Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

201. Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

A–273

New York, April 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• GA Voting

1. In resumed session GA several factors emerged on votes of importance to us which require close attention inasmuch as similar issues and similar voting problems can be anticipated in future. Specifically, successful outcome in blocking undesirable aspects of colonial issues having wide Afro-Asian and Communist support (e.g. mention of Comite of 17 in Angola res and call for Belgian troop withdrawal in Ruanda-Urundi) as well as on Cuban issue was achieved as result alignment in our support of: (a) Solid WE and LA backing. This included WE “moderates” such as Norway, Canada, Ireland, Austria and Sweden, whose support came with unusual ease this spring and WE states with grievances against us such as Portugal, South Africa and Belgium; it also included more difficult LAs such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Ecuador; (b) Backing by US allies in Asia (e.g. Pakistan, Thailand, Japan, China, Philippines, Iran) and by Malaya; (c) Abstention by French-African states and to some extent by friendliest Middle East countries (Cyprus, Lebanon and Jordan).

Chief factor assuring largest number these votes in UN appears to be our military and political alliances. Hard core of our supporters comes from NATO, OAS, CENTO and SEATO, and it is our mutual overall political and military commitments which seem to be primary factor in their voting on specific issues. Second important factor in maintaining our voting position in UN is developing shift of “moderate” Western countries toward support of our positions even in face of neutral opposition. Third important factor is fact French-Africans have so far been able maintain their moderate position. Our voting problem, as usual, is to continue to attract the “liberals” in this group while not losing the “conservatives”.

2. While there was some voting improvement, as indicated above, there was also some deterioration. English-speaking Africans such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and sometimes Tanganyika tended to vote with Belgrade Group, if not for the most extreme proposals, nevertheless for proposals we opposed—for example for the Mongolian Resolution re Cuba in Plenary, and on second operative paragraph of Cuban Resolution in Committee—more often than they tended to abstain with French-Africans. Similarly Tunisia tended regularly to vote with this group, while a year ago it was more conservative. Saudi Arabia, which by any normal standards might be expected to be no more unhelpful than Lebanon and Jordan, continued to vote and take debate and corridor lines (primarily because of Shukairy and Baroody) similar to those of UAR and Iraq.

3. Both Boland (Ireland) and Algard (Norway) have asked us if we noted change in voting and attitude of “moderate” Europeans. They added this was deliberate policy on their part to help keep UN actions moderate and to combat “take it or leave it” tendency among some Afro-Asians when they have agreed on text of resolution among themselves. Boland told us he had himself witnessed decline of League due to disenchantment of major powers. Substantial European disenchantment with UN had already set in; radical Afro-Asians likely to produce even more of this; role of “moderates” in circumstances was to restrain radicals more than to press colonial powers (which was their main concern in last few years). Both Boland and Algard also said advance in US policy on colonial matters was key factor that made such attitude on their part possible. Because US policy helped keep pressures on our allies to come up-to-date on colonial matters, European moderates could keep pressures on Afro-Asian radicals not to go too fast. In particular they felt it was necessary to have something (especially from US) they could all be for rather than just to be against other proposals, and that we were now doing this.

4. Difficult to analyze exactly what we should do in light above voting situation. Suggest, however, we should give close attention to following:

a. Measures to assure continued and better support from liberal Europeans, LAs, and modern Afro-Asians

(1) We must maintain forward-looking policy on colonial questions. In particular we must examine issues before UN constantly with view to US initiatives or to actions we can support and which can be expected to block or dull more extreme proposals. Early planning by Department is vital if we are to achieve this. Such policy is also essential to assure support of more liberal pro-West elements not only in Africa and Asia but also in Latin America and Western Europe.

(2) We must make major effort keep as close as possible to French-speaking Africans. They now possess balance of votes in Assembly. Their votes can determine who is elected GA President; their votes can determine whether GRC or Communist China has majority in GA; their votes are essential to give us two-thirds majority on issues in which Casablanca-Belgrade powers are willing to vote in conjunction with Communists against our desires; their votes could be either psychologically helpful or damaging even on issues where they do not determine outcome. Inasmuch as we will constantly be seeking their support we must be prepared to give them something in return, for example to support them actively for membership on UN bodies and to support them on some of their resolutions and amendments even if we not entirely happy with them. Conversely we should be prepared to caution them against positions which are hopeless and which will make them look bad among Afro-Asians generally even if some of our friends (including the French) sometimes object. (At the same time it is probably not desirable to talk to other dels, especially French-Africans, about how much importance we attach to their role.)

b. Measures to attract further support among Afro-Asians

(1) We need to make effort to break-up voting alignment of Arabs. Arabs now tend to follow UAR line, which sometimes puts them against us and almost never with us. They vote en bloc more consistently than any other group in UN except Soviet bloc. We now sometimes pull Lebanon and Jordan from this group; however they are always uncomfortable because it isolates them from the other Arabs. If Saudi Arabia and Libya could be persuaded at govt level to shift their voting pattern more in direction of Lebanon and Jordan than in UAR direction we might be able produce better Arab voting balance by making it easier for all of them to split away from UAR-Iraq line more often. It would be helpful to our voting situation in UN, in other words, if Arabs could be split into a “Casablanca” group including UAR, Morocco, Yemen and Iraq, and another group of Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Libya (possibly together with Tunisia). Key to such development is to seek to shift basic instructions to dels from Saudi and Libyan Govts. Their basic instructions now seem to be to vote in harmony with Arab group or majority thereof. Most frequently this results either in UAR-Iraqi domination of group or in following their lead when Lebanon and Jordan differ. If their govts could be persuaded to instruct their dels instead to vote in harmony with Lebanon and Jordan (and possibly Tunisia) we might have real gain. This would have to be done in capitals and might not be successful.

(2) We should also begin systematic campaign of persuasion here and in capitals to get more frequent votes for our positions from “middle group” (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanganyika, Liberia) of English-speaking Africans. Dept may wish pay particular attention to this group in field approaches.

c. Measures to hold support of our allies

(1) We need to bring LAs into our GA and general UN planning on ground floor and insist Europeans consult with them on same basis. Once LA voting bloc cracks seriously here we will have profound voting problems. Their support more crucial than ever and we need to give them greater and earlier attention. (See USUN 3402 for specific recommendations.)

(2) While not modifying our policies on colonial questions we also should maintain in UN best possible general relations with Portugal, Union of South Africa, Belgium and Spain in order to assure them that our differences on specific issues do not reflect general relations and to assure their positive voting support to maximum extent on broad-range UN issues.

(3) We must give firm support to our allies in Afro-Asian world (Philippines, Thailand, Iran, Pakistan, in particular) especially when they seek elections to UN bodies. These are Afro-Asian countries whose votes we count on, and get, on questions crucial to us. In doing this they risk being “ostracized” by neutralists, especially on elections. If we allow them to be badly defeated in such elections they will react in other UN votes, moving toward the protective coloration of “abstention”, and we will see further deterioration of voting support such as we have already seen in Ethiopia, Liberia, Tunisia, and to some extent Jordan. Where we are not prepared to support them, we should seek to persuade them not to run or to withdraw.

Stevenson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 320/4–1962. Confidential. Drafted by Richard F. Pedersen on April 18, cleared by Robert O. Blake and Charles P. Noyes, and approved by Zachary P. Geaneas.