Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

362. Discussion Notes by the Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Dryden)¹

Washington, April 22, 1961.

1. “Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets?”

a. “By putting a laboratory in space?”

There is no chance of beating the Soviets in putting a multi-manned laboratory in space since flights already accomplished by the Russians have demonstrated that they have this capability. The U.S. program must include the development of a multi-manned orbiting laboratory as soon as possible since it is essential for the accomplishment of the more difficult flights to the moon.

b. “Or by a trip around the moon?”

With a determined effort of the United States, there is a chance to beat the Russians in accomplishing a manned circumnavigation of the moon. The Russians have not as yet demonstrated either the booster capability or the technology required for returning a man from a flight around the moon. The state of their booster technology and other technology required for such a difficult mission is not accurately known. With an accelerated program, it is not unreasonable for the U.S. to attempt a manned circumlunar flight by 1966.

c. “Or by a rocket to land on the moon?”

On September 12, 1959, the Russians crash-landed a small package on the moon. This package did not transmit any information from the surface of the moon. The NASA program currently includes impacting instruments on the moon in such a way that they may survive the impact and transmit scientific information back to earth. The first flight in this program is scheduled for January 1962. Close-up television pictures will be obtained of the surface of the moon, as the spacecraft descends to the moon. In August 1963 the current NASA program also includes a soft landing of instruments on the moon. Several flights in succeeding months are included in this program to insure the possibility of success. The Russians can accomplish this mission now if they choose.

d. “Or by a rocket to go to the moon and back with a man?”

There is a chance for the U.S. to be the first to land a man on the moon and return him to earth if a determined national effort is made. The development of a large chemical rocket booster, the spacecraft for landing and return, and major developments in advanced technology are required to accomplish this most difficult mission. The Russians initiated their earth orbiting program probably as early as 1954 as evidenced by their flight of a dog in November 1957. In the earth orbiting competition the United States was attempting to accomplish in less than three years what the Russians had worked on for seven years. It is doubtful that the Russians have a very great head start on the U.S. in the effort required for a manned lunar landing. Because of the distinct superiority of U.S. industrial capacity, engineering, and scientific know-how, we believe that with the necessary national effort, the U.S. may be able to overcome the lead that the Russians might have up to now. A possible target date for the earliest attempt for a manned lunar landing is 1967, with an accelerated U.S. effort.

e. “Is there any other space program which promises dramatic results in which we could win?”

(1) The current NASA program provides the possibility of returning a sample of the material from the moon surface to the earth in 1964. An experiment of this kind would have dramatic value and may or may not be a part of the Russian program. The Russians could carry out such an experiment in the same time period or earlier if they choose.

(2) The lead the U.S has taken in developing communications satellites should be exploited to the fullest. Although not as dramatic as manned flight, the direct benefits to the people throughout the world in the long term are clear. U.S. national prestige will be enhanced by successful completion of this program. The current program will provide for the flight of an active communications satellite in mid-1962. The experiment will enable live television pictures to be transmitted across the Atlantic. The continuing program will lead to the establishment of worldwide operational communications systems.

(3) The U.S. lead established in our successful meteorological experiments with the Tiros satellites, should be maintained with a vigorous continuing program. The whole world will benefit from improved weather forecasting with the possibility of avoiding the disastrous effects of major weather disturbances such as typhoons, hurricanes and tornadoes.

2. “How much additional would it cost?”

An estimate of the cost of the 10-year space exploration program as planned under the Eisenhower Administration was 17.91 billion dollars, as shown in Table A–1, attached.² In this program it was planned that manned lunar landing and return to earth would occur in the time period after 1970 but before 1975. Re-evaluation of the cost of this program based on providing adequate back-ups in all areas of the work has recently been made and the original cost estimate revised to 22.3 billion dollars for the ten-year period through 1970. (Table D–1) For an accelerated national program aiming toward achieving manned lunar landing in the 1967 period, it is estimated that the cost over the same ten-year period will be 33.7 billion dollars, as shown in Table E–1. The additional 10 billion dollar cost of the program is due largely to paying for the program in the shorter time period. The resulting annual costs are naturally higher.

A list of the major items that would be initiated in 1962 with an accelerated program is shown in Attachment F. The total FY-62 funds, $1,744 millions, shown in Table E–1 is $509 million more than the approved current FY-62 budget.

3. “Are we working 24 hours a day and, if not, why not?”

