Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

125. Memorandum From the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)¹

Washington, June 24, 1961.

SUBJECT

• The Nuclear Test Ban Issue

At your request my colleagues and I have undertaken careful study of the impact of the nuclear test ban issue. We have drawn on suggestions by the Disarmament Administration, Ambassador Galbraith and Mr. Chayes.

We believe this issue is a key, conceivably the key, to our Cold War posture in the coming year. Unless we persuade our allies and the uncommitted nations of the rightness of our course in this respect, we stand in grave danger of losing their support on other issues, notably Berlin.

Whether we decide to resume testing or not, world opinion must be persuaded that:

1. The United States has done everything in its power to obtain a treaty banning nuclear testing.

2. The Soviet Union does not want a test-ban treaty and thus has not negotiated in good faith.

3. If and when the United States resumes testing, it is because the irreducible minimum security needs of the free world including the neutrals require it.

To achieve these psychological objectives, it is essential we begin now on a massive, three-phase information effort. Abroad, this is a highly emotional issue. As Ambassador Galbraith said in his memorandum to the President: “A resumption of testing would cause us the gravest difficulties in Asia, Africa and elsewhere . . . The issue between ourselves and the Soviets at Geneva are abstract and poorly understood . . . If we are the first to test that will be the one noticeable and noticed thing. Those who are unfriendly to us will have a field day on an issue where they can arouse a great deal of popular passion.”

Our task, then, is to meet this emotional issue with the patient repetition of reasonable arguments cast in emotional terms. We have six months—the time it will take the military to prepare significant weapons tests. Specifically we propose:

Phase One:

1. Ambassador Dean returns to Geneva. If he does not, our stated willingness to go the “last mile” to obtain a treaty will not be credible in the eyes of the world.

2. The President makes a major “peace” speech in which he reviews U.S. and free world efforts toward disarmament since 1945, making the test-ban treaty the symbol of these efforts. He calls on the Soviets to put the world’s fears at rest.

3. A few hours before the President delivers this address, our Ambassadors call on the heads of government to whom they are accredited and give them copies of his message. Our Chiefs of Mission use the occasion to brief the foreign leaders on the US–UK draft treaty, and our position in general, in greater detail than the President does in his speech.

4. Dean flies from Geneva to certain “neutral” capitals (e.g., Delhi, Cairo, Djakarta) to assist in briefing foreign leaders. Certain U.S. scientists are employed to brief their counterparts abroad.

5. USIA undertakes a massive information campaign to stimulate interest in and support for our position among world opinion leaders. Themes: U.S. determination to reach agreement, contrasted with Soviet intransigeance—e.g. insistence on Troika and refusal to accept reasonable inspection. Importance of test-ban treaty as first step toward disarmament; without the former, the latter is unobtainable. If peace is to be preserved, the Soviets must give up some of their irrational secrecy which is unworthy of a modern nation. What are they hiding, secret nuclear tests?

6. CIA covertly: (a) Launches a signature campaign by indigenous groups appealing to the Soviets to sign the US–UK draft treaty; (b) plants rumors in the foreign press that earthquakes, TNT explosions, etc., in the USSR may actually be secret nuclear tests.

7. Get one or more neutral nations to introduce a resolution at next autumn’s U.N. General Assembly session calling on the atomic powers to sign a workable test-ban treaty with adequate controls. Stevenson and staff tirelessly press our case in the corridors.

Phase Two:

1. If the President determines that free world security absolutely requires resumption of testing should we fail to obtain a treaty from the Soviets (and this is a big if), preparations should be as secret and low-key as possible so as not to hurt the credibility of our agreement-seeking posture. There should not be a White House announcement; when the story leaks, the AEC confirms we are making contingency preparations pending a decision.

2. If our information campaign, our pressure on world leaders and efforts at the U.N. fail to budge the Soviets, the President and Mr. Macmillan make a final, solemn public plea to Khrushchev. Again, our Ambassadors in the field personally brief heads of government on this appeal.

3. USIA obtains widest possible dissemination and discussion of the Kennedy-Macmillan appeal. Themes: Free world security and survival requires either an effective test ban or resumption of testing. The Soviets may now be testing in secret. The Chinese may be behind Soviet intransigeance.

Phase Three (assuming a decision to resume testing):

1. If Khrushchev remains adamant, the President and Macmillan simultaneously announce their decision to resume testing, emphasizing that it is being done solely because free world security absolutely requires it. The history of our efforts is reviewed. The two leaders make it clear that we will not test in the atmosphere, and thus there will be no fallout.

2. The President and Macmillan write personal letters to all heads of government, for delivery by our Ambassadors just before the US–UK announcement, disclosing their decision and repeating the reasons for it.

3. The President, Mr. Rusk and Ambassador Stevenson-in carefully-spaced statements to keep our position before the public over a period of weeks-restate that position. USIA obtains widest possible dissemination of these statements.

4. Foreign correspondents and observers, including Soviets, are invited to witness the tests so that the public may be reassured about our no-fallout safety precautions. Worldwide scientific opinion is mobilized in support of this contention.

5. Shortly after weapons tests (but only after, because security is the only valid reason for resuming testing), we carry out tests for peaceful uses of nuclear power—AEC’s “Project Plowshare.” USIA gives widest possible dissemination to this project which seeks to utilize atomic power for digging harbors, generating electricity, extracting oil, etc.

6. After our first tests, the President reaffirms the U.S. desire for a test-ban treaty and invites the Soviets to resume negotiations.

Edward R. Murrow²

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 306, USIA Files: FRC 68 A 1415, Govt. Agencies, DOD/61. Secret. Drafted on June 24 by Thomas C. Sorensen and J. O. Hanson.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.