Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

295. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, March 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Korea

I attach several messages regarding the situation in Korea.¹ Seoul’s 645 describes the problem raised by Pak’s decision to have a rigged referendum on the question whether to return to civilian government. The Department replied authorizing Berger to tell Pak we did not approve of this scheme if Berger thought it necessary. After telling Averell of my talk with you yesterday afternoon,² State sent out an additional question to Berger asking if the military government might be extended for a short time.³

This morning we had word from Berger that he wanted to go slow.⁴ Everyone agrees we must rely on his judgment.

I think you will want to catch up with this in a meeting soon after you get back.⁵

Mike

Enclosure⁶

INTELLIGENCE NOTE

• Latest Indications from the Republic of Korea

Concerted Moves to Purge Opposition. There is evidence that some force, probably the organization which Kim Chong-p’il built around the CIA and the government political party, is moving to break the power of several possible opposition groups and prolong the period of military government. Many of the leaders of the Hamkyong Faction of the junta have been jailed. The Cabinet has resigned and it appears that the Minister of Defense—who last month joined with the ROK Chiefs of Staff in forcing Kim out of the country—will not be reappointed. Small groups of military demonstrators have demanded the extension of military rule; the demonstrations were probably inspired and were certainly tolerated by the regime. There are reports that the government is prepared to place charges of coup plotting against two or three other major factional groups within the armed forces and a number of politicians, including the heads of state during the interim government of 1960 and republic of 1960-61. Chairman Pak Chong-hui may again impose martial law.

Changes in the Power Spectrum. The government’s actions seem to have at least temporarily stunned potential opposition. The Hamkyong Faction has been rendered harmless by the arrest of its leaders. The military leaders are not exerting their strength and seem bewildered by the pace of recent developments. Civilian politicians appear to be even further removed from positions of influence. The status of the Kim Chong-p’il organization is unknown; investigations of the many scandals in which Kim was involved have led to some arrests but it is not clear whether this has yet affected the basis of his power.

Pak’s Intentions Estimated. It is clear that the actions already taken could not have been without Pak’s acquiescence or, perhaps, cooperation. It is also clear that these actions involve real danger of chaos both within the political world and the armed forces, and aim at postponing civilian government.

Two opposite views are conceivable: 1) that Pak never intended to bow out of politics and contrived the entire coup plot situation as a cover to renege on his previous promises or 2) that Pak would like to carry through on his pledge, but is being used by Kim Chong-p’il’s followers to promote their own cause. Another possibility is that Pak had believed that he could move toward a civilian government without sacrificing Kim—whom he has consistently protected—or greatly reducing his own power. Finding this impossible in the situation which followed Kim’s departure he may now be driven toward a desperate effort to regain control.

United States Interests. To turn back the clock at this point may be possible, briefly, but can hardly bring stability for any prolonged period. The Pak-Kim axis is too thinly based, and the knowledge of the military government’s failures is now too widely known. The group pushing for such a reversal will be aware that the United States will not view such changes with equanimity and they will try to prevent the exercise of American influence by inspiring criticism of alleged US influence in Korean affairs. There are reports that some student demonstrations along this line are being inspired. In addition, the regime may seize upon the internal crisis to seek additional US aid as necessary to stabilize the situation.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 9/62-3/63. Secret.
1. Regarding telegram 645 from Seoul, which was attached, see footnote 1, Document 294. Also attached was telegram 547 (Document 294) and telegram 653 from Seoul, March 17, in which Berger stated that Pak’s public announcement of a referendum on March 17 “was timed to force the U.S. to deal with a fait accompli.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 9/62-3/63) Berger then asked the Department for time for the Country Team to come up with an assessment. McGeorge Bundy also enclosed a memorandum from Hilsman, printed as an enclosure. All three cables and Hilsman’s memorandum were part of the President’s weekend reading of March 17. (Ibid.)
2. No other record of that discussion has been found. Since the President was then in Palm Beach, Florida, it apparently was a telephone conversation.
3. See footnote 3, Document 294.
4. See footnote 1 above.
5. President Kennedy was in San Jose, Costa Rica, March 18-20. Kennedy met with Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, Yager, McGeorge and William Bundy, and Luther Heinz at 6 p.m. on March 26. Presumably they discussed Korea at their “off the record” meeting. Kennedy then met Harriman, Heinz, Frank Sloan, and Forrestal on March 28, 12:07 to 12:35 p.m., for an “off the record” meeting at which Korea was the topic. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) For a briefing memorandum for the March 28 meeting, see Document 298.
6. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.