In accordance with your request of Saturday, communicated to the Bureau of
Far Eastern Affairs by Mr. Kohler and
Mr. Bundy, I am transmitting under
cover of this memorandum a paper examining the problem posed by the
Government of Republic of China’s support of the Chinese irregulars in the
Burma–Laos border area. This paper reports the background of the problem,
brings out certain basic factors involved in it, and, as requested by you,
treats in considerable detail the efforts we
[Page 90]
have made and are currently making to cause the
Government of the Republic of China to cease its support of the
irregulars.
Enclosure2
United States Efforts to Effect Cessation
of Government of Republic of China’s Support of Chinese Irregulars
in Burma–Laos Border Area
In 1949–50 some of the Chinese Nationalist military forces stationed in
Yunnan Province retreated into Burma in the face of the advancing
Communists and established themselves in a remote mountainous area of
northeast Burma bordering on China, Laos, and Thailand, sparsely
inhabited by tribal peoples and not effectively administered by the
Burmese Government. The Burmese Government found the presence of these
forces in Burma highly objectionable, and finally in March 1953
requested the inclusion on the General Assembly agenda of a resolution
charging the Government of the Republic of China with aggression against
Burma and calling on the United Nations to condemn its support of the
irregulars and to take steps to bring about cessation of this support.
Subsequently, a four-nation joint military commission was established in
Bangkok under United Nations auspices, with the United States and
Thailand lending their good offices to assist the Government of the
Republic of China and the Burmese Government in working out and
implementing a program to evacuate as many of the irregulars to Taiwan
as possible. By September 1, 1954, when the Joint Military Committee
terminated its activities, roughly 5,500 Chinese troops had been
evacuated plus another 1,500 dependents and refugees. On October 31,
1953 the Government of the Republic of China’s delegate to the United
Nations publicly disavowed the irregulars and promised that the
Government of the Republic of China would no longer supply them. On
September 18, 1954, following completion of the evacuation operation the
Government of the Republic of China, through a statement by its Acting
Foreign Minister, reiterated publicly that it would not maintain any
relations with any irregulars remaining in the area nor furnish them
with any support or assistance.
[Page 91]
Following the 1953–54 evacuation this problem lay largely dormant until
1958. Beginning that year we received mounting evidence of a revival of
the Government of the Republic of China’s interest in the irregulars,
marked by efforts to increase their effectiveness by supplying arms and
equipment and by introducing Republic of China armed forces personnel
into the area for training and leadership purposes.
There are certain basic factors which are essential to an understanding
of the problem that Government of the Republic of China’s support of the
irregulars poses to us. In the first place the problem involves a
fundamental divergence of national interests between us and the
Government of the Republic of China. In our view the presence of the
irregulars in the area gives the Chinese Communists a continuing
opportunity to intervene directly or indirectly, affects adversely our
relations with Burma, and hampers realization of our objective of
bringing about increased cooperation between the countries of Southeast
Asia in the face of the Chinese Communist threat. To the Government of
the Republic of China, however, and particularly to President Chiang, the irregulars represent the
spearhead of the forces that will achieve his goal of recovering the
mainland. All available information indicates that President Chiang personally is the driving force
behind the whole irregulars operation. Undoubtedly influenced by the
fact of his advanced age and his recognition that time may be running
out for him, he is obsessed with the idea that positive steps must be
taken without delay to exploit what he regards as the shaky position of
the Peiping regime as a result of food shortages and general popular
disaffection. In his mind the irregulars are a key element in the
operations that he feels must be undertaken to spark this positive
popular unrest into active revolt.
A second major factor in the situation is the composition of the
irregulars. The 1953–54 evacuation removed from the area virtually all
of the irregulars subject to control from Taipei. Those remaining
(estimated at 5,500, including dependents) were either local tribesmen
or Chinese from the adjacent province of Yunnan, many of them married to
tribal women. For the most part these elements, as local warlords
profiting from the opium traffic, were by their standards very well off.
They had no real ties with the Government of the Republic of China or
any interest in being resettled in Taiwan. These considerations are
believed to be still operative in the case of the great majority of
irregulars presently in the area. Clearly, however, they are not
applicable to those personnel sent out from Taiwan during the past year
or two (estimated at between 1,000 and 1,500), who are subject to the
Government of the Republic of China’s control and could be evacuated to
Taiwan if the Government of the Republic of China were prepared to
cooperate.
The Government of the Republic of China’s resupply and reinforcement of
the irregulars have been a source of growing concern to us during
[Page 92]
the past two years. Over this
period we have made repeated representations to the Government of the
Republic of China—both on the formal, official plane to top officials of
the Government and to Ambassador Yeh and [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] to the persons
responsible under President Chiang
for carrying out the irregulars operation—urging that it desist from
supplying arms and providing support to the irregulars. We have pointed
out that the Government of the Republic of China’s support of these
forces in Burmese territory placed it in a completely indefensible
position, particularly in view of its categoric assertions in 1953 and
1954. We emphasized that our efforts to maintain the international
position of the Government of the Republic of China would be seriously
impaired if these continued operations in violation of its publicly
pledged word were to become known. We also argued that the irregulars’
activity, spurred by Government of the Republic of China’s support,
constituted a standing pretext to the Chinese Communists to move into
the area or at a minimum to bring intensified pressure to bear upon
Burma, Laos, and Thailand. Finally, we stressed we could see no
potential benefit from the irregulars’ operations that could possibly
outweigh the very real harm that was resulting from them. All evidence
indicated that compared with the Chinese Communist forces facing them,
they were an ineffective fighting force which presented no serious
threat to Peiping’s control of the adjacent area of Communist China.