There is not a 24 hour a day work schedule on existing NASA space programs, except for selected areas in Project Mercury, the Saturn C–1 booster, the Centaur engines, and the final launching phases of most flight missions.

a. Project Mercury at Cape Canaveral has been since October 1960 on a three-shift, seven-day-a-week basis plus shift overtime for all phases of capsule checkout and launch preparations. The McDonnell St. Louis plant, where the capsules are made, has averaged a 54-hour week on Mercury from the beginning, but also employs two or three shifts as needed in bottleneck areas. It now runs three shifts in the capsule test and checkout areas.

b. Saturn C–1 project operates at Huntsville around-the-clock throughout any critical test periods for the first-stage booster; the remaining Saturn work is on a one-shift basis plus overtime which results in an average 47 hour week.

c. Centaur hydrogen engine, which also is needed for the Saturn upper stages, is on three shifts in Pratt and Whitney’s shops and test stands.

d. Lastly, the final launch preparations of most flight missions require around-the-clock work at the launch sites at Cape Canaveral, Wallops Station, or the Pacific Missile Range. In addition, NASA computer installations at Goddard and Marshall Centers operate continuous shifts in order to handle launch vehicle test analyses promptly, and determine orbital and trajectory data, and provide tracking and telemetry of space vehicles in flight.

NASA and its contractors are not working 24-hour days on the rest of its projects because:

a. Certain projects are at an early stage of experimental study or design engineering where exchange of ideas is difficult to accomplish through multi-shifts.

b. The schedules have been geared to the availability of facilities and financial resources. The funding levels for both contractors and government laboratories have been sufficient only for single-shift operations plus overtime (generally from 5 to 20%) as required to keep up the schedules.

c. The limitations on manpower and associated funding determine the extent to which the NASA flight development centers may employ extra shifts.

In a number of areas in the national space program, the work could be accelerated if more manpower and more facilities were to be provided and funded in the immediate future. Recommendations to accomplish this are made elsewhere in this memorandum.

4. “In building large boosters should we put our emphasis on nuclear, chemical or liquid fuel, or a combination of these three?

In building the large launch vehicles required for the manned lunar landing mission, the immediate emphasis must be on the development of large solid and liquid rockets. It is believed that, in order to provide the necessary assurance that we will have a large launch vehicle for the lunar mission, we must have a parallel development of both a solid and liquid fueled large launch vehicle. The program on nuclear rockets must be prosecuted vigorously on a research and development basis. It is not believed that the nuclear rocket can play a role in the earliest attempt at manned lunar landing. The nuclear rockets will be needed in the even more difficult mission following manned lunar exploration. Use of the nuclear rocket for missions is not expected until after 1970 although flight test for developing the rocket will occur before then.

5a. “Are we making a maximum effort?

No, the space program is not proceeding with a maximum effort. Additional capability exists in this country which could be utilized in this task. However, we believe that the manpower facilities and other resources now assigned are being utilized in an aggressive fashion.

6b. “Are we achieving necessary results?”

Our program is directed towards unmanned scientific investigation of space, manned exploration of space, and application of satellites to communication and meteorological systems. The scientific investigation is achieving basic knowledge important for a better understanding of the universe and also provides data necessary for the achievement of manned space flight and the satellite applications. It is generally agreed that our scientific program is yielding most significant results.

The Mercury program is the first and necessary step in an ongoing program leading to the manned laboratory, circumlunar flight, and manned lunar landing discussed under Item 1. A manned ballistic flight is scheduled in May, unmanned orbital flights and orbital flights with chimpanzees are scheduled for the Spring and Summer providing the background for the manned flight planned in 1961.

Future manned flight depends upon improved launch vehicle capability as well as a new spacecraft for the crew. The Saturn will provide our first capability for large payloads but must be followed by a still larger vehicle for manned lunar landing. The launch vehicle for the first manned lunar landing will utilize either clustered F–1 liquid engines or solid propellant motors as discussed in item 4. We are achieving necessary technical data on the liquid engines but not on the large solid rocket engines. Ultimately, nuclear propulsion will be used to carry heavy payloads long distances into space. With our great capacity for engine research we have the capacity in this country to proceed more rapidly towards our objectives.

The Tiros and Echo satellites have provided important background data for meteorological and communication satellite systems. Additional experimentation is required in both fields before operational systems can be completely defined. We are continuing our meteorological program with Tiros flights and will use a newly-designed satellite called Nimbus when it is available in 1962. The first communication satellite (Echo) was a 100–ft. balloon which reflected ultra-high frequency signals between transmitters and receivers. The Echo type experiment is continuing and in addition we are instituting a program called Relay which carries microwave equipment for power amplification. This process decreases the requirements on the ground equipment but requires electronic equipment in the satellite with extremely high reliability compared to present day standards.

In summary we are achieving significant scientific and technical results. We welcome the opportunity of reviewing these results with you to ensure that these results are compatible with our national goals.

1. Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential File, Space and Space Program. Confidential. An attached note by Claudia Anderson, archivist at the Johnson Library, reads: “May 4, 1979: During the course of a reference request, we found that these discussion notes were used by Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, NASA scientist, with Vice President Johnson in response to President Kennedy’s memorandum, ‘Do we have a chance of beating the Soviets?’ April 22, 1961. This information is noted on a carbon copy retained by NASA.” For text of President Kennedy’s memorandum of April 20, see Exploring the Unknown, p. 424.
2. The tables and attachments are not printed.