Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

72. Message From the Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency Station in Taipei (Cline) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Taipei, October 14, 1961.

Eyes only for McGeorge Bundy from Ray Cline. This is my Smilax 3 per 6943.¹

After consultations with George Yeh and many hours talk 14 October with Chiang Ching-kuo who was constantly referring substance to Gimo we hammered out a draft of proposed confidential understanding between President Chiang and President Kennedy which Gimo has seen and will agree to if advised it is acceptable to President Kennedy.

2. Draft understanding is verbatim as follows:

A. US will not vote for admission of Outer Mongolia to UN.

B. President Kennedy will at early opportune time to be agreed issue public statement as follows:

“The United States has always considered the GRC the only rightful government representing China and has always given full support to the position and to all the rights of that government in the UN. Therefore the United States firmly opposes the entry of the ChiComs into the UN or into any of the components of the UN.”

C. President Kennedy will give President Chiang the following private assurance through diplomatic channels:

“I wish to assure you that if at any time a US veto is necessary and will be effective in preventing Chinese Communist entry into the UN, the US will use that veto.”

This assurance will be given with the explicit understanding that it must be kept wholly private since public disclosure of such a pledge at this time would adversely affect the common US-GRC interest in preserving the free world position in the UN and keeping the ChiComs out of that organization.

D. The GRC will not use the veto against Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN.

3. If you advise me these four points are acceptable to President Kennedy then Gimo will invite me for private conference where he will definitely commit himself to this reversal of position on Outer Mongolia. Strongly urge approval of wording on public statement as this is by far most innocuous of many formulations discussed. It seems to me reiteration of technical juridical position of US on ChiRep issue.

4. Gimo says he expects great local political difficulties including necessity Prime Minister to resign. Gimo will have big convincing job to do. Therefore requests one week’s time for this job between US public statement and resumption UN Security Council consideration Outer Mongolia. If draft proposal approved by two Presidents public statement should be made soon thereafter providing only Gimo is informed of timing in advance via this channel.

5. Gimo says private assurance should not be in form of letter because in China this would imply lack of trust between two correspondents. In fact Gimo says he is willing approve this difficult change in GRC policy only because he has great confidence in friendship of President Kennedy and wishes build close personal understanding between two men. Suggest private assurance be delivered orally by Ambassador Drumright as diplomatic message from President Kennedy.

6. Since now have Gimo’s concurrence in principle will brief Ambassador Drumright at earliest opportunity in accordance your authorization received today.²

7. If President Kennedy approves this draft proposal and notification reaches me during next twelve hours believe Gimo will see me 15 October and give his firm commitment, this line of action.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, China, General, CIA Cables 7/61-10/16/61. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Transmitted from the Central Intelligence Agency to the White House, where it was received at 9:01 a.m. on October 14. It does not indicate the time of transmission from Taipei.
1. Reference is apparently to Bundy’s Out Smilax 3 message, cited in footnote 1, Document 71. Cline’s first message in this series, sent on October 13, reported that he had discussed the subject of Bundy’s October 11 message with Chiang Ching-kuo and had arranged to discuss it with George Yeh. In his second message, sent on October 14, Cline reported that he had talked to Yeh, who was to see Chiang Kai-shek that day, and commented that he thought a public statement by Kennedy coupled with the proposed private assurances would persuade Chiang to withhold the veto. (Ibid.)
2. Bundy’s Out Smilax 3 message, cited in footnote 1, authorized Cline to inform Drumright.