Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

293. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 11, 1962, 9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Conversation of the President with Howard P. Jones, United States Ambassador to Indonesia

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Howard P. Jones, United States Ambassador to Indonesia
• Michael V. Forrestal, Senior Staff Member of the National Security Council

President Kennedy received Ambassador Howard P. Jones for forty-five minutes today to discuss the Indonesian situation and initiatives which might be productive following on the heels of the peaceful settlement of the West Irian dispute.

A summary of the conversation follows:

1. President Sukarno’s invitation to President Kennedy to visit Indonesia. Ambassador Jones extended to President Kennedy the urgent renewal by President Sukarno of his earlier invitation for the American President to visit Indonesia. Recognizing the many demands upon President Kennedy, the Ambassador, nevertheless, strongly urged that the President endeavor to find time for a trip to the Far East which would include a visit to Indonesia. The Ambassador emphasized that no American president had ever visited this fifth largest country in the world and that the Indonesians, emotional and sentimental as they were, would be more moved by such a gesture than any amount of financial assistance. The President, pointing out that he would have to visit other countries if he made a trip to Indonesia, nevertheless, promised to give the matter earnest consideration.

2. The relationship between President Kennedy and President Sukarno. The Ambassador emphasized that Sukarno placed a high value on what he considered to be a rapport between himself and President Kennedy, that Sukarno felt they talked the same language, and that Sukarno, who personalized everything, regarded international relations in the light of personal relations. This was an important relationship to preserve. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the help he had had from President Kennedy in this respect in the past, stressed that this was another cogent reason for a personal visit and urged that every effort be made to continue this relationship on the same cordial basis. President Kennedy suggested that the Ambassador carry back a personal letter to Sukarno and asked the Ambassador to prepare a draft for consideration.

3. Djakarta By-Pass. The President inquired whether this project was really worthwhile from the standpoint of United States objectives. Ambassador Jones replied emphatically, “Yes; indeed, in the political climate there obtaining, it was necessary” It was America’s rather dramatic contribution to the Asian Games on which all Indonesian attention was focused, but it was in any event a much needed improvement.

4. Asian Games. The President inquired whether the Asian Games weren’t something of a mess. The Ambassador agreed, observing that Sukarno’s refusal to admit the GRC and Israel was a stupid blunder, resulting in considerable loss of prestige to Indonesia.

5. West Irian. Ambassador Jones expressed his appreciation for the President’s leadership and active initiatives in the West Irian issue, commenting that a peaceful settlement would never have been reached without this. The Ambassador urged that the political advantage thus obtained be followed up immediately before time had eroded our advantage.

6. Plan of Action for Indonesia. Ambassador Jones referred to the plan of action for Indonesia which had been prepared at the President’s request covering economic, military and other initiatives which the United States might take to exploit our improved political position in Indonesia. The Ambassador said that he agreed entirely with its recommendations and urged that time was of the essence in implementing these recommendations if we were to effectively exploit the present favorable position we had in Indonesia. Ambassador Jones said we had an opportunity today we had not had since 1950 to cement relations between the United States and Indonesia. He particularly urged that the recommendations for emergency assistance in the Plan of Action be implemented on an urgent basis. Immediate help to enable the country to import badly needed raw materials and spare parts was especially important. The President inquired of Mr. Forrestal whether we had the money to do what was suggested. Mr. Forrestal replied it would be a close thing, but could be done.

A discussion then took place on various aspects of the Action Plan.

7. The Peace Corps. Ambassador Jones reported on the status of the Peace Corps in Indonesia and expressed his gratification that Sukarno had at last concurred in the establishment of a Peace Corps program in his country. Sargent Shriver’s visit to Djakarta had been outstandingly successful and we should shortly have a program underway.

8. Civic Action and Military Aid. The President referred to General Maxwell Taylor’s recommendation that we do everything possible to develop closer relations with the Indonesian military and wondered what Ambassador Jones thought about this. The Ambassador replied that he considered this of vital importance, that we are pinning our hopes on the Army in our efforts to curb the power and influence of the communists in Indonesia. The Army, most of whose officers were U.S.-trained, was basically anti-communist and we should do our utmost to keep the United States and Indonesian military together. We had a small military aid program in Indonesia. This should be continued and expanded as appropriate. The next important initiative in keeping close to the Indonesian Army was in the field of civic action. The Indonesian Army recognized it had a political role to play and that assistance in rural reconstruction and development was one way to endear itself to the people. We ought to do all possible to assist the Army in this task. The President concurred.

9. Long Range Economic Stabilization Program. Regarding this phase of assistance to Indonesia, the Ambassador suggested the desirability of the IMF taking the initiative in this sensitive area to avoid the unfavorable reaction accompanying any feeling on the Indonesians’ part that the United States was interfering in what they regarded as their internal affairs. A financial and economic stabilization program would necessarily involve some hard decisions and the IMF seemed the appropriate agency to discuss this problem with the Indonesians.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.11-KE/10–1162. Secret. Drafted by Jones. The time of the meeting, which lasted until 10:10 a.m., is taken from Kennedy’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)