241. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland)1
The proposed cable to Plimpton on financing UN peacekeeping operations2 is generally excellent-but I have several minor objections:
- 1.
-
The language near the top of page 2 that “our national interest would cause us not to favor abrupt phasing out of UN Congo operation” is irrelevant to the limited purpose of this first cable and prejudges a matter that deserves far more attention. Before Congress would approve any voluntary contribution or other special UN support in excess of 33–1/3%, key members would closely examine the Department as to whether a sharp reduction of UN forces in the Congo had been undertaken promptly on removal of Tshombe from the picture there. There is a strong possibility that we will be charged with deceit (and with some foundation for it) if we now try to keep UN forces there for a half year or more in order to supplement the local army or “do nation rebuilding” after going to Congress for funds for a year and a half allegedly to get Katanga re-integrated. Many in Congress will say the Department keeps changing its grounds for asking for these funds and this will be the third time we have shifted the basis of the UN being in the Congo.
USUN reports have said practically all UN members want the organization’s forces there quickly phased out. The Secretary over three weeks ago3 seemed to me to have indicated in a direct statement that a sharp reduction could be made in a month or so and a further drop to no more than a third of the present forces by early summer. For the present cable to say that no reduction is intended now (or perhaps for even six months) creates a record and confirms a policy that will cause vigorous Congressional objections that could impede if not checkmate later appropriations above 33–1/3%. At the least, the reference on page 2 should be deleted. Far better, the proposed policy behind the statement should be examined and that has not been done for key members of Congress as yet.
- 2.
- Reference to “whatever formula” near the bottom of page 2 seems to me to be extraneous and could be construed as an instruction to allow [Page 534] far more discretion to negotiators than I think should be left open. Our maneuverability with Congress is not potentially that open-ended.
- 3.
- In order to keep the record straight, I think it would be
useful for Plimpton to
have specifically stated at this stage (even though it would not
come up in negotiations for the present) that even if voluntary
contributions are made above 33–1/3%, Congress would almost
certainly attach at least two conditions to them. Only damage
would be done by Plimpton negotiating or USUN agreeing to a compromise which could not be
gotten through Congress because it failed to raise two
limitations that would almost certainly be imposed by the
legislative branch in the domestic environment that will exist
here for at least the next year and a half. Those two conditions
are following:
- (a)
- That the contributions by small nations will have to be raised so that the U.S. would not, by any construction, be making up for amounts that Cuba and Albania should pay. Regardless of the strength of the small nations in the UN, no Congressman that is up for election in 1964 is going to to on record as providing contributions that allow Cuba and Albania to contribute less than their share of the regular UN budget for the Congo operation.
- (b)
- Any voluntary contribution by the US to make up a deficit will be put on a matching basis with increased commitment from other large nations so as to be sure that any Congo deficit is actually met in full and there is not a second round when we would go back to Congress to ask for more money. In brief the matching formula imposed in the loan measure would almost certainly become a standard part of special U.S. contributions provided by Congress hereafter.