Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

53. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State⁰

Warsaw, August 16, 1961, 1 p.m.

282. Eyes only for the Secretary. Although Wang did not respond positively to first part my informal presentation (Embtel 281)¹ I considered occasion sufficiently favorable to proceed with expansion of remarks suggested in Deptel 221² which I emphasized was purely personal contribution advanced to see if impasse could in some way be broken.

I concluded by informing Wang that, after short holiday, I should return to Warsaw on August 28, to stay here until September 2 when I would depart for Washington. I told him that, had he any response to make to my presentation, I would be available to meet with him privately some time between August 28 and September 2.

Wang replied: I also think both sides should seek out common ground. It is most important both countries act responsibly in field of international affairs in order that peace be preserved. It is duty of both of us to resolve quarrels and strife between us. Concern which you have expressed concerning war with regard to Taiwan, however, is superfluous. We have said many times Taiwan is an internal matter for China in which US has no right to interfere. If the US were to act in conformance with President Truman’s statement and not interfere, then I believe greater half of Taiwan problem would be solved. Once Taiwan problem is normalized then basic issues between China and US can be solved. It is unwise for US Government to pay so much attention to small advantages only to lose important ones. For example, US persistence in its economic blockade against China has not prevented our reconstruction; on contrary, this blockade only hurts US economy. In similar way, US opposition to restoration to China of its legal position in UN does not prevent development of our friendship with peoples of the world but it does do great harm to US prestige. Perhaps you do not now share my views but I believe day will come when you will realize this truth.

I haven’t heard about desire to have Dr. Samuel Rosen go to China. I will look into this matter and if it is necessary to have another conversation with you, I will let you know.

I then explained again to Ambassador Wang that this was apparently case in which Chinese doctors hoped to have Doctor Rosen visit China in order to demonstrate his new technique to them but that failing any small gesture of concession from ChiComs side we had to discourage visit. I then once again expanded on our conviction that if both sides will seek resolution of small practical questions, this would promote relaxation of tension and maintenance peace.

I also took up his frequent reference to January 1950 statement by President Truman that US regarded resolution of Taiwan problem as internal affair of Chinese. I said outbreak of Korean war had changed the opinion of the American people concerning the ability of small nations in Asia to withstand by themselves external aggression. Basing himself on this new conviction of the American people, President Truman in June of 1950 had made second statement³ which took completely altered situation into account.

The meeting broke up with both of us assuring the other that despite the obvious seriousness of our differences, we must all exert every effort to resolve the problems between us.

Comment: With excellent interpreters on both sides and with reiteration of the theme through formal meeting and both halves of informal talk, Wang could hardly have failed to get the point of our approach. His fallback on classic ChiCom position was to be expected as initial reaction but he was far from hostile and at end he felt himself obliged to pay tribute to idea of efforts toward improvement. Since ChiComs will doubtless wish weigh our suggestions in light many other factors, I question if I shall hear from Wang before my departure September 2. Interesting he did not belabor ChiCom UN membership issue, probably for reasons of pride and desire show lack of concern. Significant also he wished avoid appearance of rupture of talks by insisting on tentative date three months hence for next meeting.

Beam

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8-1761. Secret; Priority.
1. Document 52.
2. Document 50.
3. Reference is to a statement made by Truman on June 27, 1950; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1950, p. 492.