Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

194. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, September 29, 1961.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

It is rather difficult to keep up with developments on the West New Guinea issue. I have had a memo in preparation for a week, but each time I return to the subject I find an important element changed. The attached telegram,¹ which I believe you have seen, is the latest and most interesting development. At last we have some idea of what the Indonesians might settle for.

There are some obvious difficulties in the Indonesian proposals, but they have the virtue of being relatively sophisticated and possibly negotiable. The crucial question remains whether the Dutch are prepared for some form of transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia.

Note that Subandrio “pleaded for active U.S. sympathy and support in finding a workable solution”. It seems to me that it is now time for us to move again. But how? We are now in a negotiating situation in which the U.S. can play two useful roles—to serve as intermediary and to put pressure on either side as it seems required. In particular, we ought to make absolutely clear to the Dutch the importance that we attach to their taking a flexible, forthcoming position.

I think it would be useful if the Secretary had a very frank talk with the Dutch in which he might make the following points:

a. That we now seem to be at a stage in the evolution of the West New Guinea problem where the prospects for a solution seem more favorable than they have at any time in the past.

b. That it seems to us absolutely crucial that this opportunity be seized; that if we do not make progress now there is a very strong possibility of a situation developing in which West New Guinea is not only lost to them, but Indonesia is lost to the West.

c. We commend the Dutch for the initiative they have shown in searching for a new approach and introducing their trusteeship proposal, but that we do not believe that the scheme, as so far developed, will be a solution which is acceptable to the Indonesians.

d. Accordingly, we hope that they will be very flexible in accepting amendments or alternatives. We should make clear that we feel that many of the concessions must come from them if there is to be a solution.

Throughout the subsequent negotiations, while we attempt to get both sides to be reasonable, we ought in general to maintain a posture of particular pressure on the Dutch.

I have tried this general approach out on Bob Lindquist, the State Desk Officer. He indicated that an immediate matter that we will need to clarify is whether Sukarno and Subandrio had read Luns’ speech at the time of Subandrio’s conversation with Jones. The apparent inclination of the Department seems to be to leave the questions of tactics largely to the Secretary in New York. Jim Bell, the Office Director, is also in New York at the UN for the session.

I asked Lindquist what he thought the Secretary’s reaction to the current situation was likely to be. He said that the Secretary has a very strong feeling that we ought not to get too deeply involved in any negotiation on this issue for fear that, if it breaks down, we will be blamed by both sides. I expressed the view that this risk seemed minimal if we put ourselves in the position where we did not stand on dead center, but somewhat on the Indonesian side. That is, if it was evident to the Indonesians that we were doing our best to make the Dutch see reason, we could only gain credit with them. Any bruising of our relations with the Dutch would, it seemed to me, be minimal. Now that the Dutch have made the first move themselves to get out of West New Guinea they can hardly blame us for forcing them out.

I asked Bob whether the WNG question was getting continuing high level attention in the Department. I asked whether, for example, Alexis Johnson was keeping up with it. He said that Alexis Johnson had not been much involved but that the Secretary himself took a considerable continuing interest.

I fear that a position of complete dead-center neutrality risks the loss of an important opportunity to settle the West New Guinea problem and of an opportunity to gain political capital with Indonesia. We can’t know now what our position will be on particular issues because we don’t know how those issues will present themselves. But I think we ought to develop a little more clarity about our objective. It seems to me that our objective must be to find an approach which will give the Indonesians real assurance that they will gain control of WNG. If we adopt this objective, our role in the negotiations will be a good deal clearer to ourselves and to the Indonesians. We will necessarily be in a position of applying pressure to the Dutch.

Again I suggest that the question involved here, though it presents itself at present in the form of a question about negotiating tactics, is actually a high policy question about which there ought to be conversation between the President and Secretary Rusk. Could it be suggested to the President that he have a talk with the Secretary?

(It is possible that the Secretary’s attitude is affected by the Dutch reaction to our role in the negotiations that led to Indonesian independence. I know from personal contact with Dutch in The Netherlands at the time how bitter their feeling was about our role, though I think they exaggerated it. But the other side of that coin is that we earned political capital with the Indonesians which we have retained even to this day, though it was considerably dissipated by the rebellion. Moreover, as I have suggested above, the public Dutch decision to get out of West New Guinea creates a situation in which we can hardly be charged with pushing them out.)

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 9/61. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer.
1. Reference is to telegram 582 from Djakarta, September 27, in which Jones reported that Subandrio had come to see him on what he described as a matter of urgency. Subandrio stated that the Dutch position was beginning to change and prospects for a solution to West New Guinea looked brighter. Sukarno had ordered Subandrio to New York. Subandrio acknowledged that U.N. trusteeship for a short duration might be necessary to save Netherlands face before transfer of the territory to Indonesia. Subandrio made a strong plea for U.S. support. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/9–2761)