203. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy1
SUBJECT
- Meeting between the President and Ambassador Stevenson, May 2
The President and the Ambassador discussed the following subjects:
1. The Azores. The President said that in the nature of things the two issues—Azores and Angola—cannot be separated because Portugal will not permit them to be separated. The Ambassador said that, since the Azores were important not only to American security but to NATO as a whole, he felt that more of an effort should be made to seek the cooperation of the NATO countries, as well as Brazil, in bringing pressure on Portugal. He reported that he had talked to Macmillan along these lines, that Macmillan had said that Britain would be glad to cooperate to this end, and that Sir Patrick Dean was ready to do anything he could.
The Acheson memorandum was discussed.2 With regard to Acheson’s recommendation that the US not participate in drafting any more resolutions on Angola, the Ambassador said that American participation was essential in order to moderate the resolution; without American participation, any resolution on Angola would be much more extreme. Acheson’s recommendation that aid to Angolan nationalists be stopped was not discussed.
Action:Schlesinger to get a precise statement of Ambassador Stevenson’s views as to how he recommends that we proceed.
2. Congo. The President explained why he thought the negotiations concerting US and UK policy toward the Congo should take place in London. The Ambassador agreed and indicated the USUN interest in the instructions to be sent to Ambassador Bruce. Action: the President said that State’s instructions should be cleared with the Ambassador before they are sent.
3. Registration of Space Vehicles. The Ambassador explained the problem—i.e., the unwillingness in Washington to register temporary space vehicles (those which go up for a short time and then come down). The [Page 435] President said that he did not understand why they should not be registered, since it was not necessary to report the content of the vehicle. Action: the President said that he would personally check into the matter and let the Ambassador know.
4. Lake Tiberias. The Ambassador said that he thought it would be a great mistake to send the proposed Lake Tiberias note to the Israeli Government. While he felt that we would come out on the Israeli side on the question, he argued that the present draft would throw away valuable bargaining power, and that we should stipulate certain conditions before we accept the Israeli position. Action: the President asked that the Ambassador get together with Mike Feldman and see whether they could agree on anything.
Stevenson and Feldman subsequently agreed that it would be a mistake to send any note at this time. When the Israeli representative to the UN returns to New York in about two weeks, Feldman will go to New York and he and Stevenson will explore the matter together.
5. Kashmir. The Ambassador said that USUN planned to take no initiative in working on the resolution.
6. Chinese Representation. The Ambassador said that the Brazzaville group has indicated that it does not feel obligated to support the US position in the next General Assembly. The President said that in due course there should be a meeting on the Chirep issue.
7. UN Bonds. The President and the Ambassador agreed in expressing skepticism as to whether Francis Plimpton would be the most effective man to help on the Hill when the bond issue goes before the House. Action:Schlesinger to call Dutton and find out why Plimpton was chosen for this assignment and whether it might not be better to use somebody else.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, United Nations (General), 3/62–5/62, Box 311. No classification marking. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Assistant Secretary Cleveland.↩
- The April 25 memorandum, prepared by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson at Secretary Rusk’s request, urged that the United States make a determined effort to create a more favorable climate for renewal of the Azores Base Agreement, which was due to expire at the end of 1962. (Ibid., Cleveland Papers, Azores, 4/62–6/62)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