Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

330. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, June 20, 1961, 10:30-11:55 a.m.

In his openings remarks, the Prime Minister stated his appreciation for the reception accorded him in Washington. Kennedy welcomed Ikeda to the United States, stated his extreme interest in relations with Japan, and “pointed out that the security interests of the United States extend to the south to Latin America, to the east to Europe and to the west to Japan. Happy relations with Japan are a fundament on which United States security rests. The President expressed the hope that the Japanese people, likewise, would consider that their security depends on good relations with the United States.” (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

• Communist China

PARTICIPANTS

• Japan
  • Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda
  • Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka
  • Kiichi Miyazawa, Member of the Upper House of the Japanese Diet
  • Shigenobu Shima, Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
  • Koichiro Asakai, Japanese Ambassador to the United States
  • Toshiro Shimanouchi, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interpreter
• United States
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
  • Edwin O. Reischauer, United States Ambassador to Japan
  • FE—Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary
  • Walter W. Rostow, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • NA—Richard L. Sneider, Officer-in-Charge of Japanese Affairs
  • LS—James J. Wickel, Interpreter

The President, in opening the discussion of Communist China, said that the problem of Communist China, and particularly the United Nations aspects of this issue, is a matter of concern on which we wish the Prime Minister’s opinion. He added that he understands the Japanese do not believe the moratorium procedure would be successful at the next United Nations General Assembly. He said that the handling of the Chinese representation to the United Nations seriously concerns the United States since we wish to assure that the Chinese Communists do not gain U.N. membership while the Republic of China does not lose its membership. We are particularly anxious, he said, for the Japanese views on this problem.

The Prime Minister said that China posed a difficult problem for Japan since there are strong feelings in Japan on this issue. Unlike the United States, the Japanese people feel a sense of kinship to Mainland China due to geographic propinquity, long historical ties, and a sense of guilt regarding the last war. Furthermore, many Japanese consider it unrealistic to keep a country with 600 million people out of the U.N. The Prime Minister pointed out, however, that this viewpoint does not mean that public opinion favors recognition of Communist China. Public opinion is not, in fact, unified on the recognition question. First, Japan has a peace treaty with the GRC. Secondly, there is a strong feeling in Japan that Taiwan must be held by the Free World and under no circumstances returned to Communist China. The Japanese, the Prime Minister explained, feel assured regarding the stability and safety of Taiwan so long as Chiang Kai-shek is in control. They are most anxious, however, about what will happen after Chiang dies since they do not trust his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, due to the nature of his background and character. Further, out of the 9 million people on Taiwan, 7 million are native Formosans who cherish freedom and independence and whose desires should not be ignored. The Prime Minister concluded that it may not be proper to seek a solution to the problem of Chinese Communist admission to the U.N. before taking action on the broader Taiwan question and securing this area for the Free World. He thought most Free World countries would agree on this approach. Further, since both Chinas insist on a “One China” policy, the Chinese Communists would not come into the U.N. if we secure Taiwan now.

The President told the Prime Minister that Khrushchev in Vienna had informed him of Chinese Communist unwillingness to enter the United Nations if the GRC remains a member. This has continually been the Chinese Communist line. He felt, however, that it is difficult to agree on a formula which appears to indicate a willingness to take Communist China into the U.N. and to embrace in effect a “Two-China” policy. This will require a great deal of work in order to reach the right conclusion.

The President emphasized that the Chinese representation question posed a particularly difficult problem for the United States since there is a great deal of emotional interest in this problem among the American people and there are also very strong feelings in Congress on this issue. He said that it was difficult for us to enter into a maneuver in which the U.S. appears to be willing to accept Chinese Communist entry into the United Nations since this is perhaps the most sensitive foreign policy issue in the United States. He suggested that the Secretary discuss the details of the China representation question with the Foreign Minister and attempt to reach a more precise understanding with the Japanese Government before the Prime Minister’s departure. Prime Minister Ikeda agreed and said that he understood the feeling of the United States on this issue quite well.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/7-1861. Confidential. Drafted by Sneider and approved in S on July 14 and in the White House on July 20. The time of the meeting, which was held at the White House, is taken from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) This is one of six memoranda of this conversation: one summarized the opening remarks; the other four concerned Japanese-Korean relations (Document 232), Berlin, Laos, and nuclear testing. (All in Department of State, Central Files, 611.94/7-1861)
1. In a discussion of Chinese issues that afternoon, Rusk and Foreign Minister Kosaka agreed that recognition of the PRC was not contemplated by either country, but that the U.N. representation issue was crucial. Rusk stated that the GRC needed to acquire more tactical flexibility to retain its seat. Kosaka advised that the question of Chinese Security Council membership should be divorced from General Assembly discussion of Chinese representation and that “the status of the Taiwan Government should be limited to only the areas under its control. For Japan, the crux of the problem is keeping Taiwan free from Chinese Communist control.” Rusk stressed that he hoped a new formula on U.N. representation could develop through multilateral discussion. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)