Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

188. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, September 10, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Brief for Sukarno/Keita Visit¹

Herewith some observations supplementary to the State Department briefing papers.

[Here follow items 1–8, Rostow’s suggestions on the President’s attitude to the Belgrade Conference initiative, arrangements for the visit, the summit, Germany, nuclear blackmail, inspections for disarmament and the test ban, a communiqué, and follow-up.]

9. Wednesday Talks—Sukarno.

a. West New Guinea. Although Sukarno has indicated that he does not want bilateral talks, it is in U.S. interests that there be such talks if at all possible on the West New Guinea issue. The issue now seems headed for a crucial debate in the UN General Assembly. We cannot stand still; perhaps the only reason that the situation has not yet moved to a crisis stage is the initiative we have already taken.

After discussing the matter with Secretary Rusk, you may wish to urge that Sukarno accept our idea of a UN committee to investigate the dispute and to make recommendations on the future political disposition of the territory. This approach sidesteps the self-determination issue. It would internationalize the problem without handing the territory over to the Indonesians, thus saving Dutch face. At the same time, because of the influence that the Afro-Asians would exert in the establishment and operation of such a committee, Indonesia might feel reasonably optimistic that the outcome would be favorable to them.

The Dutch now recognize that their interests lie in disengagement. They are willing to internationalize the problem through establishment of a UN Visiting Mission to West New Guinea to report on conditions there. They might be willing to agree in the UN to a mission with broader terms of reference, but may continue to insist upon self-determination, however little sense that makes for the stone-age Papuan population of New Guinea. The Indonesians seem to fear that the Dutch see internationalization as a way of keeping West New Guinea out of Indonesian hands. On the other hand, the British and Australians fear that UN consideration will get out of control, with the Afro-Asians dominating proceedings.

Because we have been reluctant to put ourselves in a position of appearing to back the Indonesian claim, we have not felt it desirable to spell out to the Indonesians our belief that their chances should be quite good if a UN committee were established. It would be very useful if you could probe further the reasons Sukarno seems reluctant to accept a UN committee approach. There is a serious question in our minds as to whether we should not be more explicit in suggesting to the Indonesians that they would probably come out very well under such an approach. We might, for example, either in these talks or later, suggest that, since some countries (Australia and Britain) have rather opposite concerns from those of the Indonesians, the idea may not be as bad from the Indonesian viewpoint as they seem to think.

Since the Indonesians seem to be looking for a sure thing, Sukarno might then ask for assurances that a UN operation could be managed favorably to his interests. He may ask, more specifically, whether we are prepared to put pressure on the Dutch to agree to a UN committee with sufficiently broad terms of reference and a membership sufficiently favorable to Indonesia. Our feeling is that we ought to put real pressure on the Dutch if such pressure is necessary in order to assure an agreed resolution. However, our approach to the Dutch on this question raises larger policy issues which we recommend that you discuss with Secretary Rusk in advance of the meeting with Sukarno.

b. The Pope Case. State proposes that you talk about the Pope case.² It is our feeling that to do so again would only inflate the importance of this case in Sukarno’s mind and suggest that, if he showed clemency, he could expect a good deal from us in return. We, therefore, recommend that you consider the matter carefully with Mr. Rusk before you raise it again. Perhaps the Secretary of State should handle it.

c. Aidit. You may not be able to control who Sukarno brings along on Wednesday. He introduced Aidit to President Eisenhower; and you may have the pleasure.

d. Economic Development. Professor Don Humphrey is back from his economic mission to Indonesia, and I have had a preliminary verbal report from him.³ He is at work on his formal report, a preliminary version of which should be available when Cherul Saleh (Sukarno’s rising minister, who is serious about economic development) comes to town late in September. With Sukarno you may wish to confine yourself to saying that you understand the mission, was very well looked after; you await a report of their recommendations; you look forward to the discussions your officials will have with Saleh later in the month. We may have some further suggestions about conversation on this point late Monday or early Tuesday.

[Here follows item 10, Rostow’s suggestions for the President’s discussion with President Keita.]

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Indonesia, Security, Sukarno–Keita Visit, 9/13/61. Secret.
1. Presidents Keita of Mali and Sukarno were visiting Washington as representatives of the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned States to urge Kennedy and Khrushchev to carry on direct negotiations for disarmament and peace. Therefore, a September 8 Department of State briefing memorandum for the President did not contain information on U.S. Indonesian bilateral relations. (Ibid., 9/12/61) A separate summary of the West New Guinea dispute, September 8, was sent with the memorandum. (Ibid.) Komer commented to Rostow in a September 8 note: “I can’t see the logic for avoiding things like West Irian,” and noted that Robert Johnson felt the same way. (Ibid.) In an undated note to Komer, Johnson stated that “the most useful result we might get out of the whole visit might be some forward movement on the West Irian problem” and thought it was the only bilateral problem Sukarno and Kennedy should discuss. (Ibid.)
2. Executive Secretary Battle sent a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy September 12, reiterating the history of Allen Pope and noting that the Department of State was under “extreme pressure” from the Pope family Battle recommended that President Kennedy raise the case with President Sukarno. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Indonesia, Pope Case) There is no record of Kennedy raising the Pope case with Sukarno.
3. See Document 186.