233. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)0
SUBJECT
- Korea Task Force Meeting on Thursday, June 22, 1961
Mr. McConaughy called a meeting of the Korea Task Force on June 22, 1961 to discuss a message from Seoul (No. 1840 of June 17)1 and a [Page 491] related army message2 which raised the question of whether there was significant Communist influence in the new military regime in Korea. Mr. McConaughy indicated that the Secretary was very disturbed by the embassy message.
The message reported a conversation between Charge Green and Lieutenant General Choi Kyong Nok in which the latter stated that Communists were behind the coup. General Choi based his belief on his personal knowledge of officers within the coup group, on information he had received from friends within the group, and on his examination of the past records of individuals within the coup group which indicated connections with the North Korean regime during the period 1945-49. He stated that he did not know whether General Pak was a Communist. He did identify four other generals by name as Communists and claimed that an additional three or four unnamed colonels were Communists.
Mr. McConaughy said that he had high regard for General Choi, but noted that General Choi had never got along well with General Pak who was at one time his deputy. Moreover, General Choi was related to the Foreign Minister of Chang Myon’s government. It was, therefore, necessary to take his allegations with a grain of salt.
Mr. FitzGerald of CIA indicated that CIA had examined biographical information on the members of the group, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and had consulted with one of its best sources [3 lines of source text not declassified]. He said that all of CIA’s evidence indicated that the officers in SCNR are highly motivated individuals who were disgusted with the Chang Myon government and who had engaged from time to time in plotting. CIA does not think that they are Communists although there may be some Communist agents in the substructure of the coup group. A greater danger, in CIA’s opinion, is the possibility that the coup group may, through naivete, be led to believe that unification with the North is both feasible and desirable. In conclusion, Mr. FitzGerald stated that the main stream of the coup group is not Communist.
Mr. Hilsman noted that these cables had been discussed at the USIB meeting the previous day and that USIB had also concluded that the coup group was not Communist.3 It was possible that the idea of adopting a Nasser-type approach might cross the minds of members of the coup group though we consider it unlikely that the regime will move in that direction. There is also some danger of penetration of the coup group by the Communists for intelligence purposes.
Admiral Heinz, while not commenting on the allegations of Communism, expressed concern over the growing power of Lieutenant Colonel Kim Chong-pil (head of ROK intelligence and one of those accused [Page 492] by Choi) who, he feared, might be setting the stage for ruthless one-man rule. If this kind of rule were established, it might make it easier for the Communists to take over in the future.
Mr. McConaughy agreed that the repressive acts of the new regime could produce a future explosion. He thought that General Choi may have been influenced in his view by the fact that the methods being used by the new regime were, in certain respects, similar to those used by the Communists. He mentioned specifically the parading of hoodlums through the streets. It was subsequently pointed out that this had been a common practice in China long before the Communists took over there.
Mr. Sheppard said that the only evidence that ICA had that was conceivably relevant was the fact that, in conferences with economic officials of the new regime, there was an increasing emphasis on the “socialist character” of the new regime. When pressed for details, these officials become quite vague. Mr. FitzGerald suggested that it was important for all agencies that had contacts with the military to look for evidences of attitudes that might have a bearing on the question of Communist influence.
Roger Hilsman pointed out that a number of those who were accused by General Choi had tangled with him at one time or another.
Mr. McConaughy asked what Mr. Sheppard made of the fact that we had had almost no contact with the people on the economic side of the new regime. Mr. Sheppard attributed this to three causes: (a) organizational confusion; (b) the fact that the ministries were headed by military officers and that officials below the top level had inhibitions about talking; and (c) of the fact that there were various apparently influential economic committees under the SCNR with which we had so far been unable to establish effective contact.
In conclusion it was agreed that the coup in Korea had not been the “cleverest Communist coup” ever pulled off. It was also agreed that there was some possible danger, as a result of a power struggle within the SCNR, that a group that was losing out might attempt a unification maneuver in cooperation with the North as a means of salvaging its position. Mr. FitzGerald suggested that the country team be asked to prepare a contingency plan against such possibility. I suggested that contingency planning be broadened to cover various other sorts of situations that might develop out of a power struggle within the SCNR. Mr. McConaughy agreed that, as a first step in developing such a contingency plan, it would be desirable to ask for the views of the country team.
At the end of the meeting Mr. McConaughy raised the question of progress reports to the NSC. As a result of the discussion that I had with the State people at the meeting and subsequently with Brom Smith, it was agreed that progress reports would be prepared, in accordance with [Page 493] existing State procedure, for the Operations Center and that a copy of these reports would be sent to Mr. Bundy.