When these fears were realized late last year in the form of a joint
Burmese-Chinese Communist military operation against the irregulars, we
again spoke to the Government of the Republic of China urging that it
immediately cease supplying arms and providing support to the irregulars
and take expeditious steps to withdraw personnel under its control from
the area to Taiwan. In January, with their headquarters and airfield in
Burma overrun by the Chinese Communist and Burmese forces, the bulk of
the irregulars withdrew across the Mekong into Laos. In the light of
this new situation Ambassador Drumright on instructions from us (Tab A)3 met with President
Chiang on February 7 and told
him we considered it imperative that the Government of the Republic of
China avoid resupply airdrops to the irregulars that might result in
further deterioration of the situation, and by way of positive action
commence straightway to evacuate personnel under its control to Taiwan
and make arrangements with the Laotian and Thai Governments for the
disarming and resettlement of the remainder. The Ambassador stated that
we were prepared to assist these moves as necessary and appropriate.
President Chiang told the
Ambassador (Tab B)4 that he
would have to consider our
[Page 93]
representations before giving us a formal reply, but his immediate
comments did not indicate a responsive attitude, and action was
therefore taken to supply Ambassador Drumright with our counter arguments to points made by
the President and to impress on Ambassador Yeh the great damage that
might be done to the larger interests of the Republic of China if it did
not cooperate with us wholeheartedly in dealing with the problem.
In addition to our repeated representations to the Government of the
Republic of China we have also been at pains to inform the Thai and
Laotian Governments of our views on the irregulars problem. Following
receipt of reports that the Government of the Republic of China’s supply
operation was being facilitated by the use of refueling facilities in
Thailand, we made it clear to the Thais in December, 1960, that we
viewed the Government of the Republic of China’s support of the
irregulars with extreme disfavor and strongly indicated our hope that
the Thai Government would not cooperate with the Republic of China in
continuing it. In January of this year, having heard that General
Phoumi might be considering
enlisting the support of the irregulars in the Laos conflict, we made
strong representations to him personally cautioning him against further
aggravating the Laos picture by injecting the irregulars into it.
During the past week the problem has been rendered even more acute by two
new developments. First, the Burmese press, obviously inspired by the
Burmese Government, has initiated a campaign charging that modern-type
military equipment identified as being of United States origin has been
found in the irregulars’ captured bases. Second, a Republic of China
PB4Y which was apparently seeking to drop supplies to irregular units
still remaining in Burma was shot down by Burmese fighter aircraft;5 one of the
latter was also shot down, reportedly by ground fire. This flight was
undertaken clearly in disregard of the Ambassador’s explicit
representations to President Chiang on February 7. Our Embassy in Taipei reports that
the plane was supplied to the Government of the Republic of China under
our Military Assistance Program, but had not been supported under the
Program since 1958. The Thai Air Force reports that examination of the
plane (which crashed on the Thai side of the border) reveals that it was
unarmed.
[Page 94]
[1 line of source text not declassified] the
Government of the Republic of China’s indirect, tentative response to
the Ambassador’s February 7 representations to President Chiang. [less than 1
line of source text not declassified] that if agreement in
principle is reached [less than 1 line of source text
not declassified] the Government of the Republic of China will
approach the Embassy formally. In brief President Chiang offers to withdraw all Chinese
military forces from Burma and repatriate to Taiwan those willing to
leave the area, and promises not to supply further any irregulars
remaining in Burma. In return he would want United States assistance in
resettling the irregulars withdrawn from Burma in Taiwan, Thailand, or
Laos. More importantly, he wants an agreement between the Government of
the Republic of China, the United States and the Laotian Government that
the 3,000–5,000 irregulars already in Laos should remain there retaining
arms sufficient to defend themselves against hostile forces in the area.
The latter condition would not be acceptable to us, and the President’s
proposition while a step forward does not in our view meet sufficiently
the demands of the present critical situation.
As the record shows, the Government of the Republic of China—specifically
President Chiang—has consistently
disregarded our representations on this problem. Periodically,
therefore, we have considered whether we could take steps that would
force Government of the Republic of China compliance with our wishes. In
each case we have run up against a basic limiting factor, that the
amount of leverage available to us is in a practical sense very limited.
This reflects the importance of the role that Taiwan plays in our
strategic efforts to contain Chinese Communist expansionist pressures.
The large and well-trained armed forces of the Government of the
Republic of China represent one facet of this, [1–1/2
lines of source text not declassified] are a variety of
intelligence operations conducted on and from Taiwan that are dependent
on the cooperation of the Government of the Republic of China. Any major
sanctions against the Government of the Republic of China, such as
termination or drastic reduction of our military aid program, would place these operations in jeopardy and
also tend to undermine our larger interests in the region.
I do not conclude, however, that we are helpless in dealing with the
situation. It is possible that the Government of the Republic of China’s
cooperation can be forced by a limited, selective cessation of military
aid, and that it could be handled in
such a way that the adverse repercussions noted above would be avoided
or held to a minimum. Again I think that results might be obtained by
informing President Chiang that
unless he complies with our wishes on the irregulars problem, we will
not be able to continue to work with the Government of the Republic of
China in training special forces personnel and planning possible
operations by them against the mainland. On February 17, I authorized
the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to discuss [less
than 1 line of source text not declassified]
[Page 95]
on an exploratory basis the desirability and
feasibility of exploiting these possible areas of pressure. These
discussions have been begun, and it is planned to send further
instructions to Ambassador Drumright within the next few days.6
