Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

247. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, November 14, 1961, 3:30-4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-Korean Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Korea
  • Gen. Chung Hee Park, Chairman, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction
  • Major Gen. Yang So Yoo, Foreign Affairs National Defense Committee, SCNR
  • Minister Duk Shin Choi, Foreign Minister
  • Minister Byung Kyu Chun, Finance Minister
  • Minister Byeng Kown Bak, Defense Minister
  • Minister Chung Pum Song, Deputy Chairman, Economic Planning Board
  • Ambassador Il Kwon Chung, Korean Ambassador to the United States
  • Lt. Col. Sang Kuh Han, Interpreter
• United States
  • The President
  • Secretary Rusk
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Ambassador Samuel D. Berger, United States Ambassador to Korea
  • Dr. Walt Rostow
  • Mr. Fowler Hamilton, Administrator, Agency for International Development
  • Mr. Walter P. McConaughy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
  • Mr. James S. Killen, Director, USOM Korea
  • Mr. H. L. T. Koren, Director, Northeast Asian Affairs
  • Dr. Paul S. Crane, Interpreter

The President read the joint communique and said it appeared satisfactory to him. If it were equally so to Chairman Park, he thought they could go ahead and issue it.¹ The Chairman indicated agreement, and the President directed that it be issued.

The President mentioned that he and the Chairman had discussed at lunch in considerable detail the matter of ROK-Japan relations. Also, with the Foreign Minister he had discussed the situation in Viet-Nam. The Foreign Minister had promised to give him a memorandum of what, in his judgment, might be useful to us to do in that difficult crisis. The President spoke of our great concern over how to prevent the collapse of Viet-Nam. The ultimate step was the use of U.S. troops. However, the real answer was for the Vietnamese to do for themselves and not rely heavily on help from abroad. The President said that Viet-Nam was a common problem, not just a U.S. one, and he wondered whether the Chairman might have some ideas on this score.

Chairman Park began by expressing his appreciation for the time the President was able to give him and also for U.S. support for Korea in these difficult days. As he had said to Secretary Rusk and Mr. Hamilton earlier, he realized the heavy burden the U.S. was bearing and he felt that each nation of the Free World must do its best to decrease this burden by its own efforts, thereby increasing the strength of the Free World. This was the reason why he laid such stress on the ROK-Japan settlement.

With regard to Southeast Asia, particularly Viet-Nam, the Chairman stated that, as a firm anti-Communist nation, Korea would do its best to contribute to the security of the Far East. North Viet-Nam had well-trained guerrilla forces. Korea had a million men well trained in this type of warfare. These men had been trained in the regular forces and were now separated. With U.S. approval and support, Korea could send to Viet-Nam its own troops or could recruit volunteers if regular troops were not desired. Such action would prove that there was unity of action among the nations of the Free World. Just before departure he had discussed this question with his senior ROK officers. All were enthusiastic. He suggested that the President ask his military advisers to study this offer and let him know the results.

The President expressed deep appreciation, noting that the U.S. was carrying the burden from Berlin all the way around the globe. He would talk with Secretary McNamara and the Chairman might have some more detailed discussions with him and General Lemnitzer tomorrow. The President speculated that it would probably be a good idea to talk also with the Filipinos. There was a limit, as the French found out, on what an occidental could do in a situation like this.

Turning to economic matters, the President spoke of his regret at having to institute the “Buy American” policy, which limited the effectiveness of our aid by closing cheaper supply sources to us. He then outlined in some detail for Chairman Park the Congressional alarm over the flight of gold and the alternative posed by the Congress, i.e., either it would drastically cut aid appropriations or the Administration must limit where the funds would be spent. The President had chosen the latter course, but he hoped in a couple of years the situation would be corrected, and, when this occurred, the first step would be a reversal of “Buy American.” Chairman Park appreciated this explanation and said that he was not asking revocation of the whole policy, only certain specific exceptions important to Korea. The President went into some further details on the U.S. payments difficulties and Secretary Rusk suggested that the Korean waiver request might be pursued at dinner that night.

Chairman Park said that he had brought some documents with him concerning the events before and after the May revolution and what had been accomplished. He had discussed this matter with Secretary Rusk and Mr. Hamilton. The President said both Ambassadors had presented to him very convincing stories of the accomplishments of the revolutionary group. He had been impressed and assured the Chairman the U.S. would give him the maximum support possible. He drew attention to the fact that we had had to spend a great deal more money in Southeast Asia (Laos and Viet-Nam) than originally planned. However, we knew the importance of aid to Korea; if Korea were not free, Japan would not be free and that would mean the whole Pacific area would go too, so Korea had a vital interest for us. In this connection, the President thought it would interest Chairman Park if Secretary McNamara gave him an assessment of U.S. military strength in light of the recent Soviet atmospheric testing.

Secretary McNamara described how the U.S. military budget had been increased by $6 billion over the previous administration’s planning figure primarily to increase nuclear military power, and non-nuclear strength such as ground and air support forces. Of our 1700 total nuclear-equipped bomber strength, 850 could be in the air in 15 minutes. The Polaris and Minuteman missile programs had been increased by 50 percent. 300,000 men had been added, mostly to the ground forces. A billion and a half dollars had gone into increased logistic capabilities. In sum, our over-all military strength was greater than that of the Communist Bloc and the President had instructed him to keep it that way. With regard to nuclear strength, the U.S. was substantially superior to the Soviets despite their recent test series. We were three to eight times better off quantitatively and far ahead quality-wise. The Soviets, for example, could only place 200 to 300 nuclear bombers over North America at present. As for ICBM, the Secretary noted that we now had 5 Polaris submarines carrying 80 nuclear missiles.

