332. Letter From the President of Eli Lilly and Company (Beesley) to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Narcotics, Department of the Treasury (Anslinger)1
Dear Commissioner Anslinger:
As a producer of narcotics and a company much concerned with public health and proper control over the manufacture and distribution of narcotics, we have studied carefully the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which was adopted March 25, 1961, by a Plenipotentiary Conference convened by the United Nations. We should like to express to you our views in relation to this document.
It is our considered judgment, after thorough analysis of the Single Convention, that it radically departs from the initial purpose of codifying the existing treaties and of supplementing these treaties with such additional measures as were required to attain more effective international control. In our opinion, this Convention, on the contrary, would substantially relax existing controls in opposition to the public interest. In this presentation of our views, we shall not attempt to enumerate the many inadequate provisions of the Single Convention but shall comment on some of its principal weaknesses.
In general, it is quite evident that the reservations by which individual nations may depart from the general requirements for transitional periods lasting for as long as twenty-five years seriously weaken the force and control of the treaty. In effect, these reservations practically negate international control of the use of narcotics.
Perhaps even more serious is the threat to world health posed by the relaxation of production and export controls over opium. So-called “new countries” may, under the Convention, export 5 tons of opium annually without international control or sanction.
While the Convention provides for establishment of a Narcotics Control Board, it also permits signers to void the right of the board to
- 1.
- establish estimates for a country which has failed to file its annual estimate reports [Article 12, Sections 2 and 3]2
- 2.
- examine statistical returns to determine whether a party has complied with the provisions of the Convention [Article 13]
- 3.
- ask for explanations from a government it believes is not abiding by the provisions of the Convention [Article 14, Section 1(A)]
- 4.
- call upon such government to adopt remedial measures [Article 14, Section 1(B)]
- 5.
- call the attention of the parties, the Commission of Narcotics, and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations to a government’s failure to adopt recommended remedial measures [Article 14, Section 1(C)]
- 6.
- recommend imports and exports be stopped until compliance is achieved [Article 14, Section 2].
In short, the Narcotics Control Board would not have the authority needed to control parties unwilling to honor the intent of the Convention. Many of its rulings could be ignored and flouted with impunity.
Under the Single Convention, parties may also elect to export drugs to another country in excess of the established import quotas for that country. They may also elect to void the final determination by the International Court of Justice of any dispute relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention.
It is obvious that these provisions emasculate the Convention as an effective tool for international control of addicting drugs.
Only one more nation is needed to bring the 1953 Protocol into force. In view of the fact that this Protocol, together with existing treaties would provide far more effective international machinery for proper control of the production and distribution of addicting drugs, we believe that it would be very much against the public interest for the United States to sign and ratify the Single Convention.
We should welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter in greater detail with you or others in government who are concerned with the tremendously important problem of adequate international control of addicting drugs.
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 341.9/7–2661. No classification marking. In a covering letter to Secretary Rusk, Beesley wrote that, in his company’s opinion, the Single Convention did not provide adequate international controls over the production and distribution of addicting drugs and should not be signed or ratified by the United States. Otis E. Mulliken, Acting Director of the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs, acknowledged Beesley’s letter on August 7. (Ibid.)↩
- All brackets in the source text.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