134. Editorial Note
At a Director’s staff meeting in January 1962, Acting USIA Director Wilson corroborated press reports that Murrow was in Paris “with Pierre Salinger for a meeting with the Soviet press officer Karmalov concerning exchanges in television and other communications media with the USSR.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 88 A 18, 1/1, Director’s Staff Meetings/61) Henry Loomis, USIA’s “media head” for broadcasting, had broached the idea of a television exchange at a USIA Director’s staff meeting on March 6, 1961. He then reported that the “Soviets at last have indicated their willingness to proceed with the radio-TV exchanges provided for in the US–USSR exchange agreement.” The Soviets wished to send a team to the United States in order to develop arrangements for the exchange, and Loomis felt it best for the United States to do likewise to “prevent being short-changed.” (Ibid.) The exchange agreement for 1960–1961 was signed in Moscow on November 21, 1959, and entered into force on January 1, 1960. (10 UST 1934)
On February 20, 1962, Charles Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, sent a telegram on behalf of Secretary Rusk to George F. Kennan, Ambassador to Yugoslavia, expressing President Kennedy’s request for Kennan’s input on the Kennedy-Khrushchev television exchange, for which draft texts were supposed to be exchanged on March 8. (Telegram 878 to Belgrade, February 20; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Files, USSR, TV Exchange, 3/8/62, Box 190) Kennan responded on February 23 that the exchange’s “main target will be the Soviet people” and that the President should not consider this a suitable occasion for direct personal sole-mizing [sic] with Khrushchev” but use it “to correct by skillful indirection certain impressions Soviet propagandists have endeavored to build up: namely, that we are militaristic, wedded to Cold War, averse to peaceful coexistence, animated by imperialistic designs on others and uninterested in any constructive collaborative trend on international life.” (Telegram 3991 from Paris, February 23; ibid.) In a February 21 memorandum to his brother Ted at the White House, Tom Sorensen indicated that the President would “have the same advantages in his TV appearance with Khrushchev that he had in the Nixon debates: obvious sincerity, obvious ability, obvious youth and vigor.” The memorandum continued: “Questions and comments directed to Russian-speaking guides at our recent exhibits in the USSR provide a useful insight into the Soviet public’s concerns and misconceptions about the U.S. and its policies. Based on this experience and the advice of our demonologists, we recommend that the President [Page 254] emphasize” the U.S. desire for peace, its stance on Berlin and disarmament and nuclear testing, and the “welfare base of [its] free enterprise (or mixed economy) system.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 68 A 4933, Government Agencies, White House/62)
On the same day, Ambassador Thompson sent a telegram to Secretary Rusk, indicating that as a result of his understanding from Salinger that “Cold War themes are barred,” he felt that the “target should be average Soviet citizen” for which the “problem uppermost. . . is peace. . . . Therefore suggest plus for disarmament might be one of the main themes.” (Telegram 2255 from Moscow, February 21; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Files, USSR, TV Exchange 3/8/62, Box 190)
In the wake of President Kennedy’s announcement of the resumption of nuclear testing on March 2, the Soviets cancelled their plans to proceed with the exchange. In response to McGeorge Bundy’s inquiry as to whether the cancellation represented any personal slight by Khrushchev against the President, Charles Bohlen wrote on March 9, one day after the planned exchange: “The Soviets undoubtedly feel it would be quite incompatible at a time when Soviet propaganda was denouncing the President’s speech as ‘aggressive’ or ‘atomic blackmail’ to have” the exchange. He continued that no affront could have been meant by Khrushchev in his cancellation of the event since the event was at no point official and, therefore, nothing was ever publicly retracted; the only public knowledge of the event was in the United States as a result of leaks. Bohlen also pointed to Khrushchev’s desire to “bring about a Summit in Geneva,” a goal not consonant with “rebuff[ing] the President.” Because of these factors, Bohlen viewed the Soviets’ cancellation not as petty but “quite sensible.” (Ibid.)
Hans Tuch, a USIA specialist in Soviet affairs, reported to Murrow on February 27, 1963, nearly a year later, that at the conclusion of the 1962–1963 U.S.-USSR Exchange Agreement’s mid-term discussions, the USIA “expressed complete dissatisfaction with Soviet performance but received no particular encouragement that they will do better.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 72 A 5121, Field-Soviet Bloc/63) The exchange agreement was signed in Washington on March 8, 1962, and entered into force the same day. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 726–740.