149. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy1
SUBJECT
- Public Opinion in Italy Prior to the Elections
Two factors in Italian public opinion may have contributed to the Communist gain of about 1,000,000 votes in the recent national elections.
Before the election Italians increasingly regarded the Soviet Union as moderate and reasonable in its policies, according to a public opinion survey conducted for USIA in Italy.
In addition, there was a pre-election increase in the number of Italians who said it is possible to be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time, according to an independent survey by a Gallup affiliate.
Those two public opinion factors were present at a time when Italian esteem for the United States and its leadership was at a new high.
1. General Reactions to the U.S.
The USIA survey, made in February, 1963, did not find any rise in anti-American sentiment. On the contrary, a substantial number of trend indices showed the U.S. and its leadership has rarely ranked higher in Italy. General esteem for the U.S. continued to rise from its 1960 levels and in February reached a new peak.
Favorable reactions to “what the American Government has been doing in international affairs recently” moved in precisely the same way. The belief that the U.S. was doing all it should do to prevent war; confidence in American leadership of the West; belief in the credibility of American statements—all these were at the highest levels in three years. There was the feeling—shared by a new high of two out of three—that American and Italian basic interests were in harmony. Finally, Italian neutralism, predominant in 1960, fell to a minority position [Page 281] as it was overtaken by those who preferred their nation to side with the U.S. against the U.S.S.R.
2. General Reactions to the Soviet Union
Fewer Italians than in 1960 found any commonality of national interest with the Soviet Union: general esteem for the U.S.S.R. and the credibility of Russian statements remained as low as ever.
However, net favorable reaction to Soviet international actions showed a sharp increase, from a net figure of -10 in June, 1962, to a +14 in February, 1963. The reasons given for such favorable reactions were nearly all couched in terms of Russian “moderation” and “reasonableness” in the Cuban crisis. In terms of Soviet efforts to prevent war, the net index rose from -15 to +7 between June, 1962, and February, 1963.
Therefore, relative to its previous standing, the Soviet Union was quite favorably regarded in Italy at the time of the survey.
3. Estimates of American and Soviet Strength
It is doubtful whether Italian voters’ estimates of American and Soviet strength were involved in their voting behavior. On the eve of the elections, the U.S. was in a relatively strong and improved position. Militarily, the U.S. was, for the first time, given a slight edge by Italian public opinion in nuclear weapons and—more important—a substantial edge in total military strength. In economic strength the U.S. was seen ahead by huge majorities and in scientific development as no worse than even. Only in space did the Soviet lead continue to be substantial. Finally, in terms of the wave of the future, the U.S. was expected to be the eventual winner of a quarter-century of “peaceful competition”—a sharp increase from 1960.
4. NATO and Nuclear Weapons
Reactions to NATO were, if anything, complacent. Consciousness of the organization was low and among those aware of NATO’s existence, the predominant view was that it was in a good enough condition, was strong enough, and that both Italy and the U.S. were contributing their share. Few appeared to favor either national or exclusively “European” nuclear forces. The predominant view was for reliance on American nuclear forces or some sort of all-NATO, jointly-controlled organization.
It was on the issue of nuclear war in general (not necessarily in a NATO framework) that Italians displayed the greatest sensitivity—a widespread emotion common to adherents of all political parties. Nearly nine out of ten opposed the tactical use of nuclear weapons against enemy soldiers attacking Western Europe with conventional [Page 282] weapons; a majority would still disapprove even if the alternative were being over-run. Two-thirds indicate they did not believe that nuclear warfare could be kept tactical and expressed the opinion that it would spread to attacks on cities. Three out of four saw no hope of personal survival of a nuclear war. On the optimistic side, by a slight margin, Italians felt that neither side would use nuclear weapons; and as many as two out of three were confident that the U.S. would not be rash in using nuclear weapons.
5. Issues of Disarmament
Closely linked to sensitivity to nuclear issues are Italian reactions to disarmament. In principle, nearly 100 per cent wanted world-wide disarmament—just about all desiring it to be “general and complete.” A clear majority favored an agreement with the Soviet Union to provide some degree of disarmament on the European continent. There was also a predominant feeling that American nuclear bases near the Soviet Union should be dismantled—presumably in some instances meaning those in Italy as well as those in Turkey. About one in ten voluntarily mentioned Italian bases though they were not brought into the question.
The huge figure of 96 per cent favored abolition of nuclear weapons throughout the world; as many as one in three felt so strongly that they favored the idea even if it meant leaving the West weaker than the Communist forces. At the same time, only about half the population believed that such a ban was possible. Despite this reaction to nuclear weapons, the very high proportion of 82 per cent believed that, in fact, nuclear war would somehow be avoided and was not inevitable. With the feeling in favor of nuclear disarmament went the desire to ban nuclear testing; but here the predominance of opinion took a skeptical view and considered that effective inspection—“as much checking in both countries as the U.S. feels necessary”—was a prerequisite.
On the whole issue of disarmament, two Italians out of three gave the U.S. credit for working to reach an agreement; but as many as one out of three—and most of these neither Communist nor left-wing socialist sympathizers—reacted favorably to Soviet efforts.
