Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

197. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, October 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

1. I want to say one further word on West New Guinea before departing for Saigon.¹ I believe that it is more urgent than ever that you find an occasion to talk with Secretary Rusk about the American position on the issue.

2. The only resolution of the West New Guinea issue with any permanence will be one that clearly looks to Indonesian control. Otherwise the issue will continue to divert Indonesian attention from the constructive tasks of economic development, strengthen extremist forces in Indonesia and threaten a military showdown which could throw Indonesia into the arms of the Bloc.

3. It now seems increasingly clear that the Dutch are playing a double game with us. On the one hand, they continue to hint that the real effect of their plan for UN administration and ultimate self-determination by the native Papuans will be to give West New Guinea to Indonesia. On the other hand, there are increasing indications that the intent of Mr. Luns is to put the United States, as well as Indonesia, in a very difficult diplomatic position. His purpose seems to be to keep West New Guinea out of Indonesian hands and to force the U.S. to choose between siding with the Dutch against the Indonesians by accepting his proposal, or appearing to oppose the self-determination principle by rejecting his proposal.

4. Despite our efforts to dissuade him, Luns tabled the Dutch resolution in the UN on Monday² immediately following Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio’s speech to the General Assembly. The Dutch said to us that their proposal for self-determination was a totally separate matter from any Indonesian claim to sovereignty.

5. Subandrio is quite discouraged. He does not believe it useful to attempt to offer a counter-resolution or amendments to the Dutch resolution. He has stated privately to us and to the Afro-Asians that he considers the Dutch resolution a “declaration of war” against Indonesia and has indicated that he will say as much publicly when he returns to Djakarta, probably some time next week. We have attempted to dissuade him from taking so antagonistic a public position and to convince him to take advantage of the Dutch offer rather than refuse to participate in the debate. While Subandrio was understandably incensed by some aspects of Dutch actions and attitudes, he has not helped his cause by the brittle, unyielding posture he has-assumed with the Afro-Asians and the Latin Americans.

6. Thus, events seem to be moving rapidly to a situation of diplomatic impasse and heightened tensions with a very real prospect of a future military confrontation which would present us with a most difficult dilemma.

7. Secretary Rusk is understandably reluctant to get caught in the middle of this dispute. But our recent efforts to facilitate a solution and the movement of the situation toward a climax is forcing us into a more active role. Both sides recognize that our position could be crucial to the outcome.

8. Though we have generally taken an uncommitted position, we have left the impression with both sides that we consider the Dutch move a considerable step forward. We have never clearly indicated to the Dutch that their proposal is inadequate and that we feel that changes are needed. We have never attempted to determine how far the Dutch might be prepared to go in making changes, but we have implied to the Indonesians that perhaps they could obtain changes that would make the proposal acceptable to them.

9. It is time that we talked very frankly to the Dutch. We should emphasize to them that, if they continue to ignore the Indonesian interest in West New Guinea, their actions can only lead to a political collision in the UN and to ultimate military collision in West New Guinea with disastrous results for all concerned. We should make very clear to them that we consider the self-determination principle as embodied in their resolution to be rather meaningless—

Because the stone-age Papuans cannot be prepared for meaningful self-determination during any feasible UN trusteeship period; the problem simply will not sit still that long.

Because the continuation of an administration made up largely of Dutch administrative personnel (as the Dutch intend) will be hardly conducive to genuine self-determination.

10. We should make clear that we cannot endorse the Dutch proposal in its present form. We should seek to determine how far the Dutch are willing to go in accepting amendments. If they will not accept amendments which offer a hope of making their resolution acceptable to the Indonesians, we should encourage them to withdraw their proposal. We would then have to explore other alternatives such as bilateral talks (which the Indonesians desire) or our own suggestion for a UN Commission with broad authority to recommend disposition of the territory. The Dutch proposal to turn the territory over to the UN has put us in an advantageous position in one respect: we can apply pressures on the Dutch without being accused of attempting to force them out.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 10/16/61–10/31/61. Secret. This memorandum was not initialed by Rostow nor was there any indication that the President saw it. On October 13, Robert Johnson submitted a draft of this memorandum to Rostow under cover of a memorandum that reads as follows: “Attached, as per your suggestion on Wednesday [October 11], is a draft of a new memorandum to the President on West New Guinea. I think it is very important that this go forward as quickly as possible.

   “You will note that I have introduced the idea that we should speak frankly to the Dutch and put some real pressure on them. I know that FE would be in favor of this kind of an approach—which I have long advocated—but is up against opposition from WE and IO. The Secretary’s reluctance to become more actively involved is also an important factor. I think that the President will have a much more fruitful discussion with the Secretary if he is given a point of view to present than if he simply raises the question in a rather bland fashion.” (Ibid., 10/1/61–10/15/61)

   On October 16, Johnson sent a copy of this memorandum to the President and McGeorge Bundy, indicating in a covering memorandum that “this question could be a live one during the next couple of weeks.” (Ibid., 10/16/61–10/31/61)

1. Rostow was a member of the Taylor Mission to South Vietnam, which left Washington on October 15 and did not return until the beginning of November.
2. October 9. Regarding U.N. Doc. A/L.354, October 9, see Document 193.