Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia

235. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State⁰

Seoul, July 9, 1961, 4 p.m.

45. Deptel 32.¹

1. This is interim evaluation in response your telegram.

2. Revolution now in its second stage with General Pak Chung-hui increasing his authority and control within Supreme Council and engaged in eliminating elements which he thinks threatening him.

A. His aim clearly is to unify Supreme Council into homogeneous group loyal to him and what he hopes to achieve.

B. At same time he is taking steps to break up possible anti-Pak combinations in armed forces which he thinks could threaten him from outside.

C. He is also continuing to move against civilian leaders and organizations which he believes could become centers of organized opposition. (For example after announcing three days ago four relief pension and loan measures for veterans and their survivors, Supreme Council dissolved National Veterans’ Organization.)

3. For better or for worse we must let this phase of revolution work itself out. Inexorable forces are at work and no useful purpose would be served at this juncture by our trying apply heavy pressure to alter play of these forces. First of all, Pak literally fighting for his life and we would almost certainly not be listened to. Secondly, assuming we successful in moderating or slowing down purges it would merely result in continuation of internal factionalism and postponement of eventual showdown inside Supreme Council, perpetuation and possibly accentuation of division in armed forces, and further delays in taking economic decisions, which now an immediate necessity if whole economy, already staggering under impact of revolution, is not to collapse. Thirdly, undue pressures on Pak at this critical juncture might lead him take more repressive measures that would separate this government further from its citizens and from U.S. and might invite countercoups and bloody civil strife with no acceptable politicians and few institutions to salvage ruins. What Pak ultimately aims for or will be able to accomplish, I do not know, but he is strongest figure in situation, has a clear sense of nature and use of power, and seems genuinely motivated by patriotic ideals. He nevertheless will bear watching.

4. Meanwhile, Pak is fully aware of importance restoring CINC-UNC and ROK forces command authority, has taken some constructive steps in this direction (see Embtel 35, paras 3 and 4)² and has given General Meloy and me assurances this whole problem must be and will be resolved soon. But he cannot in my opinion resolve command authority problem without regard to his own problems described in para 2 above. Pak has also taken some constructive measures to cope with corruption and social evils.

5. Supreme Council charges of Communist associations levelled against Chang Myon and some of his ministers and senior officials is a serious tactical mistake both from domestic and international point of view and is of questionable utility in terms of consolidating revolution. (Quite apart from fact that published evidence is unconvincing, these charges merely deepen prevailing atmosphere of apprehension and add to public concern here and abroad over how far Pak is going in direction of retaliation and repression.)

6. It is clear Pak’s purpose in bringing charges is to discredit Chang Myon government but why he chose this means when he could have charged them with corruption or tolerating corruption, ineffectiveness, incompetence, etc. is less clear. Probably he not only wants discredit them, but means to get them out of way. Additionally, I think Pak genuinely convinced that Communist propaganda and neutralism were making an impression in South Korea under Chang Myon govt. especially among students, labor unions and intellectuals, and he means use any evidence, however tenuous, to prove his case and to display his anti-communism.

7. Green and I feel that in formulating our public position and approach we must be ever mindful of our relations with Koreans as a whole and that Pak may be passing phenomenon. At same time we face fact there is no alternative at present to giving Pak our support and trying to encourage restraint and wisdom in his exercise of his growing power. In dealing with this dilemma our tactic at this end up to now has been to avoid public statements, and to try to moderate Pak through my personal talks with him, Foreign Minister and economic ministers; through Green’s contacts with one or two who are close to Pak; through [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]talks with Col. Kim, head of Intelligence, and apparently second strongest man in junta.

8. We feel that we must now give some public indication of our concern. Accordingly suggest following procedure:³

A. Secretary call in Korean Ambassador and state that we prepared and want to work with ROK Govt. on friendly and cooperative basis toward achievement of govt’s worthy goals and we recognize govt. has made some constructive reforms. At same time certain actions such as continued detention of certain ROK Army officers (FYI, officers who were loyal to Gen. Magruder’s orders on May 16. End FYI) and charges of Communist associations leveled against Chang Myon and some of his people well known to us are causing apprehension among U.S. public, Congress and in executive branch, including U.S. military. While we do not wish prejudge these matters, want to convey importance of speedy investigation and early public trials. Moreover, we would strongly urge ROK Govt. avoid retaliation, vindictiveness and repression which can only sow seeds of national bitterness and future disunity, and observe policy of clemency and magnanimity in order unite country and enlist popular support and confidence. We do not believe govt. can achieve its declared objectives and gain US understanding without this.

B. Secty should also refer to our concern over gap which still remains in CINCUNC’s Command authority.

C. That I be authorized in name of Secretary to make simultaneous official representations here.

D. That Dept. Spokesman make general public statement on Secty’s meeting with Amb Chang along lines A above for replay here. Since Pak has given me his assurances there would be public trials, Spokesman can also refer to this assurance in his statement.

Berger

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/7-961. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and Tokyo.
1. In telegram 32 to Seoul, July 6, the Department stated that recent events in Korea—the ouster and detention of General Chang To-yong, his replacement by Pak Chung-hui, and sweeping government accusations against the former Chang Myon government of Communist connections—were causing concern in Washington. The tentative Department assessment was that Chang’s ouster was inevitable and the accusations against Chang Myon and associates were an attempt to weaken the opposition to the junta. The Department worried about the loss of Chang To-yong’s moderating influence on the SCNR and asked for the Embassy’s assessment. (Ibid., 795B.00/7-761)
2. Paragraph 3 of telegram 35 from Seoul, July 7, reported that General Pak told Berger, General Meloy, and General McNamara that with the ouster of 30 General Army officers the purge of the ROK Armed Forces was over, that military officers assigned to civilian duties would be replaced by civilians, that the ROK military chain of command was in effect, and that soldiers charged with police functions had been ordered to stop browbeating the public. In paragraph 4 Meloy welcomed these assurances, which he believed would help reestablish command authority. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 129 to Seoul, July 13, the Department stated that Rusk made such a statement to ROK good will Ambassador Yang Soo Yoo and Ambassador Il Kwon Chung. (Ibid., 795B.00/7-961) See Document 234.