Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

324. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 41-61

Washington, February 7, 1961.

PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN

The Problem

To analyze the political situation in Japan in the light of developments during 1960 and to estimate the general outlines of probable developments over the next year or so.

Conclusions¹

1. Although Japan will almost certainly remain aligned with the US over the next year or so, it will continue slowly to grow more assertive of its own independent interests and more active in world affairs. The conservative elements will almost certainly continue to control Japanese governments for the foreseeable future and Ikeda will probably retain the Premiership for the next year, at least. Japan’s economy will probably continue to expand at a rapid rate although it will remain sensitive to adverse actions abroad beyond the control of the Japanese. (Paras. 15-22)

2. Ikeda will almost certainly have his hands full coping with dissension within his party and with an irresponsible and increasingly aggressive opposition in the Diet. Consequently, he will probably exercise extreme caution in dealing with sensitive domestic or foreign policy issues and will emphasize domestic economic measures of popular appeal to the Japanese. He will seek to avoid accusations of highhandedness or subservience to foreign pressures. (Para. 16)

3. Pacifist and neutralist sentiment, born of Japan’s [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] fear of involvement in another war, will almost certainly continue to influence the government’s execution of its pro-Western policies. In addition, there will probably be strong domestic pressures for the regularization of Japanese relations with Communist China. However, if the US maintains its opposition to recognition of Communist China, the Ikeda government probably will not take any serious steps in this direction. (Paras. 23-27)

4. The Left will seize any opportunity to agitate the public and to maintain pressure upon the Japanese Government to obstruct effective implementation of the US-Japan security arrangements. In most circumstances, the Ikeda government will probably take fairly vigorous steps to oppose leftist efforts to obstruct operation of the US bases. [12 lines of source text not declassified] In addition, the utility of the bases would almost certainly be impaired by leftist mass demonstrations and labor boycotts, and possibly by sabotage.² (Para. 28)

[Here follow the Discussion section of the estimate, a political annex, and an economic annex.]

[19-1/2 lines of 2-column source text not declassified] barring an unexpected change in Japan’s leadership, we believe that the Japanese Government would not stand in the way of US use of Japanese bases for logistical purposes in support of security operations elsewhere in the Far East during the next year or so, although it would expect to be informed in advance of our intentions. [Footnote in the source text.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with this estimate on February 7 except the representatives of the AEC and the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.
1. NIE 41-63, October 9, 1963, reached largely similar conclusions regarding Japan: The outlook for continued political stability appeared favorable. The economy, while growing rapidly, was “exceptionally vulnerable to threats to its export markets.” Although the economy would continue to expand, it would probably not be “at the remarkable rate of recent years.” The Security Treaty would remain the “keystone” of Japan’s defense and military planning, but the Japanese would be “particularly edgy about their use in connection with hostilities which Japan did not see as an immediate threat to itself.” NIE 41-63 placed greater emphasis than its predecessor on an expected increase in Japanese international assertiveness. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) See the Supplement.
2. The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, and the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, would substitute the following text for the last four sentences of this paragraph: