, etc., would have great impact.

One specific proposal² is that the U.S. and the USSR each place in polar orbit a meteorological satellite to record cloud-cover and radiation-balance data, such that

• —The two satellites have reasonably overlapping lifetimes (at least three months).
• —The satellites orbit in planes at right angles to each other, providing at least six-hour coverage of the earth.
• —The data characteristics permit reception and analysis interchangeably, if possible.
• —Each country may receive telemetry from the other’s satellite through continuous readout if power sources permit or by command if otherwise.
• —Camera resolutions are appropriate only for the objective—photographs of cloud cover.
• —The results are to be made available to the scientific community (World Data Centers and WMO).

(ii) Coordinated programs including experimental or research satellite launchings in other fields than meteorology (e.g., communications) could also be of value. In the field of geophysics, for example, there are possibilities for the useful coordination of the orbits of contemporaneous satellites so as to obtain measurements under contrasting or complementary conditions.

(iii) Simultaneous and coordinated rocket launchings from a number of stations covering a wide range of latitudes and longitudes would for the first time provide a global picture of the properties of the atmosphere at a given instant of time, if conducted on a scale greater than now done during International Rocket Weeks.

The first proposal in Category (b) above falls in the meteorological field, in which the U.S. appears to lead. While the USSR has not yet done anything in this field, it has on one occasion indicated at the highest scientific level that space meteorology is favorably viewed as an area for cooperation. A generous timescale (or offer to provide instrumentation) might moderate the negative factor.

The proposals made in Category (b) are, like those in Category (a), for coordinated rather than interdependent efforts and thus would avoid difficulties which may be associated with the latter type of cooperation with the USSR.

Category (c)

These proposals relate to the exploration of celestial bodies.

(i) Mars or Venus programs.

Planetary investigations are immensely difficult undertakings requiring protracted programs of great complexity and variety, progressing through fly-bys, orbiters, hard and soft landings, and surface prospecting. The U.S. and the USSR could coordinate their independent programs so as to provide for a useful sequencing and, perhaps, sharing of experimental missions, with scientific benefits and economics. Full data exchange, guaranteed by provision of telemetry calibrations, should be provided. If cooperation is interrupted, no loss is sustained and the programs may proceed independently. The U.S. and USSR could, alternatively, enter into a joint program that would mean more intimate involvement; such a program would include cooperative development of equipment and sharing of experimental missions, and would point toward eventual joint launching of probes.

(ii) Manned Exploration of Moon.

The exploration of the surface of the moon is the first space endeavor where we think that the presence of man will add greatly to what could reasonably be done with instrumented packages.

As a first step in non-limited cooperative effort, the U.S. and the USSR would each undertake to place a small party (about 3) of men on the moon for scientific purposes and return them to earth.

As in planetary programs, a more extensive cooperative program could also be envisaged in which the U.S. and USSR enter into a joint manned lunar program, including cooperative development, planning, and international exploration.

The proposals made in Category (c), in the lunar and planetary fields, suggest programs for which the USSR has demonstrably greater existing capability. Inclusion of both categories in proposals to the USSR may therefore be effective.

No significant Mars probe capability now exists in the U.S. By 1964, Centaur should permit significant fly-bys only, while Saturn C–1 would put about 300 pound payloads in orbit after 1964.

The Mars/Venus program is a long-range one whose cost varies widely with numbers of launchings, nature of payloads, and extent of back-up. A balanced program (unmanned), including some 15 Venus shots and 8 Mars shots in the next decade, may cost in the order of $1 billion.

Neither country now possesses a capability for a manned lunar project. It will require boosters of the order of Saturn C–2 using orbital rendezvous and refueling techniques (still to be attempted and perfected) for the upper stages. At least six Saturn C–2’s would be required for a single mission, plus appropriate back-up. The time-scale is probably a decade, during which some 70–80 Saturns would be required for developmental purposes, and the cost is roughly of the order of $10 to $30 billion. During the decade, alternative vehicle systems may conceivably become available, obviating the difficult rendezvous requirement.

In the suggestions for cooperation given above, it can be seen that the degree of involvement between the U.S. and the USSR can in principle be varied from coordination of national programs to full cooperation on joint endeavors;

It is possible to restrict proposals which may be made to the Soviet Union to the level of coordination of essentially independent programs. Benefits would derive from joint planning and organization of such coordinated efforts. This might have the advantages of greater acceptability in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union (where suspicions of U.S. motivations would be present in any case). It may also be more realistic in terms of the technical exchanges and access which may be feasible.

On the other hand, it would be possible to indicate a range of possible relationships to the Soviet Union, extending to interdependent programs and leaving it to them to select the starting level.

As we contemplate programs that involve greater degree of cooperation, positive factors would be the impact on U.S./USSR relations growing out of intimate cooperation on large and meaningful projects, and the advantages accruing to both countries in carrying out space programs utilizing the best of what each has to offer without unnecessary time pressures. We must also anticipate certain increased difficulties. These would include the risk that the whole program would be lost if one or the other participant withdrew because of political or other reasons; the fact that we would have to be prepared to admit Russians to installations such as Cape Canaveral and to show them details of our booster and payload systems (of course, the Russians would have to do the same if they agreed to intimate cooperation), and the possibility that Congressional, scientific and public support might also be more difficult because of the very high costs involved, coupled with the potential damage to our program if the Soviets became obstructive or withdrew.

At any level of relationships, proposals for cooperation in Category (c) have the greatest potential for matching the President’s theme that “Both nations would help themselves as well as other nations by removing these endeavors from the bitter and wasteful competition of the Cold War.” The United States considers exploration of the celestial bodies, particularly manned space exploration, to be perhaps the most challenging adventure of this century. This venture should be conducted on behalf of the human race and the earth as a whole, not on behalf of any single nation. The vigorous and accelerating United States space exploration program is proceeding in this spirit. If the Soviet Union shares this conception, then planning should be undertaken promptly for cooperative manned exploration of the moon and unmanned exploration of Mars and Venus. These projects should of course be open to the participation of all interested countries, conceivably under the auspices of the United Nations. They could, however, be undertaken most constructively only if the United States and the Soviet Union agree on objectives and on coordination of their efforts for the most rapid progress and the most efficient use of human and natural resources.

1. Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office of International Affairs. Confidential. The paper is marked “Redraft.” An April 14 covering memorandum from Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, transmitted the paper to Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Technical Assistant in the Office of the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, and Marvin W. Robinson of NASA’s Office of International Programs. Robinson in turn sent it to Deputy Administrator Dryden on the same date. The paper is also printed in John M. Logsdon, Dwayne A. Day, and Roger D. Launius (eds.), Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume II: External Relationships (Washington, 1996), pp. 143–147.
2. Broader cooperation in meteorology is possible and desirable. A specific proposal for a major world-wide cooperative meteorological program, in which satellites would be a part, is being developed separately. [Footnote in the source text.]