Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

217. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 21, 1962.

SUBJECT

• United States Strategy at the 17th General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary
• Harlan Cleveland—IO
• Ambassador Stevenson
• Arthur Schlesinger
• Joseph J. Sisco—UNP

The following principal points emerged from the discussion with the President on US strategy in the United Nations at the 17th General Assembly.

1. Presence of the President at the UNGA.

The President felt we could not advise U Thant to oppose Khrushchev’s attendance at the General Assembly. He agreed U Thant might be asked to indicate to Khrushchev that if he decides to come to the General Assembly it might be for only a few days. While the President thought it was probably inevitable that other chiefs of state and government would want to attend if Khrushchev came to the Assembly, he agreed that U Thant might also be advised to tell Khrushchev it would be desirable not to make this matter a big show and that he should not encourage attendance of Tito, Nasser, Castro, etc. As to the President’s plans, the matter would be kept open pending U Thant’s return from Moscow. Governor Stevenson felt the President, without a lot of the build-up of last year, should come to the General Assembly, make a temperate, moderate speech, and that this would help maintain public confidence in the United Nations in this country. The Secretary felt that the President’s attendance again, and on more or less a regular yearly basis, might be resented by other delegations. He thought that if Khrushchev does not come then perhaps the President might go to the General Assembly and meet the delegates at a reception or possibly go up later in the session to make a major speech on disarmament. The President felt that if Khrushchev comes to the Assembly in the latter part of September he himself should go at the beginning of the session and speak before Khrushchev. If Khrushchev does not come to the General Assembly, the President is reserving judgment as to his attendance. In general, he was disinclined to go to the Assembly just twelve months after his last appearance. While leaving open whether he would attend in the absence of a Khrushchev appearance, the President asked that a possible draft speech be prepared for him so that he could make a determination on whether something worthwhile could be said. As to what might be included in such a speech, the Secretary suggested one section should be devoted to the settlement of disputes, citing in particular the role played by the United States on both the Laotian and West New Guinea issues. The Secretary felt also that some of the suggestions contained in the strategy paper² for strengthening the UN in the peaceful settlement field might be incorporated in the speech. Governor Stevenson said emphasis in the speech should be given to economic and social programs, trade, the Common Market and that this general area might provide one of several useful themes. Governor Stevenson also felt the speech should include a section on disarmament. In addition, he felt a strong pitch should be made in favor of responsible and moderate action on the part of the General Assembly as a way of increasing public confidence in the United Nations in this country.

2. Visits of Chiefs of State and Governments.

The President asked that a memorandum be prepared for him suggesting the ways in which such visits should be handled. Should they be invited to Washington? Should the President see them in New York?

3. UN Finances.

Mr. Cleveland posed the question, “After the bond issue, what?” He said that there were two possibilities: a special scale in which the United States would probably have to pay 44% or so; the other is to finance each UN peace and security operation by special voluntary contributions. The President felt it was easier to get money from Congress to support peace-keeping operations in specific crises than to get it to agree on the specific percentage contribution the United States would make for all peace-keeping operations. He agreed preliminary consultations could be undertaken with members of Congress and with delegations at the United Nations on the question of long term financing. However, such consultations would be undertaken on the assumption there would be no formal Assembly action until late in the session or at a special session in the spring of next year.

4. General Assembly Delegation.

The President reviewed the delegation list and found it satisfactory. The formal papers nominating the members of the delegation will be sent to the President for approval in the next few days.

5. Colonial Questions.

The President agrees we should oppose sanctions as a way for the Assembly to deal with Portuguese colonial policy and the South African questions. He also agrees we should attempt to get the Soviets off the Committee of 17 on the assumption that we would also do the same. The Secretary reported we had made no progress in our negotiations with the Portuguese on the Azores base and that they have linked this question with the United States position in the United Nations on colonial questions. The Secretary said we want to make a strong effort to get the Azores base negotiations completed before the General Assembly gets involved in a number of the Portuguese colonial questions. The President agreed we should see how far we can get with the Portuguese on this matter, although he was not disposed to make concessions on the colonial issues if the Portuguese were not going to make any movement towards moderation and were going to use the base negotiations as a means of exerting pressure on us.

6. Hungary.

The President was interested in having this item come up late in the session. He hoped any procedure to keep this question under review, while at the same time eliminating it as a formal item on the agenda in the future, could be justified as a more effective way to deal with this matter now than in the past.

7. Outer Space.

The President agreed we should make a vigorous defense of various aspects of US space programs on which we anticipate Soviet attacks. He agreed with the Secretary’s suggestion that the State Department, in consultation with the other interested departments, be asked to develop the lines of our response in speeches in the General Assembly on the four areas which the Soviets will attack: our alleged plans to “militarize” outer space; our alleged “contamination” of space through nuclear testing and project West Ford; our reconnaissance satellite program; and our alleged plan to achieve “US private monopolies” of space communications. The President agreed also we should try to secure Assembly approval for constructive measures of international space cooperation.

8. Berlin.

The President agreed with the Secretary we could not now determine whether Berlin would be brought to the United Nations and/or whether we should take an initiative ourselves if it appeared the Russians were about to do so. The Secretary reported contingency discussions were in train among the Four Powers on this question.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 7/62–8/62, Box 311. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and approved in S on August 27 and in the White House on August 29. Transmitted to Bundy under cover of an August 31 memorandum.
2. See Document 216 and footnote 2 thereto.