60. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Read) to the President’s
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Washington, September 10,
1963.
SUBJECT
- Proposed Policy Statements to General Ne
Win of Burma by Ambassador Byroade
Enclosed is a memorandum recommending that Ambassador Byroade be authorized to make certain
policy statements to General Ne Win
in the President’s name. The statements are in the nature of reassurances,
without specific commitments, that the United States would assist Burma in
resisting foreign threats to its independence.
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Ambassador Byroade has an appointment
with the President today at 4:30 p.m., and will wish to discuss this matter
with the President.1
Attachment3
SUBJECT
- Assurances to General Ne
Win of Burma
There have been some indications in recent months that General Ne Win may be becoming increasingly
concerned over Burma’s vulnerability in the face of Communist China. To
some extent his aloofness toward the United States and even his domestic
policies (e.g. current negotiations with Burmese Communist insurgents)
may be influenced by a desire to please Communist China or by
behind-the-scenes Chinese pressure coupled with a belief that he could
not rely on support from the United States. If so, he might adopt a
somewhat more friendly posture toward the United States and a firmer
stance against communism in Burma if he were given reassurance that the
United States would be prepared effectively to help his country resist
Chinese pressure or aggression.
Given Burma’s neutrality and the very limited degree of cooperation
between the United States and Burma, there can be no question of a
formal commitment to take any specific action to help Burma. Moreover,
the Burmese themselves would not welcome any public indication that they
were under a United States or SEATO
“umbrella”. On the other hand, because of its geographical position
between Thailand and the India–Pakistan sub-continent, Burma’s
continuing independence and freedom from Chinese domination are of such
importance to the United States that we could not stand idly by if the
Chinese should move against
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it. While expending vast efforts to prevent Communist takeovers in Laos
and Viet-Nam, the United States could not accept a Chinese end run into
Burma.
In these circumstances, we believe it would be useful to have the United
States concern for Burma’s independence clearly impressed upon General
Ne Win. Ambassador Byroade will be proceeding to Rangoon
shortly and the occasion of an early substantive talk with the General
would be an appropriate occasion for this. We believe his remarks would
carry additional weight if they could be presented as coming from the
President.
We recommend that Ambassador Byroade be authorized to tell General Ne Win that the President wishes him to
know the following:
- 1.
- The United States regards Burma’s continuing independence and
freedom from foreign domination as vital to the security of
Southeast and South Asia, where United States interests are
deeply involved. Burma is no less important in this regard than
other countries of Southeast Asia.
- 2.
- In view of Burma’s neutrality it would obviously be
inappropriate for the United States to make a commitment to take
any specific military measures in some undefined future
contingency. Nevertheless there should be no doubt of the
willingness of the United States to take all feasible measures
to support Burmese resistance against foreign aggression, direct
or indirect, or against other foreign threats to Burma’s
independence.
- 3.
- United States concern for Burma is not diminished by that
country’s neutral foreign policy, which we fully understand and
respect. Nor is it affected by the form of internal organization
adopted by the Burmese so long as the Government remains
determined to maintain Burma’s independence and true
neutrality.
