Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

337. Airgram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

A–906

Ankara, April 7, 1962.

SUBJECT

• 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs

REF

• Deptel 735 and Embtel 1060²

Following discussions with the Ambassador and the Economic Counselor, former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Flues, now Special Consultant to Secretary Dillon, and Mr. John Cusack, District Supervisor, U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, conferred during the week ending March 24 concerning the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and the 1953 Protocol on Opium, with Turkish Government Ministers and key officials responsible for this subject. Accompanied by the Financial Attache and Embassy Economic Officers, Mr. Flues and Mr. Cusack met with, among others, the following:

• Ihsan Gursan, Minister of Commerce
• Majhar Ozkol, Under Secretary, Ministry of Commerce
• Ekrem Geris, President, Foreign Trade Department, Ministry of Commerce
• Cahit Hayta, Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Vahap Asiroglu, Director General, Third Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Osman Derinsu, Director General, Fifth Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Ahmet Topaloglu, Minister of Interior
• Fethi Celikbas, Minister of Industry

Mr. Flues informed the GOT officials that the United States will not ratify the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in its present form and will seek to obtain support from other countries for its position.

The major conference of the week was held under the Chairmanship of Under Secretary of Commerce Ozkol, who has been the permanent Turk expert on narcotics and represented Turkey in that capacity at international meetings. Under Secretary Ozkol will lead the Turkish delegation at the Geneva session of the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs in May, and it is expected that he will probably be elected to preside over the session. On the Turkish side, this meeting was attended also by the President and other representatives from the Foreign Trade Department and representatives from Toprak, including Huran Balkan, who has acted as GOT opium monopoly salesman abroad. No representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other Ministries participated. The major presentation by Mr. Flues was made to the Ministry of Commerce at that meeting since conversations earlier with other Ministries indicated that they normally defer to Commerce at the technical level as the Ministry directly responsible for narcotic matters.

During the course of the meeting, Under Secretary Ozkol stated the GOT position and views as follows, in summary:

a) Turkey agrees that the Single Convention is defective, should be corrected, and Turkey would not ratify it in its present form; but it believed that some 37 countries will ratify the Convention, including three already in.

b) The GOT considered the 1953 Protocol a good treaty and consequently has already put its provisions into effect internally, but believes its scope to be too narrow. Ignoring the 1948 convention, Ozkol made his usual lengthy statement regarding the need for better controls on synthetics and marijuana, and indicated his belief that the U.S. is not sufficiently interested in this area.

c) The GOT would not ratify the 1953 Protocol now but would reexamine it as an interim opium agreement if Geneva produced no prospect of meaningful changes in the Single Convention in the near future. Ozkol believes that ratification of the Protocol before the Geneva session would indicate that Turkey had been pressed by the U.S., and would thereby create a basis for adverse propaganda. He believes the prospects for obtaining support from other missions for making changes in the Single Convention are better if Turkey is not committed to the Protocol in advance.

d) Mr. Ozkol suggested use of the Geneva session to press for modification of the Single Convention, and urged that the GOT and the U.S. present a common approach and seek support meanwhile from other countries. He stated a readiness to discuss the Protocol with Mr. Anslinger at Geneva in this context. He stated also that if Geneva was a failure in generating support for modification of the Single Convention, then he would immediately discuss the situation with Anslinger and could use the full discussion of Geneva as a basis for a new look at the Protocol.

e) During the conversation, Mr. Ozkol pointed out that the United States purchased 191 tons of opium from India last year. Mr. Flues advised him that the United States also bought 20 tons from Yugoslavia, its first purchase from that source in 25 years, and stated that the GOT price was not competitive on the world market. It appeared that the GOT and Ozkol were under economic pressure with Toprak reporting 350 tons of uncommitted stocks of opium on hand and prospect of a bumper crop of 250/300 tons this year. Mr. Flues requested Toprak’s latest price quote and was informed that it was $18 per kilo. Mr. Flues requested that Toprak reexamine this price, with the possibility that U.S. business could help GOT clear its stock overhang if Turkey’s price were more competitive.

It was the impression of Mr. Flues and the Embassy officers present at these conversations that the Foreign Office sees the narcotic problem and the U.S. position with respect to the Single Convention in a broader context and desires closer GOT/US collaboration on the subject. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that, while the Ministry of Commerce is the Ministry technically responsible for the subject, other Ministries also are involved in other aspects of the problem, such as control and enforcement, agricultural reform, etc., and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumes a coordinating role, particularly with respect to international negotiations and broader considerations which may affect those negotiations. It was evident that there was some Foreign Office irritation with the Ministry of Commerce. Other Ministries appeared to have a somewhat similar attitude in looking at the problem more broadly and desiring closer Turk-American collaboration.

Summarizing the results of his conversations on the United States position with respect to the Single Convention, Mr. Flues stated the following to the Ministry of Commerce and Foreign Affairs:

a) The discussions revealed a clearer area of agreement than previously and remaining differences relate largely to strategy/emphasis. With respect to strategy, however, the U.S. believes that changes in thinking about the Single Convention at Geneva are more likely if other nations are confronted with the 1953 Protocol in legal effect.

b) The Protocol has already been overwhelmingly ratified by other nations and thus it appears that Turkey should support world opinion by taking action to seek international adoption of effective opium controls. Moreover, as Mr. Ozkol has indicated, Turkey itself had already adopted the provisions of the Protocol for its own internal use.

c) Geneva at best has a limited role since it can only promote a better climate for changes in the Single Convention, which may take time. Meanwhile, the present opium control system needs strengthening by bringing the Protocol into legal effect.

d) While expressing gratification for the progress made during the talks, the United States, in supporting the combined effort at Geneva, will not cease its present efforts to bring the Protocol into effect.

Assessing the results and implications of the week-long series of discussions with GOT officials, Messrs Flues and Cusack, and Embassy representatives concluded:

a) The combination of the U.S. position on the Single Convention; the enlarged responsibilities of Ozkol as Under Secretary of Commerce; the Toprak stock problem; pressure from other interested Ministries, especially the Foreign Office; etc., may have influenced the Ministry of Commerce to a more responsible position. Mr. Ozkol may wish to use his suggested approach at Geneva as a more responsible and yet a fact-saving tactic; however, we doubt if he likes the Protocol any better than he did as a GOT technical narcotics expert.

b) Opinions can differ as to what meaningful results Geneva produces regarding the Single Convention. Mr. Ozkol can drag further on the Protocol by claiming that the GOT is satisfied with the progress at Geneva; Ozkol still appears to be the key GOT figure with regard to this question.

c) In view of the limited time before the Geneva sessions, it is not likely that there will be any parliamentary action on the Protocol before then in either Greece or Turkey. As a consequence, probably little would be lost by expressing respect for Ozkol’s strategy, while not abating pressure for Protocol ratification as soon as possible. In light of his statements, however, it could be difficult for Ozkol to assume a completely negative position after Geneva.

After assessment of the real effect of the concessions made by Ozkol, in his final visit with Mr. Hayta, Mr. Flues suggested that he (Mr. Flues) might try to obtain a Greek concert on the Protocol so that Turkey need not feel alone.

Hare

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 341.9/4–762. Confidential. Drafted by Flues and V.W. Mitchell, and cleared by L. Wade Lathram, William M. Kerrigan, and Elaine D. Smith (the latter two in draft). Repeated to Athens and Rome.
2. Telegram 735 notified the Embassies in Ankara and Athens of Flues’ travel plans. Telegram 1060 from Ankara summarized the meetings that Flues and Cusack had with Turkish officials. (Ibid., 102.102/3–1562 and 341.9/4–662, respectively)