Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters

106. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, January 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between DCI and Mr. Bundy in Bundy’s office at 4:30 p.m. on January 10th

1. Mr. Bundy spoke of the concern regarding friction between CIA and Defense which apparently had been reported to him, and possibly to the President, by McNamara and Gilpatric. McCone responded that, in his opinion, the friction arose from two sources. One, DIA in establishing its areas of activities was giving substantial indication (at the working level) of a desire to duplicate rather than utilize CIA facilities. This tendency had been noted by General Carter and was a reason for many strong positions taken by General Carter in defense of this Agency. However, DCI noted that he believed all such controversies involving General Carter were, in the final analysis, amicably settled. Two, problems with Dr. Scoville, which to a certain extent were attributable to Scoville’s personality. Underlying these arguments was the constant desire of Defense and Air Force to pre-empt entirely all reconnaissance. Bundy volunteered that this would not be acceptable because history had indicated that Air Force reconnaissance [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] would be placed on a lower priority to operational Air Force programs and this would be undesirable.

Action: Despite the pros and cons of the various arguments, it is essential that both CIA and Defense adopt policies and understanding which will avoid so far as possible controversy and jurisdictional disputes. DCI should discuss this whole subject very frankly with Secretary McNamara.

2. McCone stated to Bundy that he felt that he must have a stronger voice in reconnaissance than now exists or was contemplated in the defunct NRO arrangement.² He pointed out that the actions of SAC in connection with Cuba demonstrated the point that a military unit will, if left to its own devices, place operational requirements on a higher priority than intelligence-gathering during peace time. McCone stated and Bundy agreed that CIA and not SAC was responsible for both the U–2 and Discoverer, as well as Oxcart. I pointed out that Air Force efforts in satellite photography had failed completely and this was agreed to by Bundy. McCone stated that he would discuss this matter frankly with McNamara but that he would not continue to be responsible for intelligence unless he, and through him CIA, was the final authority on reconnaissance operations, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Overt operations during a war are in preparation for military action and should very logically be a military responsibility.

3. McCone outlined his views on the reorganization of USIB and the manner in which the national resources such as NRO, AFTAC and NSA should be handled by a full-time Assistant Secretary of Defense. The alternative would be a new Deputy Director of Intelligence to handle these particular operations; however this seemed impractical in view of the very large amount of support required in the Defense Department.

[Here follow paragraph 4 dealing with Cuba, paragraph 5 concerning Chinese Communist nuclear capabilities, and paragraph 6 briefly indicating that Cuba and the Chinese Communist nuclear threat were issues of high importance.]

John A. McCone³

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, DCI Memoranda for the Record, 1/l/63–2/9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on January 11.
2. See footnote 2, Document 90.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.