Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

166. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)¹

Washington, April 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

• United States Position on “Package” Membership Proposal Including Mauritania and Outer Mongolia

The Brazzaville Group, who are the sponsors of the draft resolution before the General Assembly on the admission of Mauritania to the UN, have accepted the Soviet amendments to their resolution to include, and give priority in the resolution to, Outer Mongolia, and have requested that the U.S. agree to this “package” in order that another Soviet veto of Mauritania in the Security Council may be avoided. The French, who have agreed to support the Group on this matter, have informed us that the admission of Mauritania constitutes the “number one objective” of the Group under the instructions given them by their respective chiefs of state, and the Group have made clear that they will insist upon consideration of this matter at the resumed session. In this situation, the draft resolution with the Soviet amendments is practically certain of adoption despite strong Moroccan opposition to the admission of Mauritania and regardless of the U.S. position. A somewhat similar resolution, strongly and actively opposed by the U.S., was defeated in 1957, when the Assembly composition was much more favorable, by a vote of only 33 to 37 with 10 abstentions.² There is general agreement that the U.S. should vote against the Soviet amendments and abstain on the resolution as a whole if the amendments are adopted.

The pending draft resolution with the Soviet amendments would do no more than find Mauritania and Outer Mongolia qualified for UN membership and endorse their admission, with a request to the Security Council that it take note of this finding. In view of our recent decision to undertake negotiations looking toward recognition of Outer Mongolia, it would obviously be highly preferable if Security Council consideration of this request could be deferred until just before the 16th General Assembly. However, if the resolution is adopted by the Assembly, an African request for immediate Security Council consideration of this matter is likely so that the Assembly can act to admit Mauritania ( and Outer Mongolia) before it adjourns, and is practically certain when the Security Council acts on Sierre Leone’s application following its independence on April 27. Ceylon is President of the Council in April and is most unlikely to resist an African request for an immediate Council meeting. While Chile is Security Council President in May, pressure from Sierre Leone for early consideration of its application, which the UK would almost have to support, would make postponement for any length of time extremely difficult.

There are two courses open: (1) the U.S. could abstain or join China in voting against the admission of Outer Mongolia in the Security Council and attempt to organize a sufficient number of negative votes and abstentions so that the negative votes of U.S. and China do not constitute a veto, as the U.S. did in 1957 and last December; or (2) the U.S. could abstain as it did on the package proposal including Outer Mongolia in 1955, which was vetoed by the Chinese, and try to persuade the Chinese also to forego use of their veto. (If the GRC were to agree, this course would result in admission of both Outer Mongolia and Mauritania.)

Arguments in favor of the first course are:

1) It would put the U.S. in a much better bargaining position in its negotiations on the recognition of Outer Mongolia;

2) It would permit us to approach the Chinese in the broader context of our negotiations on the Chinese representation issue, in which we contemplate urging that both the U.S. and the GRC agree to forego use of their veto on membership;

3) It would not risk a Chinese veto of the “package” proposal, with the serious damage to the over-all position of the GRC in the UN that would result from such a veto, and particularly among the Africans;

4) It would not have the implications for the GRC’s status that adoption of a more flexible position on the Outer Mongolia question by the U.S. (and the GRC) at this particular juncture would have;

5) It would avoid a “back to the wall” reaction from the GRC just when we are trying to negotiate the representation issue;

6) It could give us a strong bargaining point with the Africans in obtaining their support of whatever handling is decided on with respect to the Chinese representation at the 16th General Assembly.

Arguments against the first course are:

1) It would almost certainly result in a Soviet veto of Mauritania for which the Africans would blame us;

2) The U.S. rejection of their approach would be strongly resented by the Africans, particularly as we could not explain our basic dilemma to them, and would be seriously prejudicial to our efforts to make them more responsive to U.S. influence;

3) It would probably result in such a reaction against the GRC as to reduce its support among African states, although the reaction would probably be less severe than in the event of a GRC veto under the second alternative;

4) It is far from certain that we could organize the necessary number of negative votes and abstentions in the Security Council to avoid the U.S. and Chinese veto which would be the “kiss of death” for the GRC in the UN. (There are five certain votes on the Council in favor of the “package”: USSR, France, UAR, Ceylon, Liberia; whether in the face of French-African agreement on the “package” and GA endorsement of it, the UK, Turkey, Chile and/or Ecuador could be persuaded to abstain is far from certain.) If we were to vote against, and this were also to be a veto, this would be contrary to established U.S. policy.

5) It is questionable whether the active U.S. opposition to acceptance of the “package,” which would be required not only in the Security Council but also in the GA to assure a substantial number of at least abstentions on the resolution there, is consistent with the decision to open negotiations on the recognition of Outer Mongolia, since we would not be in a position to explain that our opposition is essentially tactical and temporary.

The second course, which is that reflected in the attached telegram,³ avoids, in my opinion, these disadvantages and has the following advantages:

1) It would result in the admission of Mauritania;

2) It would go far to meet the request of the Brazzaville Group;

3) It would not be too unpalatable to Morocco;

4) It would undoubtedly be warmly received by the great majority of UN members;

5) It would avoid a complete reversal of our previous position on Outer Mongolia pending the outcome of the projected negotiations;

6) If the GRC agrees to forego the use of the veto, this course would avoid focussing the resentment of the Africans on the GRC at this critical time. It is, however, by no means certain the GRC would agree, whatever pressure exerted, to join us in an abstention. Its veto in 1955 came despite U.S. representations at the highest levels urging that it forego use of its veto in its own self-interest. If the GRC were to veto, the consequences in terms of loss of African support for its position in the U.N. would be extremely serious.

The disadvantages in this course are the obverse of the advantages in the first course and relate exclusively to our policies with respect to the GRC and Outer Mongolia.

We have been informed by USUN that Ambassador Stevenson has agreed to meet with the Brazzaville Group before the end of the week to give them our answer and there is a possibility that the Africans may raise their draft resolution at the next plenary, scheduled for April 13.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1960–63, 303.702/4–1261. Confidential. Drafted on April 12 by Virginia F. Hartley. The date is handwritten on the memorandum. An attached draft memorandum from Cleveland and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler, on the question of negotiations with the Outer Mongolians, dated July 20, is not printed.
2. The 12th Session of the UN General Assembly had considered a series of draft resolutions concerning the admission of the Republic of Korea, Vietnam, and the Mongolian People’s Republic as members. On October 17, 1957, the General Assembly rejected draft resolution A/PC/C.17, introduced by India and Indonesia, that called for the relevant records and proposals regarding all three applicants to be re-submitted to the Security Council for further consideration (on September 9 the Soviet Union had vetoed the admission of the Republic of Korea and Vietnam, while a Soviet draft resolution to admit the Mongolian People’s Republic was defeated by a vote of 5 to 2, with 4 abstentions). (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961)
3. Not found.