Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

195. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, January 19, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Conversation with U Thant

The attached somewhat bland memorandum from State will probably not tell you a great deal that you do not already know.²

A couple of additional points:

1. West New Guinea. It is the view of Harriman and of the White House staff that we can most effectively stop an Indonesian invasion of West New Guinea by indicating to the Indonesians that they are going to get West New Guinea in the long run anyway, and that the one thing which would fatally prejudice their case would be an act of aggression. The logic of this view would be for you to suggest that U Thant point out to the Indonesians that military action is the one sure way of jeopardizing something which must otherwise fall into their waiting arms. I must add, though, that the Secretary of State seems to dissent from this proposed line of action.

2. US Attitudes toward UN. I think it is fair to say that there is an impending crisis of confidence in American attitudes toward the UN. The new apprehensions, which you yourself, of course, do not share, rise in great part from the flow of new small nations into the UN, from the expectation that this will continue for some time to come, and from the supposed consequence that the General Assembly will be dominated in the future by untried people from young and unsophisticated countries. The crisis has been foreshadowed in the tendency on the part of thoughtful pro-UN figures (Fulbright, McCloy) to propose the limiting of the US commitment to the UN as well as in the primitive “Get the UN out of the US and the US out of the UN” pitch of the John Birchers. Some of this will come to a head in the debate in the Congress over the bond issue.

You yourself have, of course, a steady confidence in the UN and in the purpose and capacity of the new nations to support the organization and live responsibly by the Charter. However, both the general situation and the bond issue debate suggest the need for moderate actions and tempers on the part of the new nations during the resumed session of the General Assembly. The most hopeful aspect, from the viewpoint of preserving US confidence in the UN, is the emergence of a reasoned and responsible group of statesmen from the new countries (among whom U Thant himself, of course, is a prominent figure).

3. UN Future. There is some speculation that U Thant finds the job burdensome, that he prefers to have more time for his own thought and work, and that he may therefore get out at the end of his present term. You might want to express sympathy for the sacrifices he has made in taking the job but add (if you are impressed by him) that he is playing a role of unique importance and that we hope that he plans to stay on. You might want to add that we are all interested in his long-term views about the future of the UN, and that you hope an opportunity will arise when you and he and Governor Stevenson can set aside present problems and try to figure out where the UN should be in, say, 1972 and 1987.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subject Series, United Nations (General), 1/62–2/62, Box 311. No classification marking.
2. Not printed. The January 18 memorandum outlined topics for discussion with Acting Secretary-General Thant. The President held a luncheon meeting with Thant on January 19 between 1:05 and 3:10 p.m. in Suite 42A of the Waldorf Astoria Hotel during a visit to New York.