Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

343. Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

A–1817

London, February 15, 1963, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Narcotics—1953 Protocol vs Single Convention

REF

• CA-7714 of January 22, 1963²

The United States point of view in support of the 1953 Opium Protocol vis-a-vis the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (reference airgram) was presented on February 13 to the United Kingdom during an interview with Mr. T.C. Green of the Home Office, which bears primary responsibility in all matters pertaining to narcotics control. Mr. Green expressed considerable disagreement with the American position, and his arguments are summarized below. He hastened to add, however, that the United Kingdom fully shares the United States concern for securing a workable international agreement to facilitate control over illicit production and traffic in narcotics. Mr. Green felt that our disagreements stem only from honest differences of opinion as to the best means to achieve that end.

The following matters were discussed:

(1) Closed List of Producers. In regard to the United States contention that the 1953 Opium Protocol provides superior control over narcotics production through the use of a closed list of seven countries permitted to produce for export, Mr. Green argued that even before the Protocol comes into force on March 8 of this year the list will be outdated, and that in any case the list could never serve as a practical working device. Of the seven producing countries, three (USSR, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) have long since made clear their opposition to the 1953 Protocol and their intention not to ratify or support it. Of the other four countries (Greece, India, Iran, and Turkey), only Greece, India, and Iran have ratified the Protocol. However, since 1953 Iran has ceased production of opium for export, and Greece, according to Mr. Green, has not produced opium for export for many years. Therefore, since the manufacturing parties to the 1953 Protocol soon will be obliged to import only from one of the producing parties on the closed list, the result will be that India will have a monopoly on legal international trade in opium. Possible future ratification by Turkey would provide only one alternative legal market for the opium manufacturing countries who adhere to the Protocol. The United Kingdom opposes this very severe restriction on the legal sources of supply, and feels that other countries which might otherwise support the 1953 Protocol are discouraged from doing so by this situation. As for the countries which do not adhere to the agreement, they are not subject to any form of production control now, and will not be any more circumscribed even after the 1953 Protocol comes into force.

Furthermore, the Home Office rejects the United States argument that the provisions of the 1961 Convention, authorizing any state to produce up to 5 tons annually for export, will encourage new countries to enter the opium export trade. Those desiring to do so at present are already producing as much opium as they wish, and the introduction of an international agreement legalizing exports up to 5 tons a year will not necessarily serve to spark new production.

(2) Limitations on Stocks. On the closely related problem of establishing limits on the total stock of opium which may be held by a nation, the United Kingdom is again opposed to the United States view. The specific percentage limitations on stocks set forth in Article 5 of the 1953 Protocol are actually, in Mr. Green’s words, “a farce.” Since a producing nation may select any year after January 1, 1946 as the base for the computation of its total medical and scientific needs for opium, and presumably will select the year of highest volume, the limit thus established will be so high as to be meaningless. It was in recognition of this fact that the nations which participated in the drafting of the Single Convention in 1961 omitted any reference to stock limitations. Considering the other provisions for supervision of international narcotics trade contained in the 1961 Convention, the Home Office believes that there need be no fear or expectation that any country will amass an unduly large amount of opium. Mr. Green commented that at present by far the largest single stock of opium in the world is held by the United States.

The matter of disposition of seized shipments of illicit narcotics was raised in this regard. The British here too support the terms of the 1961 Convention over the 1953 Protocol. They contend that the Single Convention actually offers greater incentive for non-producing countries to increase their surveillance over illicit traffic in narcotics. Under Article 7 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the 1953 Protocol, a non-producing nation which has confiscated an illicit narcotics shipment, and which requires no additional narcotics for its own use, is compelled either to return the narcotics to the lawful owner, if possible, or to destroy the shipment. The 1961 Convention, on the other hand, allows such a country the further option of exporting the narcotics to a manufacturing country, under normal control provisions, for a profit. It therefore will be clearly in any nation’s self-interest to search out and confiscate illegal shipments of drugs.

(3) Reservations. While conceding that the reservations section of the 1961 Convention is broader than the United Kingdom would wish, Mr. Green explained that it had been designed primarily to obtain the support of the Soviet Bloc countries for the final draft. The Bloc countries had raised a serious objection concerning so-called “Third Countries,” or countries outside the United Nations (particularly Outer Mongolia at that time, Red China, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam). Since the 1961 Single Convention would be administered solely by the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc countries insisted that they would not support the extension of the control mechanism to “Third Countries” who were unable to secure United Nations membership. This objection was met by allowing the reservation in respect to Article 12 paragraphs 2 and 3, and Article 13 paragraph 2, of the Single Convention. Mr. Green asserted that since then the Soviet Bloc countries have in fact made clear that they do not intend to make any broader use of the reservations, and he believes that it is doubtful that other nations will do so to thwart the purposes of the agreement. If that is their intention, they would find it simpler to remain completely outside any international narcotics agreement. The participation of the Soviet Bloc countries, is, however, so vital to any system of narcotics control that the United Kingdom feels that to attain that end the concession on reservations is well worth any risk that may be involved.

(4) Possible Amendments to 1953 Protocol. Mr. Green called attention to the fact that the 1953 Protocol deals only with opium, while the 1961 Single Convention covers the entire range of narcotics, most especially coca leaf and cannabis (marijuana). In accordance with the reference airgram, the view was expressed that the United States shares the same concern, and would be happy to consider means of amending the 1953 Protocol in due course to cover all drugs, just as we would be prepared to discuss possible limited modification in the closed list of producers, and some alteration in the provisions for local inquiry and mandatory embargo. It is the opinion of the Home Office, however, that to achieve these worthwhile ends it would be necessary to convoke an international conference almost identical to that which produced the 1961 Single Convention, and that it would be most unrealistic to expect that the final agreement would be materially different from that document. Mr. Green volunteered his belief that a United States attempt to gather international support for a conference to discuss only the change we desire, and no others, would not be successful.

On the basis of these convictions, Mr. Green stated that the United Kingdom remained convinced that the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs would prove to be a more practical instrument of narcotics control than the 1953 Opium Protocol. Therefore it is still the intention of the Government to seek enabling legislation, possibly in 1964, to permit ratification of the Single Convention. He expressed his hope that the United States, regardless of its misgivings in this matter, would cooperate in administering the 1961 Single Convention when and if it comes into force.

For the Charge d’Affaires ad interim:
Donald R. Lesh
Third Secretary of Embassy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, SOC 11–5. Official Use Only. Drafted by Donald R. Lesh and cleared by Dougherty. Repeated to USUN and the Mission in Geneva.
2. Airgram CA-7714 encouraged Missions to urge host governments to join in implementing the narcotics control system provided for by the 1953 Opium Protocol rather than to ratify the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. (Ibid., 399.53/1–2263)