Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

190. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)⁰

Washington, September 14, 1961.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

Unless the President talked with Sukarno about West New Guinea privately at the airport, the subject was not discussed with the Indonesians during the Sukarno visit.¹ We also continue to lack specific information as to the Dutch plans for the UN. I am informed by Bob Lindquist, the State Indonesian Desk Officer, that the Secretary of State will see Luns in New York on Monday, September 18.² A talking paper has been prepared for the Secretary for that conversation.³ It is expected that that talk will produce more specific information as to Dutch plans. The Secretary will probably also urge the Dutch to be as forthcoming as possible.

As I see it, we have, up to now, played a useful, but rather gingerly, mediatory role. We have “suggested”, but not pushed our proposal for a UN Commission with broad terms of reference. We have never gone so far as to show either the Dutch or the Indonesians the draft resolution that we prepared and circulated for information to the U.S. embassies concerned. (That resolution would create a Commission with authority to “consider conditions” in the territory and to report to the UNGA “as to how the question may be resolved in accordance with the Charter”.)⁴

You may recall that some months ago I did a paper⁵ on our policy alternatives in West New Guinea in which I analyzed various alternative approaches in terms of the extent to which they would achieve one of two policy objectives: (a) a solution of the West New Guinea problem; and (b) the achievement of a major gain in U.S. relations with the Indonesians (by taking a position which was favorable to their interests.) The approach we have taken has emphasized the first objective over the second, though it has gained us some good will from the Indonesians. Given this emphasis, the cautious approach we have taken up to now has had real utility. The series of talks we had with the Dutch helped them to face up to the real situation and to arrive, on their own, at a more realistic and flexible position. They have come, as a result of these talks, to recognize the need for disengagement and to think specifically about how it might be accomplished. At the same time they have not been left with the feeling that the U.S. is seeking to force them out of WNG.

We are going to have to continue to play our role with some finesse if our objective continues to be one primarily of finding a solution rather than one of making absolutely clear to the Indonesians that we are in their corner. However, I think we have now arrived at the point where we are going to have to put some pressure on both sides if the Dutch are going to be sufficiently forthcoming and if the Indos are going to be brought around to a realization that they too must take some chances. It is Lindquist’s judgment that, if the Dutch drop a resolution into the UN hopper, they are likely to be quite flexible about accepting amendments. They want to be able to show that they stood by their principles, but that the UN took matters out of their hands. If this judgment is correct—and no one can, of course, be positive that it is—it suggests that we ought to be taking two kinds of action in anticipation of the UN debate:

a. We ought to ascertain Dutch intentions more precisely, if we can. That is State’s plan. However, we also ought to make very clear to the Dutch that we believe that it is of great importance that they maintain maximum flexibility with respect to possible amendments to any resolution that they submit. We should go beyond that and say that we will ourselves be prepared to work for or support amendments designed to give any UN Commission sent to the area the broadest possible terms of reference.

b. Following talks with the Dutch, we ought to have serious talks with the Indonesians in which we (1) point out that a UN Commission with very broad terms of reference would offer them a real opportunity to achieve their objectives—we might make the point that some (the British and Australians) seem to fear that the Afro-Asians will run away with any UN consideration of this problem; (2) recommend strongly that they take a constructive attitude toward any Dutch proposals because it is our judgment that there is flexibility in the Dutch position and that the Dutch will accept amendments to their proposal; and (3) that we will work positively for a UN Commission with broad terms of reference and that we assume that the Indonesians will interest themselves in the question of the composition of any such commission.

My recommendations go very much to questions of tactics. They may, therefore, seem to be matters that should be left entirely to the State Department. However, the question of tactics here is not unlike the question of tactics on a UN Angola resolution.⁶ It is a question of how far we should be prepared to go in risking Dutch displeasure in order to get a resolution that offers real promise to the Indonesians. It therefore becomes a rather important policy matter.⁷

If we could reverse our present course—and eventually we might be forced to—the question could become one of simply choosing up sides in this dispute. But as long as we are on the present course with its emphasis upon seeking a mutually accepted (if not mutually acceptable) solution, the questions do present themselves as questions of tactics. We ought always, of course, to bear in mind that if we do not maintain the momentum on this issue we may very well be faced by the question in the more dramatic form of a military confrontation which would present us with a real dilemma and out of which we would stand to lose much.

I recommend that you suggest to Alexis Johnson that the Secretary review with the President either before or immediately following his talk with Luns (preferably before), his ideas as to how this matter should be handled. In this review, I would like to see some discussion of the kind of tactics I have suggested above.

Bob

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 9/61. Secret. A copy was sent to Komer.
1. On September 13, Sukarno and President Kennedy met in the White House from 12:17 to 12:50 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) According to the memoranda of conversation of that meeting, both September 13, the two Presidents discussed China, the Non-Aligned Nations Conference at Belgrade, and the German problem.
2. The record of the Luns–Rusk conversation at the United Nations is in a memorandum of conversation, SecDel/MC/10, September 18. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Rusk listened to Luns’ proposals and provided encouragement.
3. Memorandum from Tyler to Rusk, September 16. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.56/9–1661)
4. See the second attachment to Document 181.
5. Not further identified.
6. U.N. Doc. S/4835, June 9, 1961. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 888–889.
7. Johnson added the last sentence by hand.