The President said we were faced with the challenge of maintaining our strategic position and being prepared to fight guerrilla wars—“wars of liberation,” as Khrushchev called them in stating the Soviets would back these types of wars. However, the President said, he was confident we could deliver, even after an initial Soviet attack, a more crippling blow to the Soviets than they had originally launched against us. Secretary Rusk repeated this, because he said he wanted it absolutely certain that Chairman Park and his party understood what the President had just said.

The President said our most difficult task right now was the other kind of struggle, such as that going on in Iran, Viet-Nam and Cuba. Secretary Rusk asked Chairman Park if there were Communist infiltration across the 38th parallel. The Chairman replied that there was none now across the parallel. They had tried by every means to infiltrate but they had been rooted out. The President invited the Chairman to give his estimate of the state of morale and political orientation of the North Koreans. The Chairman replied that their daily food consumption was low and civilian living standards very poor. They were, of course, superior in basic industries and mineral resources to South Korea. Likewise, their electric power output was now 1,100,000 k.w. whereas the ROK goal in their 5-year plan was only 1,030,000. The President asked about the possibility of atomic generation of electric power in Korea. The Chairman replied that construction costs were so high they had given it no thought, but (smiling) if U.S. support were forthcoming, they would certainly consider it. North and South Korean ground forces and navy were about even in potential, according to Chairman Park, but in air power the Communists were 4 times as strong. Secretary Rusk asked whether this was strictly North Korean air power or ChiCom and Soviet air power. The Chairman said it was strictly North Korean; however, the U.S. air forces in Korea and Japan equalized the situation.

North Korea was putting great emphasis on industrialization and South Korea was in danger of falling far behind. His most urgent task was to maintain his armed strength and at the same time to build up the economy. He compared the situation in Korea today to Germany, saying that in a divided country, unless each side maintained economic strength equal to the other, one side would fall far behind in many respects. The Chairman did not want South Korea caught this way and his primary objective in coming here was to seek the President’s positive support for the maintenance of the Korean armed forces at their present strength and also for the implementation of economic reforms and regeneration. The Chairman inquired whether the words of the communique meant that that support would be forthcoming. Secretary Rusk reassured the Chairman that we recognized the importance of maintaining armed strength throughout the Free World and at the same time generating economic, social progress. Our experts would work with his and the Secretary felt sure we could move forward with confidence together.

The President said he wanted no misunderstanding between himself and the Chairman. As he had already indicated, he considered the safety and security of Korea vital to the U.S. We would do the very best we could but the Chairman must realize that we had not been too successful in the aid appropriations this year and he wanted the Chairman to have a very clear idea of our problems and responsibilities and why we cannot do as much as we would like. The Chairman said that he wished to reiterate his conviction that it was most important that the developing nations of the Free World be able to stand on their own feet. He felt the emphasis should be on those nations that could accomplish the most in the shortest time. The President said that we shared that thought. Our Congress and people felt most strongly that aid should go where it would do the most good. Laos had been most distressing because we had put a lot of aid in there that seemed to have gone down the drain. One of our disappointments had been that the economically sound European nations had not assumed more of the aid burden. They were ready to make loans, but at 6 percent or higher. The President added that, as far as Berlin was concerned, he could give no assurances of successful negotiations, so that we might be faced with a serious problem of access to the city after the peace treaty had been signed. In fact, we might be hard pressed in Berlin and Viet-Nam at the same time.

The Chairman said he thought he had taken enough of the President’s time and wanted to say good-bye, but could he have before leaving a “refreshing answer” to his request for support? The President replied that we would far rather do what we said we would, rather than say something we could not fulfill. As a matter of fact, he had wished someone would give him something refreshing, and he had been refreshed by the Chairman’s offer of help in Viet-Nam. The President said that perhaps he had given the Chairman some encouragement by telling him we had enough atom bombs to blow us all up. Seriously, he did not want the Chairman to leave with a feeling of not having achieved what he had come here for, but he was sure the Chairman realized now the grave problems facing us. The President hoped that Ambassador Chung would be able to elaborate on these for the Chairman.²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, Park Visit, 11/61-12/61. Secret. Drafted by Koren and approved in S on December 5 and in the Department of Defense on December 6. The closing time of the meeting, which was held in the White House, is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.) Extensive briefing material for Pak’s visit is ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, Park Visit, 11/61-12/61, and ibid., Park Briefing Book, 11/14/61-11/15/61, Parts I-III.
1. The communique, which was negotiated in advance of Pak’s visit, is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 979-980.
2. President Kennedy met Pak Chung-hui for a farewell call at the White House on November 15 from 4 to 4:35 p.m. When Kennedy remarked that he hoped that his visit assured Pak of U.S. interest in Korea, Pak asked for special foreign aid assistance during the next year. Kennedy suggested that the situation should be reviewed in 6 months. Pak reiterated his offer of ROK troops for Vietnam or guerrilla wars elsewhere. Kennedy suggested that the time was not right for such a commitment, but he promised to keep in touch on the issue through Ambassador Berger. (Memorandum of conversation, November 15; Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, Park Visit, 11/61-12/61)