Office of the Historian

300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea0

Washington, April 8, 1963, 6:57 p.m.

624. Seoul’s 789, rptd Tokyo 304, CINCPAC 264.1

1.
For time being at least, we believe U.S. should minimize its involvement in junta’s April 8 solution to political controversy for following reasons:
A.
Solution must be a Korean solution.
B.
As it now stands, suspension formula is not clear cut resolution of controversy, particularly since commitment to hold elections has not been voiced publicly or apparently even privately to opposition leaders.
C.
Formula thus far represents unilateral action by junta rather than agreement with opposition.
2.
Approve your discouragement of intransigent opposition by civilian leaders para 5 reftel,2 but suggest you avoid endorsing April 8 formula or strongly encouraging them to accept it unqualifiedly. We agree it desirable that civilian leaders use April 8 statement constructively. It would now appear to be sound tactic for them to press for elections and for verification of govt’s real intention regarding elections.
3.
Dept plans make no early comment on April 8 formula and may hold to that position even after reaction of civilian political leaders has been clarified.
Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 S KOR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Norred, cleared in draft with Yager and with Gregory of FE/P, and approved by Rice. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
  2. In telegram 789, April 8, the Embassy commented on a plan, announced by the SCNR on April 8, to hold “in abeyance” until September the national referendum scheduled for April. During September the government would examine the political situation with representatives of political parties and decide whether to hold the referendum or go ahead with the presidential and National Assembly elections. In the meantime, the announcement continued, the government would concentrate on improving its administrative functions and deal with food shortages. Political activities by political parties would be allowed, but the government expected the parties to reform themselves. (Telegram 787 from Seoul, April 8; ibid.) The Embassy noted that there were three positive aspects of this announcement: postponement of the April referendum on continuation of military rule, the commitment to discuss the future with the opposition, and lifting the ban on political activity. (Ibid.)↩
  3. In paragraph 5 of telegram 789, Berger stated that although he felt unable to tell the opposition that the ROK Government had given him any assurances, he did not want to encourage the political opposition’s intransigence. In his discussion with opposition leaders he would emphasize the positive. (Ibid.)↩