Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

171. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 1, 1961, 7 p.m.

3227. 16th GA. We have reviewed political items before 16th GA on which decisions are needed. Fol are, in our opinion, most important:

1. Elections and slates: (A) LA candidate not yet in field for SC; we working on this with Argentina and propose raise question with Betancourt in Caracas; (B) we have had no response from Dept re desirability active campaign for Philippines in SC; (C) no word yet received from Canada or whether it interested in Comite I.

2. Disarmament: Must await decisions on nuclear testing (see USUN 3200² for our comments) and results of disarmament discussions.

3. Hungary: Since Dept prefers Boland not approach Hungarians in New York (Deptel 2358–USUN 18419)³ we are awaiting Dept’s decision re alternative initiative.

4. Korea: Coup in Korea creates exceedingly difficult situation for us in GA, both on seating of del and on substance of issue. Having put invitations to dels at 15th GA on basis acceptance UN competence it important new ROK govt again explicitly accept UN competence. Also appears necessary to us that we have new policy on Korean issue for this fall. We felt this before coup, which makes it even more imperative. Present policy created restlessness even among 16 and if, as is likely, neutrals such as India seek raise new elements there will be considerable support, probably including French Africans. We not certain what elements would be best or feasible in new approach, but if be able offer some kind of conf or meeting on our terms good vote might be expected. Possibility of avoiding Korean item entirely at 16th GA should also be considered. We note Seoul’s 1686⁴ comments ROK probably would not wish have issue come up this year. In light fact 15th GA referred issue to 16th session and it therefore on provisional agenda, this may not be easy course. However, if ROK requested further postponement of issue it might be possible.

5. African item: We believe it might be best if African item could be referred to Second Comite with view to avoiding more readily question of target dates, which will be one of first items in Comite IV. Suggest we be authorized explore this with selected African dels. Also believe postponement item gives opportunity for modifications in economic portion of draft res and suggest Dept examine it with view to making res more meaningful. If African dels not willing refer item to Comite II believe we must be at least as forthcoming on concept target dates as we were finally prepared to be at 15th GA and that we should tell UK this soon.

6. “Troika” Secretary General: Consideration by Assembly of top-level structure of Secretariat will be required as result report of comite of eight experts to review Secretariat’s organization. Sov drive for three-headed SYG will undoubtedly collapse of its own weight, but will produce counter proposals which may be even more difficult. One such proposal put forward last year by Nehru and Nkrumah and supported by certain members of expert comite will undoubtedly be for three Deputy SYGs—one from Sov Bloc, one Western, and one “neutral.” Suggest we be instructed tell SYG we as much opposed to “troika” at deputy level as at SYG level and to ascertain his views. We will withhold recommendations until we have studied report of comite of experts and have had SYG’s reaction to it.

7. Mauritania: What we do on Mauritania and Outer Mongolia in SC will vitally affect our relations with French-speaking Africans for entire GA. Approach being made Moscow per Deptel 2088 will materially assist us in this connection. If approach results in establishment of relations and admission of Outer Mongolia to UN, we should be authorized discuss this with French African states before public announcement is made in order to parley this change into maximum support from them on other issues in GA such as ChiRep, Korea and disarmament. If Outer Mongolian reply is not negative we should also be authorized discuss it with French Africans before public knowledge so that we can shift much blame as possible to USSR if Mauritania again vetoed. Suggest also Dept now request British delay application of Sierra Leone in SC until situation with Outer Mongolia clarified.

8. South Africa: Our observations re policy on South Africa conveyed in USUN 3102.⁵ Dept’s comments requested.

9. UNRWA: We see little alternative to extending UNRWA for another period. Given other problems we likely to face it would be politically dangerous to alienate Arabs to point which termination UNRWA would cause; we believe it highly important decision on UNRWA be made in light entire GA picture. Key issue likely revolve around length of UNRWA extension. Property rights custodian and/or repatriation also likely be raised by Arabs as major political contention. If material progress made through PCC Special Rep or otherwise on repatriation-resettlement issue, we may find it possible make policy advance over simple UNRWA continuation, i.e., generate some movement toward repatriation and resettlement.

10. Budget: Finding solution of critical cash problem of UN and financing of ONUC and UNEF will certainly be of crucial importance to future of UN. In our view, best approach probably is through establishment of peace and security fund; our preliminary thoughts re one possible solution pouched OIA/Westfall. In effort reduce magnitude of problem, suggest Dept review need for continuation UNEF at present level. As Dept undoubtedly aware, Secretariat giving serious consideration possibility reducing magnitude and, accordingly, cost of ONUC operation by end 1961.

