192. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State0

783. West New Guinea (WNG). At lunch today FonMin Luns (Netherlands) presented his thinking and ideas for internationalization of WNG.

I outlined to Luns my 14 Sept talk with Sukarno1 touching specifically on Sukarno’s vague proposal for UN administration of WNG with pre-condition that end result would involve reversion of WNG to GOI sovereignty, Sukarno’s rejection of self-determination, Sukarno’s optimism that pressures were at work on Dutch Govt to disengage from WNG, and Sukarno’s claim to be seeking full restoration of diplomatic and economic relations between GOI and Dutch.

Luns and Meijer said on most confidential basis they were considering, but had not yet decided upon, initiative at 16th GA either in form of requesting separate item on WNG or introducing draft res during debate on colonial declaration (GARes 1514),2 which they and NZ had supported at 15th GA.

Dutch position has now evolved to point where Luns can state to GA his govt’s willingness divest itself of sovereignty over WNG provided [Page 433] GA endorsement is found for UN administration of WNG leading to self-determination for Papuan people.

Luns indicated full flexibility as to manner in which UN would administer WNG. He had in mind precedent of Somalia in which sovereignty was given to people under UN trusteeship and administration. He also had in mind something along lines of TVA. Sole condition was that administration would be under UN auspices. He foresaw likelihood that Dutch administrative personnel in WNG would come under UN supervision with slight augmentation by other nationals. In answer to our query as to whether he could state to GA Dutch acceptance of Indonesian participation in administration of WNG under UN auspices, Luns said his Parliament would not permit such statement.

Luns did not profess to believe that this new position would be acceptable to Sukarno who views WNG as under GOI sovereignty and whose ambitions are territorial. Nonetheless he felt encouraged by conversations with Nehru, by Sukarno’s inability to obtain at Belgrade endorsement of his position, and by complete discretion which had been maintained by govts, including India, Malaya and Japan, with whom Dutch have discussed their proposal. He recognizes likelihood of Indonesian opposition at GA but felt two-thirds majority might be found for appropriate res.

We commented that we viewed this new position as extremely forthcoming and that, as he knew, U.S. hoped progress could be made toward some solution of WNG and lessening of Dutch–GOI differences. We were unsure that even with this new position Dutch could succeed in isolating Indonesia from ASAF group to extent Indonesia would be unable to build blocking third.

Luns commented they had discussed matter with 40 countries and were encouraged by responses received.

Luns did not go into pros and cons of separate item versus consideration under colonial item but mentioned advantage he saw of raising matter under colonial item in that this would make it more difficult for Indonesians to put in counter item. He also saw advantage for West in taking initiative which would show that WNG is not, strictly speaking, “colonial” question in light of new Dutch position.

We also asked Luns if he did not envisage some form of member state study commission which would supervise UN administration and be responsible for conduct of plebiscite. Luns said he did. We asked him if he would be able to state to GA that his govt would not object to Indonesian membership on this commission. Luns felt that he could so state so long as composition of commission was balanced.

I am very favorably impressed with this new Dutch position which I think goes long way toward establishing Dutch bona fides and exposing Indonesian territorial ambitions. I think concept of self-determination [Page 434] for Papuan people is sound and worth our support. I recognize likelihood that Indonesia will argue that self-determination in WNG amounts to attempt by colonial power to dismember GOI through secession, similar to arguments which were made about Katanga. I am unable to evaluate likelihood that Indonesia would be so isolated within ASAF group that Dutch have reason to be confident in obtaining two-thirds majority support. In any case it seems unlikely that any scheme could be found which would be acceptable both to Dutch and Indonesians. However, in light of my recent talk with Sukarno I suspect Sukarno may need continuing dispute with Dutch for domestic purposes. Nonetheless Luns’ proposal seems to come as close to Sukarno’s ideas as is possible without involving direct transfer of WNG to GOI.

Stevenson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/9–1661. Secret; Limited Distribution.
  2. See Document 191.
  3. U.N. Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted December 14, 1960, is entitled “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 110–111.