Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

110. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 11, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with Secretary McNamara, 11 July, 5:00 p.m.

1. The content of my letter of July 10th² on the subject of the budget was discussed in considerable detail. It was agreed that I, as DCI, should have access to the Defense intelligence budgets. SecDef plans to prepare for all intelligence budgets by function, setting forth cost and manpower requirements similar to that of the CCP study. This will be true for NRO, which is now nearing completion, for General Carroll’s DIA, and the classical Service intelligence operations, and for certain other particular activities. All of these are in preparation at the present time, and will be completed by Fall. The guidelines for the preparation of budgets have been established and there will be ample opportunity for review.

2. I confirmed that such a procedure would meet my needs, but that it was essential that I assure myself and the President that existing resources in all Agencies are being used to the maximum, that there is minimum duplication, that there are no visible gaps, and that the intelligence community is operating efficiently and effectively. McNamara agreed. I particularly raised the question of utilization of CIA resources and special skills. McNamara agreed that these should not be duplicated by DIA, but that DIA should make maximum utilization of such skills.

3. I raised the question of LeMay’s desire to take over all aerial reconnaissance. McNamara indicated that this would not be advisable; he would not approve it; he had so told LeMay that as far as he was concerned this issue was dead. He said he thought NRO was operating more effectively now, and he hoped there would be a continual close-working arrangement between Fubini, McMillan and the CIA staff.

4. I raised the question of the control of detection and analysis of Soviet missile and space activity, referring particularly to Dr. Wheelon’s plan for Mistic. McNamara asked that Dr. Wheelon review this organizational plan with Fubini, as McNamara felt the idea had great merit, although he was not familiar with the details.

5. McNamara had not been brought into the discussion of membership of GMAIC. He had no comment, except to say that he felt there were far too many people involved in all decision-making processes. He did not see why NASA necessarily had to be brought into the intelligence processes merely to make their facilities available, that the disciplines in NASA existed elsewhere, and in general he had some reservations about the plan merely because he thought that too many people were involved in all Government policy-making processes. He pointed out that the number of people who had injected themselves into the test ban discussions really had no right to a voice with respect to policy. I would expect McNamara would support Carroll’s objection to NASA’s membership on GMAIC.

6. Reference the supplying of NATO with information on Soviet capabilities as outlined in the 11 July memorandum of Elder’s and the June 14th memorandum of USIB,³McNamara could not recall how this question arose, and asked that we discuss it further later, with General Carroll, and if the issue still was unresolved, further discussion could take place.

7. [1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memoranda for the Record, 6/5–7/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on July 12.
2. In his letter of July 10 to McNamara, attached but not printed, McCone described discussions with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget concerning the extent to which McCone as Director of Central Intelligence (as contrasted with Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) was involved in the planning, preparation, and review of budgets, programs, and personnel requirements of the intelligence community. The letter set forth a brief agenda of issues for discussion at the July 11 meeting with McNamara.
3. The July 11 memorandum is attached but not printed; the June 14 memorandum was not found.