442. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State0
1775. Eyes only Secretary and Ambassadors. Re Deptel 1742 and Embtel 1760.1 Supplementing my report on our conversation with Sarit, I wish point out he and his mil colleagues were concerned over US Govt’s selection of Udorn and Ubol for deployment US combat forces. That is why Sarit asked for further discussion on defining exact locations.
- Firstly, he repeated his view Commies will fight guerrilla war here. So, he and Secy McNamara had discussed locating battle group presently in Thailand somewhere along east-west highway to give mobility into north or northeast and be close to Lao frontier.2 Thai military especially worried about salient pointing into Thailand at approx 17 degrees 30 mins latitude and 101 degrees longitude. Therefore Sarit seemed surprised that we were now suggesting battle group for Ubol, when he thought we wanted it north for counter guerrilla operations. If USG strongly desires Ubol location for battle group I would appreciate guidance on arguments to be used with Sarit and Thai military.
- Secondly they are also interested in improving road maintenance and accessibility for mil purposes in north and northeast and asked [Page 934] whether battle group would have engr bn organically attached when deployed here. Gen Harkins confirmed battle group would, but he made it clear its construction capabilities quite limited and we avoided any further discussion of its deployment. Hope of this kind of help was reinforcing Sarit’s desire have battle group in Thai north central area.
- Thirdly, Sarit and Thanat convinced it would be better for local community relations as well as basic Thai/US relations if combat troops could be located and housed outside of urban areas such as Udorn and Ubol where large numbers Americans already concentrated. This is of course common sense for all of us. But in addition we have just gone through nasty incident with three Air America civilian pilots at Udorn who shot up King’s photo in their house when intoxicated, as I have reported [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. While Sarit has managed so far to keep this explosive case of lese majeste and inexcusable conduct out of Thai press, incident is generally known in Udorn and in govt and newspaper circles in Bangkok, and thus to Commies’. With this background Sarit wants to make doubly sure that influx of American personnel is controlled and indoctrinated to prevent similar explosive and dangerous incidents. Gen Harkins and I discussed question troop morale and indoctrination and believe nothing should be left undone from top mil authorities down to unit commanders to insure fullest briefing on Thailand for every individual arriving. Also indispensable are good command leadership, discipline and creative imagination to build up good relations and prevent or handle bad cases vigorously and quickly. In this connection, PriMin praised example 809th Engr Construction Bn and its Commander Col Hardin.
Sarit approved deployment because he said he agreed with their three missions as I stated and explained them several times at outset last night’s discussion, particularly first two. Evident that appreciation of these missions by Sarit and his colleagues was important factor in overcoming their concern about possible local incidents, Communist or left wing propaganda attacks and puzzlement of Thai population which has never had foreign mil forces stationed here in recent times except for unpleasant Japanese occupation WWII. In agreeing to US proposal Sarit asked us to keep these last three factors in mind in order to help govt minimize their repercussions. Of course our motivation of defending Thailand is strong reason in dangerous circumstances for Thais departing from historical precedent or recent reluctance.
It was also clear last night that Sarit had thoroughly discussed possibility of US deployment to Thailand with Thanat and senior mil advisors before our arrival. His response to my presentation was carefully worked out in advance and forcefully and systematically delivered.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/5–1462. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 1:45 p.m. and repeated to Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.↩
- Documents 438 and 440.↩
- See Document 436.↩