285. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
207. Policy. CINCPAC also for POLAD. President Sukarno has accepted terms of preliminary understanding on WNG issue between governments of Indo and the Netherlands.
Subandrio asked me to come to his home early this morning to notify me of this final decision (subject only to rubber stamping by Indo Parliament) and to hand me a copy of the agreed text. I congratulated Subandrio on major diplomatic victory thus achieved and I [he] took occasion to express deep appreciation for efforts USG “without which peaceful solution would not have been possible.” He said Ambassador Bunker was “wonderful”, repeated several times “you can be proud of Bunker” in describing skillful handling discussion of difficult and delicate subjects.
When expressing appreciation for President Kennedy’s support, Subandrio—clearly relishing experience in retrospect, observed that in all his career he had only been “threatened” twice—one by Mao, Chou En-lai in Peiping; second by President Kennedy in Washington! Subandrio gave dramatic account of his interview with President Kennedy in which he said President had stated vigorously that he was on side of Indos in this dispute but that US would have to switch to support of Dutch if GOI walked out on one of the greatest diplomatic victories of all times and resorted to use of force. He, however, credited President Kennedy’s personal intervention at critical point with saving negotiations. It was obvious Subandrio’s decision to stay on resulted from this meeting. Finally, he said it was quite obvious that tactful exercise of State Department influence with Dutch had made agreement possible.
For record he wanted to make clear that GOI had not decided launch military attack in West Irian area immediately upon his return home; that decision to do so would have rested upon what he had to report. I commented that my assessment had been that Indos were poised for attack in event Foreign Minister returned to report failure of talks which Subandrio did not deny.
Subandrio further stressed outcome was outstanding diplomatic victory for US as well as Indo. Only US could have accomplished this result. Settlement of this dispute would mean much to US in terms of prestige in Asia and Africa. He noted it was first time US or any Western [Page 625] power had actively intervened to settle colonial dispute in favor of former colony. It was in truth historic occasion. (By inference, in context of what has gone before, this implied major defeat for Commie diplomacy and internal political effort by PKI.) Subandrio also noted that UN role in settlement this historic dispute should be substantial help to U Thant and offset on world stage experience in Congo.
I took advantage of this warm and friendly moment to urge strongly point raised in Deptel 125,1 emphasizing that now is time for GOI to play part of generous victor. Subandrio noted that agreement in paragraph 25 stated “after this agreement has been signed”, diplomatic relations will be resumed. He said this gave GOI great flexibility and assured me it was his intention resume diplomatic relations almost immediately if implementation of agreement went well. He was thinking in terms of month after signing. He pointed out that Sukarno, Nasution and others based on past experience were still suspicious that Dutch would create obstacles to smooth transfer of administration. But if all went well in first weeks there was no reason why diplomatic relations could not be resumed at once.
In this connection, he said President Sukarno, to whom he reported last night after 8 p.m. arrival, had expressed fear Dutch Parliament might not act promptly to ratify agreement and hoped US Government would do what it felt it could to impress upon Dutch importance of expeditious action. I said I would pass on this request at once but I observed I thought Sukarno’s fears were unfounded.
When Subandrio arrived at airport last night, majority of Cabinet led by First Minister Djuanda and large crowd of well-wishers were there to meet him. Spontaneous cheer went up from crowd as Subandrio stepped from plane. Sense of relief at result of talks was evident on all sides.
President Kennedy’s use of term “West Irian” in his press conference2 did not go unnoticed here. It was highlighted in press and several spoke to me about it at airport, including Deputy First Minister Leimena who, with big smile, noted this was first time President or any Washington official had publicly used Indonesian name for territory. Subandrio did not say but his elation suggested Sukarno’s approval of WNG understanding reached by his Foreign Minister had been wholehearted.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/8–362. Secret; Niact. Repeated niact to The Hague, priority to Canberra, London, USUN, CINCPAC.↩
- In telegram 125, July 31, the Department suggested that Jones stress to Sukarno that “magnanimity is a two-way street and counsel him that immediate resumption of relations after signing the agreement would be a constructive step towards restoration of good relations.” (Ibid., 656.9813/7–3162)↩
- In his press conference on August 1; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 592.↩