Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

301. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of United Nations Political Affairs (Sisco) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Gardner)¹

Washington, September 4, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Proposal for a United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights

I am concerned about the proposal in the Strategy Paper (which is elaborated in the Bilder-Nason memorandum defining terms of reference) to establish a United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights “to investigate and report to the General Assembly on how the members of the United Nations are fulfilling their obligations under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter.” The arguments against the proposal contained in L/UNA’s lineup of pros and cons and in Finger’s memorandum of August 29, strike me as well taken. In addition, I should like to point out a number of other serious political risks inherent in the proposal. Moreover, I see no reason to incur these risks, since I believe that we can derive the same political advantages by following the alternative course of strengthening the executive arm of the United Nations to take action in specific human rights situations, rather than establishing new United Nations machinery.

I.

A permanent United Nations Commissioner, armed with a staff and a roving mandate as “watchdog” for the General Assembly, would be tempted to encroach on politically sensitive areas and to compound the problems that we have faced in the General Assembly and the Committee of 24 on racial issues. The natural ambition of such a man will be to take on juicy political issues which promise a harvest of publicity and of favorable notices from the Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations. The Commissioner’s authority to initiate investigations and engage in “fact finding” wholly at his discretion, which is the essence of the proposal, is particularly open to abuse. He will tend to interpret his mandate in the broadest manner, and to intervene in domestic human rights situations by making studies and issuing reports with the imprimatur of the United Nations. We might find ourselves faced with the kind of free-wheeling and grandstanding operation that has characterized the Committee of 24.

Moreover, pressures on the United Nations Commissioner from the Afro-Asian majority and from many of the lobbies will tend to direct his attention to human rights problems in our societies rather than in those of the bloc or the Afro-Asians. Apartheid, the treatment of Buddhists in South Vietnam, the denial of political rights in the Republic of Korea are obvious areas in which the United Nations Commissioner and his staff would be persuaded to intervene.

What is to keep him out of Puerto Rico? Denied a hearing before the Committee of 24 will not the Puerto Rican petitioners be likely to appeal to the human rights commissioner? Technically we could not oppose this on the same ground that we have used to keep the Puerto Rican nationalists out of the colonialism committee, namely that the Puerto Ricans have chosen self-determination in the form of association. What is to prevent the commissioner from hearing the petitioners and issuing a report on United States compliance with Articles 55 and 56 in Puerto Rico?

Or, for that matter, what is to prevent the United Nations Commissioner from undertaking an investigation of the United States racial situation next time the headlines flaunt an incident in Birmingham or Cambridge or Chicago? Even if we succeeded in blocking such moves—as we probably could—the anti-UN lobby in the United States would have a field day every time an African leader called on the Commissioner to intervene in the United States racial situation.

But, would not this risk be counterbalanced by the political gains we could hope to get when the commissioner acted to spotlight human rights violations in the bloc? I doubt it. Certainly we can expect our citizenry to press the commissioner to investigate, for example, violations of human rights by the GDR authorities at the Berlin wall and the mistreatment of religious minorities in the USSR. The initial impact of a Soviet refusal to let the investigators in will be damaging in Moscow. But the more lasting effect will be the diversion of frustration into resentment against the Administration and the Department for failing to “force” the United Nations to do something about human rights violations in the bloc. Powerless to act in the closed societies the United Nations Commissioner will naturally want to earn his keep and maintain his self-respect by busying himself where he can—in the open societies of the West.

II.

I believe the same objective envisaged in the proposal for a United Nations Commissioner could be achieved by adapting and strengthening existing United Nations machinery. Any scheme to be workable and politically acceptable to us must contain two elements that are missing from the Commissioner proposal. First, the system must be so designed as to selectively employ investigating and reporting mechanisms in specific instances. Second, the investigating and reporting activities of any United Nations representative must flow from the authority of the Secretary-General, acting either under his implicit constitutional authority or on the basis of an explicit mandate from the General Assembly or the Security Council. What we certainly do not want is the establishment of another autonomous United Nations institution armed with a broad fishing license from the General Assembly. Instead what appears to be called for is the adaptation to the human rights field of the kind of machinery and administrative style that is invoked when the Secretary-General assumes peacemaking or plebiscitory assignments on behalf of the United Nations.

Our preference should therefore be for strengthening the resources and broadening the options open to the Secretary-General, so that he can select and adapt the instrumentalities that suit particular cases. Such a system has proved politically and administratively sound in the past, and would put us in a much better position to exercise some influence on the Secretary-General’s choice of representatives and procedures. The Secretary-General should be able to call both on his staff and on neutral and experienced diplomats outside his own establishment to accomplish this task.

I would therefore suggest that in place of a United Nations Commissioner, we consider taking the initiative, on an appropriate occasion during the 18th General Assembly discussion of human rights, in proposing that the United Nations executive capacity to act in the human rights field be strengthened in the following way:

a. To enable the Secretary-General to take on broader functions in the field of human rights, expand the staff of the Under Secretary for Social and Economic Affairs by the addition of experts who could advise the Secretary-General on problems arising in connection with both advisory and investigative activities of the United Nations.

b. Include in the staff personnel who would be available to the Secretary-General to undertake investigations and make reports on all human rights problems with which the Secretary-General is charged.

c. Request and authorize the Secretary-General to set up a panel of distinguished world figures, with the appropriate academic, judicial and administrative experience and background in various fields of human rights, so that they would be available to him for assignment as his special representatives as occasion requires.

Thus, one could envisage the Secretary-General at the request of interested members and with the approval of the South Vietnamese government naming a special representative to visit South Vietnam to observe and report on the treatment of Buddhists, thus deflecting a premature call for General Assembly consideration. In the Berlin situation, to take another example, we might want to involve the United Nations in the human rights aspects without engaging the United Nations in the basic political issues of Berlin. We could consider the possibility on an appropriate occasion of a General Assembly request to the Secretary-General to send a special representative to Berlin to report on the humanitarian aspects.

Many other instances will come to mind. The main point is that we can expect in the future that the functions of the United Nations in human rights matters will be expanded, and that they will be broadly interpreted to include racial situations with political dimensions. We should encourage the Secretary-General’s involvement, rather than that of another General Assembly committee or commissioner both of which are likely to cause us more political trouble than recourse to the tested facilities of the Secretary-General. Our effort should therefore be directed toward broadening the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and giving him the staff and facilities to do the job. Such a staff would work with the human rights commission and supplement its activities, particularly in studies and reporting. But when the staff undertakes human rights assignments with political aspects—and this would definitely include any investigative activities—it would be administratively controlled by the Secretary-General who would accept political responsibility for its work.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, SOC 14 ECOSOC. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Nathan A. Pelcovits. A note on the memorandum indicates it was not sent.