224. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Tour d’Horizon—UN Matters
PARTICIPANTS
- U Thant—Acting Secretary General of UN
- Philip Dean—Director, UN Information Center
- Mr. Ball, Under Secretary (in part)
- Mr. McGhee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
- Governor Stevenson, US Representative to UN
- Governor Harriman, FE
- Governor Williams, AF
- Mr. Cleveland, IO
- Mr. Talbot, NEA
- Mr. Wallner, IO
- Mr. Godley, AFC
- Mr. Sisco, UNP
After Mr. McGhee welcomed the Acting Secretary General, the following principal points emerged from the conversation:
1. Palestine Refugees. Mr. Talbot outlined our approach to the Johnson Mission, emphasizing in particular that what was being sought was acquiescence of the parties and not necessarily approval. (From Thant’s reaction it was clear he had not previously understood this point.) Thant, who was obviously fully familiar with recent developments, said he did not intend to express a public view on this matter at this stage, particularly since the principal parties concerned had not yet reacted. However, if at a later stage an expression of his support would be helpful he would give this sympathetic consideration.
After agreeing generally with the views expressed by Mr. Talbot regarding the Johnson Plan and the steps envisaged, Thant said he thought it would be difficult to go ahead if one of the parties should disagree. Mr. McGhee stressed we cannot let this problem drift since it would become even more difficult in the future. Mr. Cleveland said there is increasing unwillingness in this country to continue the “UNRWA retail operation” indefinitely and that if the Johnson Plan does not work we will have to look to ways and means to have the host governments undertake responsibilities for the refugees.
2. West New Guinea. After Mr. McGhee complimented U Thant on the role he played in bringing about a settlement of the West New Guinea issue, the Secretary General in turn said modestly that a settlement would not have been possible without the vigorous support of the United States. He paid special tribute to Ambassador Bunker. In response to Governor Harriman’s inquiry, U Thant said Indonesia has suggested a Mexican, Osorio-Tafall, who has been heading up the UN Technical Assistance program in Cairo, as the UN Administrator in West New Guinea. U Thant is now awaiting the Netherlands’ response on whether Osorio-Tafall is acceptable.
3. Thai-Cambodian Question. After Governor Harriman outlined our views on the Thai-Cambodia question, U Thant reviewed his conversations with the Thais and Cambodians in New York. After receiving the Thai request for sending either a representative or team to investigate the facts, the Secretary General communicated this request to the Cambodians on September 6. He received a favorable Cambodian reply last Sunday (Sept. 10), but they have suggested that the UN role not be limited to Thai-Cambodia but also include South Viet Nam. U Thant said this placed him in a delicate position since South Viet Nam is not a member of the United Nations.
U Thant reported Sihanouk prefers a Burmese as a UN representative in the area and the Secretary General has discussed two possible Burmese diplomats with Ambassador Barrington, Burma’s UN Permanent Representative in New York. The Secretary General expects to get the [Page 493] Burmese Foreign Minister’s reaction this coming weekend, and assuming an affirmative reply from the Burmese Government, he intends to send a UN representative to the area as soon as possible, probably by the end of this month. He will also send a UN staff official along with him. If the UN presence is limited to a UN representative or so, the Secretary General intends to defray the costs out of the present UN budget. If, however, a UN Commission is sent, the Secretary General intends asking the two governments to pay the costs equally. When the Secretary General indicated that he was thinking of sending a UN representative for a period of 3–6 months, Governor Harriman asked that he keep the period of time open since it would probably be necessary for such a presence to remain for an extended period. Governor Harriman also pointed out the difficulties which would be involved if South Viet Nam were included within the area of responsibility. He expressed the hope Thant could convince Sihanouk to go ahead with a UN presence dealing with the Thai-Cambodian area and to defer its possible extension to South Viet Nam.
4. Laos. Governor Harriman sketched briefly our present thinking on Laos, including the “growing pains” which the agreement is experiencing and explaining why more of a UN presence has not been possible to date. He expressed the hope that the UN Representative in Laos could act with more vigor. Thant informed us he intends to replace the present representative with an individual who could be expected to act more vigorously and decisively. U Thant agreed with Governor Harriman that the UN presence can have a salutary effect, although he felt Souvanna Phouma has certain obsessions and suspicions which will have to be dispelled. According to Thant, Souvanna Phouma sees the UN role limited to technical assistance. Thant said it would take sometime to breakdown some of the adverse psychological factors prevalent in the present situation.
5. Congo. Mr. Ball joined the group as the conversation turned to the Congo and asked the Secretary General to give his present assessment of the situation.
Thant gave a detailed interpretation of the events of the last 48 hours in the Katanga in which he maintained strongly that Tshombe had contrived the incident in which two Katangese were killed for the purpose of influencing the Congress on the UN bond issue. U Thant placed great emphasis on the need for the British to apply pressure on Welensky. U Thant is convinced that Welensky is in an excellent position to influence Tshombe and that the British in turn can contribute greatly by exercising influence on Welensky.
Thant said he was thinking in terms of about 30 day period (Oct. 10) in which the reconciliation plan should be put into effect. He detailed the steps taken by the UN experts in consulting with the various provinces on the Constitution, indicating a much more optimistic time schedule than our own as to how long it would take to achieve changes and complete the [Page 494] ratification process in the provinces. He said UN experts have consulted all provincial parliamentary leaders, including the Katanga (we do not have confirmation of this and are making further inquiry). He predicted the main problem would be where the residual powers reside; Adoula wants them to be maintained in the Central Government, whereas Tshombe wants them in the provinces. U Thant predicts we will know within a short time whether the reconciliation plan will work, the first test being whether the Katangese cooperate with the various commissions.
Once again Thant returned to the need for the British to get Welensky to influence Tshombe. In response to U Thant’s inquiry, Mr. Ball informed him that Mr. Streulens’ visa has expired and under our procedures it would be necessary for him to reapply if and when he left the country.
The conversation concluded with Mr. Ball and others emphasizing in particular the importance of full consultations with the Katangese on the question of the constitution.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IO Files: Lot 64 D 191, Woodruff Wallner Subject Files, U Thant Visit, September 13, 1962. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and approved in M and U on September 18.↩