Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

130. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy¹

Washington, August 31, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Considerations Regarding Nuclear Testing

1. What is now to be tested is not so much nuclear devices as the will of free men to remain free.

2. Those who today urge you to resume testing immediately will tomorrow contend that the decision to do so was merely another belated reaction to Soviet action.

3. What is required is time. We can within weeks achieve the position of the last best hope of freedom, sanity and survival. This can be done not only by the exposure of Soviet duplicity, but also by playing heavily upon the fears of hazards to health and future generations.

4. No further public statements should be made during the Belgrade Conference. Our people there should be instructed to say quietly that our arsenal is adequate to any demands that may be made upon it and that the President is considering the advisability of giving Khrushchev one final chance to draw back.

5. There should be no indication of consultation with our allies lest this be interpreted as a sign of vacillation or indecision.

6. Steps should be taken to bring the question before the U. N. General Assembly, where in the course of a roaring debate the Russians can be hoist on a troicka of their own making, Berlin, colonialism and nuclear testing.

7. I have heard no arguments from the military or scientific community to indicate a delay of a few weeks in the resumption of testing would endanger the national security. This time, if properly employed, can be used to isolate the Communist Bloc, frighten the satellites and the uncommitted, pretty well destroy the Ban the Bomb movement in Britain, and might even induce sanity into the SANE nuclear policy group in this country.

8. During this interval, special effort should be made to arrange for an Administration spokesman to appear on television and radio, not to make statements of policy but rather to explain why precipitate action is unnecessary and unwise and why this country should not, by the immediate imitation of Soviet tactics, throw away this opportunity to consolidate its leadership of the non-communist world.

Edward R. Murrow²

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Nuclear Testing, Box 799. Confidential.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.