Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

351. Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (Reischauer) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)⁰

Tokyo, February 12, 1962.

Dear George: I trust that the furor over the Wall Street Journal rewrite of the Beecher article on the Attorney General’s so-called “hint” about the equalization fee¹ has quieted down long before this letter arrives. But, in case it has not, I feel that you should know one matter that was not brought out in the telegraphic exchanges for fear that it might leak.

The Attorney General was supposed to have a personal message from the President for Ikeda (in fact, he had none), and we were informed (I cannot remember who in his party transmitted the information) that, before the Attorney General left Washington, Ambassador Asakai had been given a broad hint or even more that the President as of now did not intend to apply the equalization fee, whatever the Commission’s recommendation might be. Since there was every reason to believe Asakai had sent this information to Ikeda, the Attorney General and I decided that it would look most curious to Ikeda if the Attorney General did not mention this point as part of the President’s personal message. Under the circumstances, in fact, silence on this point might have seemed like a rupture of the close relationship Ikeda feels he established with the President in June. Consequently, the Attorney General, after giving Ikeda the President’s assurances of his determination to move toward more liberal international trade and to exert his energies to see that Japan was not economically isolated, told the Prime Minister that the President as of now did not expect to apply the equalization fee, but hoped to rectify the inequalities of the two-price system in some other way.

Ikeda’s reaction showed that it would indeed have been most unfortunate if the Attorney General had not made this statement. Ikeda said that he himself already knew of this from Asakai, that he had felt all along the President would not apply the equalization fee, but that he felt it would be most undesirable if this information leaked out at this time and that he, therefore, hoped the Attorney General would not tell anyone, including the Foreign Minister, of the President’s thinking on this matter. Only six persons were in the room at the time—Ohira, the Cabinet Secretary, Miyazawa of the Upper House (both close aides of the Prime Minister), Osborn of the Embassy and myself. My wording in Embassy telegram #2234² (“At no time did he make any statement or observation that could reasonably have provided basis even for Beecher’s original implications, much less Journal’s further distortions.”) was meant to exclude this conversation with the Prime Minister, since it obviously could not “have provided basis” for story. The statements in this telegram, therefore, are absolutely correct in my judgment.

There is one other point about the equalization fee problem I might as well bring up now. When a final decision is made by the President, whatever it may be, it would be highly desirable to have it passed to Ikeda before it is made public in Washington. This would strengthen his feeling of closeness to the President and would give him a chance to assume a suitable posture for the moment when the news breaks. A day or two in advance would probably be adequate, and the most intimate and therefore desirable way of passing the news to him would, I feel, be through me.

I sometimes despair of our American newsmen over here. They know so little of Japan that they get things wrong constantly. In the light of what has already been said between us and the Japanese and what is in their minds, the Attorney General (except for his Ikeda talk) was constantly throwing water on their hopes that the equalization fee would not be imposed. Despite this fact, I cannot overemphasize what a tremendous success the Attorney General’s visit was, especially the incident at Waseda University.³ While the latter skirted the thin edge of disaster, it turned out to be a resounding triumph that may well have a lasting effect on the student movement in Japan.⁴

Sincerely,

Ed

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-KE/2-1262. Secret; Eyes Only.
1. Reference is to an article by Henry Beecher which appeared in The Wall Street Journal on February 10. The article stated that Attorney General Kennedy had hinted while in Japan that the United States would not impose the cotton equalization fee with regard to Japan. After receiving representations from Ball, The Wall Street Journal printed a partial retraction on February 13. Further documentation on this incident is ibid., 033.1100-KE/2-1062, and in the Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Calls, Japan, February 10-12, 1962.
2. Dated February 10. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-KE/2-1062) It was sent for the Department’s use in denying the statement in the original Wall Street Journal article concerning the interest equalization tax.
3. According to telegram 2183 from Tokyo, February 6, the Attorney General dealt effectively with “Communist-sponsored” hecklers during a visit to Waseda University that day, and his handling of the incident favorably impressed the Japanese public. (Ibid., 033.1100-KE/2-662)
4. The Embassy’s lengthy telegraphic summary of the Attorney General’s visit concluded that the “outpouring of good will during this visit was on a scale unique in history of US-Japan relations.” (Telegram 2261 from Tokyo, February 15; ibid., 033.1100-KE/2-1562)