11. Angola: Momentum of this item grows steadily and at 16th GA Angola could easily become one of two or three major issues. We will therefore need have worked out our policy objectives and next steps to be taken well before GA. In fact by then we may already have given definitive shape to our position under pressure of SC meetings. Assuming Portuguese fail take effective reform measures policy decisions will be (A) whether West should try deal with Angola problem primarily outside UN, with the UN action held to minimum; (B) if primarily in UN, what kind of practical arrangements can be set up to provide effective but orderly steps toward self-determination on basis which will get GA support. Present Portuguese policy certain to produce continued pressures for even stronger UN reses.

12. Procedures: We have discussed with UKDel desirability initiating steps to improve UN procedure. Campbell (UK) tells us there some hesitation about this in UKDel but he believes they will soon start consultations with other Commonwealth members on cosponsorship of item. If they get balanced cosponsorship they probably will go ahead but otherwise are not likely put item on this fall.

13. Outer space: Whether or not Sovs participate in work of outer space comite this summer, this field will be ripe by time of GA for US initiative designed reduce Sov prestige and put US efforts and objectives in favorable light before world public opinion. USUN developing ideas which we will forward.

14. Tibet: So far as we know decision has not yet been reached whether or not US will encourage Malaya, Thailand, and possibly Ireland, to resume their initiative for inscription this item at 16th GA. If Hungarian item dropped, subsequent dropping of Tibet item would seem equate it in eyes of many Afro-Asians as “cold war” item which had been maintained purely at US insistence. We therefore suggest prompt consultations with Malaya and Thailand to see if, without US prodding, they plan request inscription. (GA decision at end 15th session unclear about what done with Hungary and Tibet items but presumption is they were not transferred to 16th GA.)

15. Future of TC: Unless it clear early in GA future we wish TC have, debate likely be disorganized with decision contrary US interests. With departure from Council Belgium 1962, TC again be out-of-balance with but nine members and influence on GA be considerably diminished. Choices before us seem be (A) do nothing and allow influence TC wither; (B) amend Charter to provide larger membership; (C) provide for elected or appointed members of subcomite of Council under Rule 66 of procedures (Australian proposal), or find other means strengthen TC. We believe (C) offers most promise finding some satisfactory solution, pending conditions favorable to Charter amendment.

16. Comite on Info, renewal and terms: All-out effort will be made extend comite life indefinitely until all territories self-governing, and to revise terms reference enable hearing petitioners, full discussion of political development, including target dates for individual territories, and, generally, give to Comite on Info powers provided TC. UK has said it would not participate in comite on this basis. In any event question essentially one of competence (i.e., whether GA competent dictate to member states in absence specific provision Charter) and ties in with issue of target dates.

17. Southwest Africa: GA will have decide what is next step take to bring about change in South African policies. Comite SWA will by then have reported unable enter SWA despite terms GA res. It possible we will be faced with res which could seek revoke mandate and impose UN trusteeship or one which would request imposition sanctions against Union. Both discussed 15th GA without res and probable both will be proposed formally. Main problem for US is find something positive to support rather than simple opposition to extremist res.

18. Initiatives in UN: This GA, like last year’s, most likely be negative in nature from US point of view. Chief points of our concern likely be ChiRep, “troika” proposal, budget, Council elections. On other items we will be making little, if any real progress, and on East-West items we will continue be in weak position. (Nature disarmament discussion unpredictable now.) We and UKDel believe we must do something to overcome this negative appearance of GA (which may continue into future also), and must look for initiatives.

(A) If we can make proposal for billion dollar economic program (USUN 3152)⁶ this would provide dramatic initiative this fall.

(B) We also suggest proposals for African program be firmed up to point where we can make concrete offers of support for large-scale new African project, perhaps willingness put large amount into African development banks if established. African item now suffers from lack firmness of our part either (1) on what we wish see done or (2) on what we willing put into it. With advances on these positions, which we could put forward as response to African sentiment at 15th GA, we could again capture initiative and African imagination on this item.

(C) We should also make most in UN of program to use surplus food to assist food-deficient peoples through UN system.

(D) Another initiative which we believe US could take, and on which we should seek cosponsorship of other friendly dels, is something on concept of “open world.” Low key but substantial and extended efforts to propagate this concept both in UN and elsewhere would in our opinion be of substantial benefit to Western world. It represents what we stand for as contrasted to what Sovs stand for. Phrase “open world” is succinct and descriptive enough to capture world imagination as earlier concept such as “Iron Curtain” and we should be able put sufficient substance into basis US (and Western) national policy on such issues to make it something Russians will ultimately have to come to terms with. Current Russian hesitation on inspection systems, which is becoming better known to world opinion, will make them more vulnerable to sustained program on our part to promote this concept.

Stevenson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 230/6–161. Secret; Priority.
2. Dated May 26. (Ibid., 397.561–GE/5–2661)
3. Dated May 26. (Ibid., 764.00/5–2651)
4. Dated May 29. (Ibid., 325.95/5–2961)
5. Dated May 12. (Ibid., 870X.411/5–1261)
6. Telegram 3152 from USUN May 19, referred to a proposed “Plan To Establish and Activate a UN Development Authority.” (Ibid.)