6. Common Market Issues
On current issues related to the Common Market, Italian opinion appeared to be lined up with the American position and against either the Soviet line or Gaullist nationalism. Two out of three wanted Britain in the organization, and substantial pluralities desired to see the Market extended to include various other nations. Proponents of “independence” from the U.S. were far outweighed by those wanting to work for an integrated Europe “in close partnership with the U.S.”
[Page 283]7. The Outcome of the Cuban Crisis and Revised Opinions of Soviet Russia
A major outcome of the Cuban crisis, other than American gains, appears to have been an increase in the number of Italians attributing such qualities as “moderation” and “reasonableness” to the Soviet Government. As cited above, as many as 30 per cent reacted favorably to “what the Soviet Union has been doing in international affairs recently,” compared to only 16 per cent reacting negatively. Most of this favorable group—comprising all segments of Italian political affiliation—went on to praise Soviet moderation and reasonableness in the Cuban crisis. When the question was asked directly in terms of Cuba, from 10 to 22 per cent of the parties ranging from the Center-left to the Liberals reported that their views of the Soviet Union had changed for the better. The reasons for this favorable change was nearly always given in terms of Soviet moderation and willingness to avoid war. Indeed, the proportion of those expressing improved opinions of the U.S.S.R. was just as high as the proportion expressing more favorable views of the U.S. Again, when the question was asked directly, public opinion was just as inclined to credit Soviet moderation as U.S. military strength for the outcome—an outcome which nearly all aware of the crisis felt had decreased the chance of nuclear war in the future.
Thus the gains of the U.S.—general acceptance of its need to act unilaterally and improvement of its already high general esteem and military image-to some degree appear to have been offset by the increased acceptance of the Soviet image as moderate and reasonable. The original Soviet provocation appears in the net to have been swallowed up by its subsequent behavior.
8. The Soviet Union and Europe
Although the P.C.I., like most local Communist parties, has of necessity stressed its independence, patriotism and indigenous quality, it has undoubtedly repelled a considerable number of possible sympathizers because of its connection with Moscow. Stressing its independence on the one hand, and on the other concentrating on improving the image of the Soviet Union so that the connection will be less damaging, have been permanent necessities for the P.C.I. Certain events of the past year and their reflection in Italian public opinion appear to have worked effectively for the Italian party’s propagandists.
We have noted the favorable reactions of all segments of the Italian population—ranging from a tenth to a third and higher—to the Soviet posture of moderation in the field of international relations. Another reinforcement of this view can be noted in Italian reactions to the Sino-Soviet conflict-a [Page 284] conflict which to a considerable degree tends to put Soviet Communism into the position of being a reasonable, moderate, conservative, almost pacific force as compared with the Chinese extremists. This conflict appears to have had particular impact among the non-Communist forces in Italy. Thus P.C.I. adherents are most likely to deny that relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China are bad, while adherents of the other parties—no less on the right than on the left—predominantly hold that relations have deteriorated. Again, it is the non-Communists who are most hopeful that eventually the Soviet Union “will think of herself as a European state and seek friendship with the West in order to oppose Communist China.” The P.C.I. sympathizers widely deny this possibility.
Such feelings on the part of large segments of the population provide a psychological atmosphere in which the Italian Communist party can operate effectively. The P.C.I. always has been among the most “reasonable” and “legal” in Europe.
9. Communism and Catholicism
The findings of an independent survey casts light on the effect of recent tentative contacts between the Kremlin and the Vatican. The study was made by the Gallup affiliate, DOXA, at about the same time as the USIA survey. It asked Italians: “Can you be, at the same time, a good Communist (enrolled in the P.C.I.) and a good Catholic?”
The results—only partially available—reveal that among right-wing socialists (P.S.D.I.) those answering “Yes, one can be a good Communist and a good Catholic at the same time” rose from 9 per cent in 1953 to 21 per cent in 1963; among Christian Democrats the rise was from 5 per cent to 16 per cent. For the nation as a whole, the “yes” response rose from 21 per cent to 23 per cent. In terms of the voting population, this 7 per cent switch would in itself amount to between two and two and a half million votes. It should also be noted that the question was posed in the extreme terms of being “enrolled in the P.C.I.”. Merely voting on occasion for specific P.C.I. candidates, for any number of reasons, would be felt by many to be considerably lesser offense-particularly if the voting were rationalized as merely being a protest against the government or against the rise of 12 per cent last year in the cost of living.
A follow-up study of the elections is underway.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 72 A 5121, Field-Europe/63. Confidential. Drafted in USIA/IRS on May 8. In a May 25 memorandum to Stephens (whose office bore the major responsibility for the Communist-related polling requested in this memorandum) Murrow wrote: “I have just read the memorandum to the President on public opinion in Italy prior to the elections. It is a first-class job. Pray convey congratulations to all hands concerned.” (Ibid.) The President requested on June 11 more thorough USIA polling results on Communist influence in Europe, including complete tables from the agency’s “worldwide survey.” (Ibid.)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